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63Theories of mind and 'the commonsense view'Mind and Language 17 (5): 467-488. 2002.It is widely believed that people are sometimes directly aware of their own psychological states and consequently better placed than others to know what the contents of those states are. This (‘commonsense’) view has been challenged by Alison Gopnik. She claims that experimental evidence from the behaviour of 3– and 4–year–old children both supports the theory theory and shows that the belief in direct and privileged knowledge of one’s own intentional states is an illusion. I argue (1) that the …Read more
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49Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary MetaphysicsWiley-Blackwell. 2005._Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics_ is about some of the most fundamental kinds of things that there are; the things that we encounter in everyday experience. A book about the things that we encounter in everyday experience. Contains a thorough and accessible discussion of the nature and aims of metaphysics. Examines a wide range of ontological categories, including both particulars and universals. Mounts a forceful and persuasive case for anti-reductionism
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41Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 1998.This volume is a comprehensive survey of contemporary thought on a wide range of issues and provides students with the basic background to current debates in metaphysics
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40Psychological type-type reduction via disjunctionSouthern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1): 65-69. 1992.
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37Emergence and Non-reductive PhysicalismIn Sophie Gibb, Robin Findlay Hendry & Tom Lancaster (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Emergence, Routledge. pp. 195-205. 2018.
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37Psychophysical Supervenience, Dependency, and ReductionIn Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 140--57. 1995.
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36IntrospectionIn A. Beckermann, B. McLaughlin & S. Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 741-766. 2009.‘Introspection’ is a term used by philosophers to refer to a special method or means by which one comes to know certain of one's own mental states; specifically, one's current conscious states. It derives from the Latin ‘spicere’, meaning ‘look’, and ‘intra’, meaning ‘within’; introspection is a process of looking inward. Introspectionist accounts of self-knowledge fall within the broader domain of theories of self-knowledge, understood as views about the nature of and basis for one's knowledge …Read more
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30What is empiricism?--, Nativism, naturalism, and evolutionary theoryAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64 (1): 81-92. 1990.
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30Perception and reasonAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1). 2002.Book Information Perception and Reason. By Bill Brewer. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. xviii + 281.
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29Reply to Cynthia MacdonaldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3): 739-745. 1999.What is introspective know ledge of one’s own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the cogito-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. These present the most formidable challenge to the view that certain cases of self-knowledge are quasi-observational and so deserve de…Read more
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27Externalism and normsIn Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Cambridge University Press. pp. 273-301. 1998.We think that certain of our mental states represent the world around us, and represent it in determinate ways. My perception that there is salt in the pot before me, for example, represents my immediate environment as containing a certain object, a pot, with a certain kind of substance, salt, in it. My belief that salt dissolves in water represents something in the world around me, namely salt, as having a certain observational property, that of dissolving. But what exactly is the relation betw…Read more
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27On the Unifier—Multiplier ControversyCanadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (4). 1978.Many recent discussions of the identity and individuation of actions focus on attempts to find satisfactory answers to questions like, “When, if ever, is a shooting a killing?” Those who attempt to answer such questions divide themselves, on the whole, into two opposing groups. I. Thalberg has conveniently labelled the members of one group ‘unifiers’, and the members of the other group ‘multipliers’.The unifier account is commonly attributed to philosophers such as G. E. M. Anscombe and Donald D…Read more
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23Externalism and NormsRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 273-301. 1998.We think that certain of our mental states represent the world around us, and represent it in determinate ways. My perception that there is salt in the pot before me, for example, represents my immediate environment as containing a certain object, a pot, with a certain kind of substance, salt, in it. My belief that salt dissolves in water represents something in the world around me, namely salt, as having a certain observational property, that of dissolving. But what exactly is the relation betw…Read more
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18Critical noticesInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (2). 1997.An Essay On Rights By Hillel Steiner Basil Blackwell, 1994. Pp. x + 305. ISBN 0-631-19027-9. Price 14.95 Connectionism and eliminativism: reply to Stephen Mills in Vol. 5, No. 1.
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16McDowell’s Alternative Conceptions of the WorldInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (1): 87-94. 2011.
Manchester, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |