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923Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal ConceptsNoûs 38 (3): 503-524. 2004.It is widely accepted that physicalism faces its most serious challenge when it comes to making room for the phenomenal character of psychological experience, its so-called what-it-is-like aspect. The challenge has surfaced repeatedly over the past two decades in a variety of forms. In a particularly striking one, Frank Jackson considers a situation in which Mary, a brilliant scientist who knows all the physical facts there are to know about psychological experience, has spent the whole of her l…Read more
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165The identity theory of truth and the realm of reference: Where Dodd goes wrongAnalysis 69 (2): 297-304. 2009.In ‘On McDowell's identity conception of truth’ , we suggested that McDowell's Identity Theory, according to which a proposition is true if and only if it is identical with a fact, is only fully understood when we realize that there are two identity claims involved. The first is that, when one thinks truly, the content of a whole thought is identical with a Tractarian Tatsachen – a complex fact constituted by simple Sachverhalte – and the second is that these simple Sachverhalte are in turn iden…Read more
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90McDowell’s Alternative Conceptions of the WorldInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (1): 87-94. 2011.This Article does not have an abstract
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Vermazen, B. and Hintikka, M , "Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events" (review)Mind 94 (n/a): 632. 1985.
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11Berkeley, by George PitcherJournal of the British Society for Phenomenology 12 (1): 91-93. 1981.
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Tacit KnowledgeIn Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. 1995.
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146Shoemaker on self-knowledge and inner sensePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3): 711-38. 1999.What is introspective knowledge of one's own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the cogito-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. These present the most formidable challenge to the view that certain cases of self-knowledge are quasi-observational and so deserve det…Read more
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1Causal relevance and explanatory exclusionIn Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. 1995.
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4Psychological Type‐Type Reduction Via DisjunctionSouthern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1): 65-69. 1992.
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194Mind-Body Identity TheoriesRoutledge. 1989.Chapter One The most plausible arguments for the identity of mind and body that have been advanced in this century have been for the identity of mental ...
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Reductionism: Historiography and PsychologyIn Aviezer Tucker (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography, Blackwell. 2008.This chapter contains sections titled: 1 2 3 4 5 Bibliography.
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30What is empiricism?--, Nativism, naturalism, and evolutionary theoryAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64 (1): 81-92. 1990.
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36IntrospectionIn A. Beckermann, B. McLaughlin & S. Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 741-766. 2009.‘Introspection’ is a term used by philosophers to refer to a special method or means by which one comes to know certain of one's own mental states; specifically, one's current conscious states. It derives from the Latin ‘spicere’, meaning ‘look’, and ‘intra’, meaning ‘within’; introspection is a process of looking inward. Introspectionist accounts of self-knowledge fall within the broader domain of theories of self-knowledge, understood as views about the nature of and basis for one's knowledge …Read more
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6Externalism and Authoritative Self-KnowledgeIn Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford University Press. pp. 123-155. 1998.Externalism in the philosophy of mind has been thought by many to pose a serious threat to the claim that subjects are in general authoritative with regard to certain of their own intentional states.<sup>1</sup> In a series of papers, Tyler Burge (1985_a_, 1985_b_, 1988, 1996) has argued that the distinctive entitlement or right that subjects have to self- knowledge in certain cases is compatible with externalism, since that entitlement is environmentally neutral, neutral with respect to the iss…Read more
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648Self-knowledge and the "inner eye"Philosophical Explorations 1 (2): 83-106. 1998.What is knowledge of one's own current, consciously entertained intentional states a form of inner awareness? If so, what form? In this paper I explore the prospects for a quasi-observational account of a certain class of cases where subjects appear to have self-knowledge, namely, the so-called cogito-like cases. In section one I provide a rationale for the claim that we need an epistemology of self-knowledge, and specifically, an epistemology of the cogito-like cases. In section two I argue tha…Read more
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Connectionism and EliminativismIn Cynthia Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. 1995.
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Philosophy of Psychology. Debates on Psychological ExplanationRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 187 (1): 110-111. 1997.
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6Explanation in HistoriographyIn Aviezer Tucker (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography, Blackwell. 2008.This chapter contains sections titled: 1 2 3 Acknowledgment Bibliography.
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Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary MetaphysicsPhilosophical Quarterly 56 (224): 459-463. 2006.
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23Externalism and NormsRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 273-301. 1998.We think that certain of our mental states represent the world around us, and represent it in determinate ways. My perception that there is salt in the pot before me, for example, represents my immediate environment as containing a certain object, a pot, with a certain kind of substance, salt, in it. My belief that salt dissolves in water represents something in the world around me, namely salt, as having a certain observational property, that of dissolving. But what exactly is the relation betw…Read more
Manchester, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |