Ralph Wedgwood

Many philosophers think that internalism supports a noncognitivist account of normative judgments, according to which these judgments do not count as genuine beliefs, but rather as non-cognitive states of some kind. Such noncognitivist accounts of normative judgments naturally accompany an expressivist account of the meaning of normative statements. This chapter considers the prospects of such an expressivist theory, taking as its paradigm the most recent theory of Allan Gibbard. It is argued that this theory is vulnerable to a strengthened form of the objection that P. T. Geach derived from the work of Frege. This makes it plausible that expressivist accounts face insuperable problems, and so that both expressivism and non-cognitivism should be rejected.

This essay defends a version of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) – the doctrine that there is normally a stronger reason against an act that has a bad state of affairs as one of its intended effects than against an otherwise similar act that has that bad state of affairs as an unintended effect. First, a precise account of this version of the DDE is given. Secondly, some suggestions are made about why we should believe the DDE, and about why it is true. Finally, a solution is developed to the so-called ‘closeness problem’ that any version of the DDE must face.

The contemporary debate on the metaphysical side of metaethics is dominated by two paradigms—reductive naturalism and primitivist non- naturalism. It is argued here that these are both extreme views. In principle, it should be possible for there to be a host of intermediate views between these two extremes. In fact, most of the views that were taken on these metaphysical questions by philosophers of ancient and medieval times differed from both reductive naturalism and primitivist non-naturalism. However, the metaphysical views of these past philosophers cannot easily be endorsed today. This is because our conception of the natural world has changed from that of these premodern thinkers, because of the development of modern natural science. Nonetheless, it is still possible to make sense of intermediate positions, lying between the two extremes of reductive naturalism and primitivist non- naturalism. These intermediate positions are prima facie promising, and deserve careful consideration from contemporary metaethicists.

This essay examines the epistemology of evaluative, and especially moral, thinking, and attempts an analysis of value-concepts. It proposes an account according to which sentiment plays a central role in all rational evaluative thinking. But this account diverges sharply from traditional emotivism: it insists that rational evaluative thinking must be principled; it defends the pursuit of systematic moral theory through seeking reflective equilibrium; and, though committed to holding that value-judgments can be straightforwardly true, it is compatible with many metaphysical positions about the nature of evaluative truth, ranging from subjectivism to non-reductive realism about values. ;First, a general conception of epistemology and conceptual analysis is articulated. A philosophical study of a concept should offer a non-circular account of what it is to grasp the concept; and grasp of a concept involves mastery of the basic rules for forming rational beliefs involving the concept. ;Value-concepts, it is proposed, are essentially practical. This implies internalism: value-judgments are essentially connected to an actual or imagined motivation to act accordingly. To avoid circularity, such an internalist account must assign an evidential role in evaluative thinking to emotions or sentiments. ;As guides to evaluative truth, sentiments are highly fallible. But one can counteract this fallibility only by constructing a set of general principles, through seeking reflective equilibrium on the basis of one's sentiments, and thereby simultaneously refining both one's sentiments and one's value-judgments. ;According to this account, rational evaluative thinking is principled reliance on sentiment A discussion of the emotions shows that this account of value-concepts is not circular; and it is indicated how the metaphysical questions, about what it is for value-judgments to be true, could be resolved. ;Moral judgments differ from other value-judgments in demanding, not just theoretical agreement about what is true, but practical agreement about what is to be done; and moral sentiments stem from a capacity to respond emotionally to facts about people's interests regardless of how exactly one is related to those interests oneself. Finally, various sceptical challenges to our moral capacities are considered