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286Real metaphysics and the descriptive/revisionary distinctionIn Cornelis De Waal (ed.), Susan Haack: A Lady of Distinctions: The Philosopher Responds to Critics, Prometheus Books. 2007.
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404What is Colour? A Defence of Colour PrimitivismIn Robert Johnson & Michael Smith (eds.), Passions and Projections: Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn, Oxford University Press. pp. 116-133. 2015.
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30Perception and reasonAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1). 2002.Book Information Perception and Reason. By Bill Brewer. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. xviii + 281.
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137Externalism and First-Person AuthoritySynthese 104 (1): 99-122. 1995.Externalism in the philosophy of mind is threatened by the view that subjects are authoritative with regard to the contents of their own intentional states. If externalism is to be reconciled with first-person authority, two issues need to be addressed: (a) how the non-evidence-based character of knowledge of one's own intentional states is compatible with ignorance of the empirical factors that individuate the contents of those states, and (b) how, given externalism, the non-evidence-based char…Read more
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63Theories of mind and 'the commonsense view'Mind and Language 17 (5): 467-488. 2002.It is widely believed that people are sometimes directly aware of their own psychological states and consequently better placed than others to know what the contents of those states are. This (‘commonsense’) view has been challenged by Alison Gopnik. She claims that experimental evidence from the behaviour of 3– and 4–year–old children both supports the theory theory and shows that the belief in direct and privileged knowledge of one’s own intentional states is an illusion. I argue (1) that the …Read more
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Supervenient causationIn Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. pp. 4-28. 1995.
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40Psychological type-type reduction via disjunctionSouthern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1): 65-69. 1992.
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791‘‘In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-KnowledgeSynthese 191 (15). 2014.It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-know…Read more
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378How to be Psychologically RelevantIn Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. 1995.How did I raise my arm? The simple answer is that I raised it as a consequence of intending to raise it. A slightly more complicated response would mention the absence of any factors which would inhibit the execution of the intention- and a more complicated one still would specify the intention in terms of a goal (say, drinking a beer) which requires arm-raising as a means towards that end. Whatever the complications, the simple answer appears to be on the right track
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2Classicism vs. connectionismIn Cynthia Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. 1995.
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287Beyond program explanationIn Geoffrey Brennan (ed.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit, Oxford University Press. pp. 1--27. 2007.
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491Self-Knowledge and Inner SpaceIn Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), McDowell and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 73--88. 2006.This chapter contains section titled: Externalism and Authoritative Self‐Knowledge The “Fully Cartesian” Conception Externalism and Authoritative Self‐Knowledge A Suggestion.
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27Externalism and normsIn Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Cambridge University Press. pp. 273-301. 1998.We think that certain of our mental states represent the world around us, and represent it in determinate ways. My perception that there is salt in the pot before me, for example, represents my immediate environment as containing a certain object, a pot, with a certain kind of substance, salt, in it. My belief that salt dissolves in water represents something in the world around me, namely salt, as having a certain observational property, that of dissolving. But what exactly is the relation betw…Read more
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49Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary MetaphysicsWiley-Blackwell. 2005._Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics_ is about some of the most fundamental kinds of things that there are; the things that we encounter in everyday experience. A book about the things that we encounter in everyday experience. Contains a thorough and accessible discussion of the nature and aims of metaphysics. Examines a wide range of ontological categories, including both particulars and universals. Mounts a forceful and persuasive case for anti-reductionism
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1Causal relevance and explanatory exclusionIn Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. 1995.
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146Shoemaker on self-knowledge and inner sensePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3): 711-38. 1999.What is introspective knowledge of one's own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the cogito-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. These present the most formidable challenge to the view that certain cases of self-knowledge are quasi-observational and so deserve det…Read more
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4Psychological Type‐Type Reduction Via DisjunctionSouthern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1): 65-69. 1992.
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Reductionism: Historiography and PsychologyIn Aviezer Tucker (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography, Blackwell. 2008.This chapter contains sections titled: 1 2 3 4 5 Bibliography.
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194Mind-Body Identity TheoriesRoutledge. 1989.Chapter One The most plausible arguments for the identity of mind and body that have been advanced in this century have been for the identity of mental ...
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36IntrospectionIn A. Beckermann, B. McLaughlin & S. Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 741-766. 2009.‘Introspection’ is a term used by philosophers to refer to a special method or means by which one comes to know certain of one's own mental states; specifically, one's current conscious states. It derives from the Latin ‘spicere’, meaning ‘look’, and ‘intra’, meaning ‘within’; introspection is a process of looking inward. Introspectionist accounts of self-knowledge fall within the broader domain of theories of self-knowledge, understood as views about the nature of and basis for one's knowledge …Read more
Manchester, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |