University of Oxford
Faculty of Philosophy
DPhil, 1989
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory
  •  533
    Practical unreason
    Mind 102 (405): 53-79. 1993.
    Some contemporary theories treat phenomena like weakness of will, compulsion and wantonness as practical failures but not as failures of rationality: say, as failures of autonomy or whatever. Other current theories-the majority see the phenomena as failures of rationality but not as distinctively practical failures. They depict them as always involving a theoretical deficiency: a sort of ignorance, error, inattention or illogic. They represent them as failures which are on a par with breakdowns …Read more
  •  404
    Frog and Toad lose control
    Analysis 56 (2): 63-73. 1996.
    It seems to be a truism that whenever we do something - and so, given the omnipresence of trying (Hornsby 1980), whenever we try to do something - we want to do that thing more than we want to do anything else we can do (Davidson 1970). However, according to Frog, when we have will power we are able to try not to do something that we ‘really want to do’. In context the idea is clearly meant to be that what we really want to do and what we most want to do are one and the same. But how is this mea…Read more
  •  197
    Review: Search for the Source (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196). 1999.
    The Sources of Normativity is an ambitious and demanding book. It is impossible to do full justice to The Sources of Normativity in a review essay such as this. I shall therefore concentrate on Korsgaard’s partisan goal: her defence of a Kantian view about the sources of normativity. It was evidently this part that most excited the commentators when they first heard Korsgaard deliver her Tanner Lectures. I suspect it is the part of the book that will most excite the general reader as well. Certa…Read more