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91Emergence in mind (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2010.The volume also extends the debate about emergence by considering the independence of chemical properties from physical properties, and investigating what would ...
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Weak externalism and psychological reductionIn David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism, Oxford University Press. 1992.
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478Consciousness, self-consciousness, and authoritative self-knowledgeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3): 319-346. 2008.Many recent discussions of self-consciousness and self-knowledge assume that there are only two kinds of accounts available to be taken on the relation between the so-called first-order (conscious) states and subjects' awareness or knowledge of them: a same-order, or reflexive view, on the one hand, or a higher-order one, on the other. I maintain that there is a third kind of view that is distinctively different from these two options. The view is important because it can accommodate and make in…Read more
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533Tropes and Other ThingsIn Stephen Laurence & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, Wiley-blackwell. 1998.Our day-to-day experience of the world regularly brings us into contact with middlesized objects such as apples, dogs, and other human beings. These objects possess observable properties, properties that are available or accessible to the unaided senses, such as redness and roundness, as well as properties that are not so available, such as chemical ones. Both of these kinds of properties serve as valuable sources of information about our familiar middle-sized objects at least to the extent that…Read more
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287Real metaphysics and the descriptive/revisionary distinctionIn Cornelis De Waal (ed.), Susan Haack: A Lady of Distinctions: The Philosopher Responds to Critics, Prometheus Books. 2007.
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407What is Colour? A Defence of Colour PrimitivismIn Robert Johnson & Michael Smith (eds.), Passions and Projections: Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn, Oxford University Press. pp. 116-133. 2015.
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30Perception and reasonAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1). 2002.Book Information Perception and Reason. By Bill Brewer. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. xviii + 281.
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137Externalism and First-Person AuthoritySynthese 104 (1): 99-122. 1995.Externalism in the philosophy of mind is threatened by the view that subjects are authoritative with regard to the contents of their own intentional states. If externalism is to be reconciled with first-person authority, two issues need to be addressed: (a) how the non-evidence-based character of knowledge of one's own intentional states is compatible with ignorance of the empirical factors that individuate the contents of those states, and (b) how, given externalism, the non-evidence-based char…Read more
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63Theories of mind and 'the commonsense view'Mind and Language 17 (5): 467-488. 2002.It is widely believed that people are sometimes directly aware of their own psychological states and consequently better placed than others to know what the contents of those states are. This (‘commonsense’) view has been challenged by Alison Gopnik. She claims that experimental evidence from the behaviour of 3– and 4–year–old children both supports the theory theory and shows that the belief in direct and privileged knowledge of one’s own intentional states is an illusion. I argue (1) that the …Read more
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Supervenient causationIn Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. pp. 4-28. 1995.
Manchester, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |