•  92
    A probabilistic epistemology of perceptual belief
    Philosophical Issues 28 (1): 1-25. 2018.
    There are three well-known models of how to account for perceptual belief within a probabilistic framework: (a) a Cartesian model; (b) a model advocated by Timothy Williamson; and (c) a model advocated by Richard Jeffrey. Each of these models faces a problem—in effect, the problem of accounting for the defeasibility of perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge. It is argued here that the best way of responding to this the best way of responding to this problem effectively vindicates the …Read more
  •  58
    Fifteen Sermons and Other Writings on Ethics by Joseph Butler (review)
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 56 (3): 563-564. 2018.
    As a young Anglican clergyman, Joseph Butler published the first edition of his Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel in 1721; a revised edition appeared in 1729. Almost immediately, it was widely understood that these sermons present a strikingly subtle and careful form of a relatively traditional conception of ethics, in contrast to the more radical views of other philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes. Only a few years later, David Hume was much concerned to assimilate Butler's insights, w…Read more
  • Principle and Sentiment: An Essay in Moral Epistemology
    Dissertation, Cornell University. 1994.
    This essay examines the epistemology of evaluative, and especially moral, thinking, and attempts an analysis of value-concepts. It proposes an account according to which sentiment plays a central role in all rational evaluative thinking. But this account diverges sharply from traditional emotivism: it insists that rational evaluative thinking must be principled; it defends the pursuit of systematic moral theory through seeking reflective equilibrium; and, though committed to holding that value-j…Read more
  •  2
    1 The Sceptical Paradox
    In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 226. 2013.
  •  91
    The Value of Rationality
    Oxford University Press. 2017.
    Ralph Wedgwood gives a general account of what it is for states of mind and processes of thought to count as rational. Whether you are thinking rationally depends purely on what is going on in your mind, but rational thinking is a means to the goal of getting things right in your thinking, by believing the truth or making good choices.
  •  563
    The internalist virtue theory of knowledge
    Synthese 197 (12). 2020.
    Here is a definition of knowledge: for you to know a proposition p is for you to have an outright belief in p that is correct precisely because it manifests the virtue of rationality. This definition resembles Ernest Sosa’s “virtue theory”, except that on this definition, the only virtue that must be manifested in all instances of knowledge is rationality, and no reductive account of rationality is attempted—rationality is assumed to be an irreducibly normative notion. This definition is compati…Read more
  • Butler on Virtue, Self-Interest, and Human Nature
    In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    In his Sermons, Joseph Butler argued for a series of extraordinarily subtle and perceptive claims about the relations between virtue and self-interest. Unfortunately, there has been a great deal of controversy among Butler's interpreters about what exactly these claims amount to, and about what role these claims play in the overall project of his Sermons. Commentators generally agree that the first method is the rationalist method, which Butler almost certainly associated with the work of Samuel…Read more
  •  11
    1. The 'aim'of belief
    In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief, Oxford University Press. pp. 123. 2013.
  •  219
    Review of Being Realistic about Reasons, by T. M. Scanlon (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262): 213-217. 2016.
    This is a review of T. M. Scanlon's book "Being Realistic about Reasons", which is based on the Locke Lectures that Scanlon gave in Oxford in 2009.
  •  50
    Review of Jacobs and Potter, hate crimes: Criminal law and identity politics (review)
    Journal of Homosexuality 45 (1): 152-159. 2003.
    This is a review of Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and Identity Politics, by James B. Jacobs and Kimberly Potter; it is argued that the arguments of that book completely fail to establish the book's principal conclusions.
  •  91
    The Price of Non‐Reductive Physicalism
    Noûs 34 (3): 400-421. 2000.
    Nonreductive physicalism faces a serious objection: physicalism entails the existence of an enormous number of modal facts--specifically, facts about exactly which physical properties necessitate each mental property; and, it seems, if mental properties are irreducible, these modal facts cannot all be satisfactorily explained. The only answer to this objection is to claim that the explanations of these modal facts are themselves contingent. This claim requires rejecting "S5" as the appropriate l…Read more
  •  158
    Practical reason and desire
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3). 2002.
    Many philosophres have attempted to argue from the "Humean Theory of Motivation" (HTM) and the "Internalism Requirement" (IR) to the "Humean Theory of Practical Reason" (HTPR). This argument is familiar, but it has rarely been stated with sufficient precision. In this paper, I shall give a precise statement of this argument. I shall then rely on this statement to show two things. First, the HTPR is false: it is incompatible with some extremely plausible assumptions about weakness of will or akra…Read more
  •  159
    Review of David Enoch, "Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism" (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251): 389-393. 2013.
    This is a review of David Enoch's book "Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism".
  •  86
    Christopher Peacocke's The Realm of Reason (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3): 776-791. 2007.
    In this book, Christopher Peacocke proposes a general theory about what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. This theory is distinctively rationalist: that is, it gives a large role to the a priori, while insisting that the propositions or contents that can be known a priori are not in any way “true in virtue of meaning” (and without in any other way denigrating these propositions as “trivial”, or as propositions that “tell us nothing about the world”, or the like). Peacock…Read more
  •  55
    The fundamental principle of practical reasoning
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2). 1998.
    The fundamental principle of practical reasoning (if there is such a thing) must be a rule which we ought to follow in all our practical reasoning, and which cannot lead to irrational decisions. It must be a rule that it is possible for us to follow directly - that is, without having to follow any other rule of practical reasoning in order to do so. And it must be a basic principle, in the sense that the explanation of why we rationally ought to follow this rule lies purely in the structure of o…Read more
  •  508
    Conceptual role semantics for moral terms
    Philosophical Review 110 (1): 1-30. 2001.
    This paper outlines a new approach to the task of giving an account of the meaning of moral statements: a sort of "conceptual role semantics", according to which the meaning of moral terms is given by their role in practical reasoning. This role is sufficient both to distinguish the meaning of any moral term from that of other terms, and to determine the property or relation (if any) that the term stands for. The paper ends by suggesting reasons for regarding this "conceptual role semantics" app…Read more
  •  810
    The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’
    Philosophical Issues 25 (1): 123-143. 2015.
    Many philosophers working on the branches of philosophy that deal with the normative questions have adopted a " Reasons First" program. This paper criticizes the foundational assumptions of this program. In fact, there are many different concepts that can be expressed by the term 'reason' in English, none of which are any more fundamental than any others. Indeed, most of these concepts are not particularly fundamental in any interesting sense
  •  220
    Schroeder on expressivism: For – or against? (review)
    Analysis 70 (1): 117-129. 2010.
    This is a critical discussion of Mark Schroeder's book, "Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism" (Oxford University Press, 2008).
  •  113
    Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly
    In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality, Oxford University Press. pp. 201--229. 2003.
    Let us take an example that Bernard Williams (1981: 102) made famous. Suppose that you want a gin and tonic, and you believe that the stuff in front of you is gin. In fact, however, the stuff is not gin but petrol. So if you drink the stuff (even mixed with tonic), it will be decidedly unpleasant, to say the least. Should you choose to drink the stuff or not?
  •  624
    Akrasia and Uncertainty
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4). 2013.
    According to John Broome, akrasia consists in a failure to intend to do something that one believes one ought to do, and such akrasia is necessarily irrational. In fact, however, failing to intend something that one believes one ought to do is only guaranteed to be irrational if one is certain of a maximally detailed proposition about what one ought to do; if one is uncertain about any part of the full story about what one ought to do, it could be perfectly rational not to intend to do something…Read more
  •  187
    Rationality as a Virtue
    Analytic Philosophy 55 (4): 319-338. 2014.
    A concept that can be expressed by the term ‘rationality’ plays a central role in both epistemology and ethics -- and especially in formal epistemology and decision theory. It is argued here that when the term is used in this way, the concept of “rationality” is the concept of a kind of virtue, with all the central features that are ascribed to the virtues by Plato and Aristotle, among others. Interpreting rationality as a kind of virtue helps to solve several problems, such as the relations bet…Read more
  •  669
    The Nature of Normativity
    Oxford University Press. 2007.
    This is a book about normativity -- where the central normative terms are words like 'ought' and 'should' and their equivalents in other languages. It has three parts: The first part is about the semantics of normative discourse: what it means to talk about what ought to be the case. The second part is about the metaphysics of normative properties and relations: what is the nature of those properties and relations whose pattern of instantiation makes propositions about what ought to be the case …Read more
  •  113
    Non-cognitivism, truth and logic
    Philosophical Studies 86 (1): 73-91. 1997.
    This paper provides a new argument for a position of Crispin Wright's: given that ethical statements can be embedded within all sorts of sentential operators and are subject to definite standards of warrantedness, they must have truth conditions. Allan Gibbard's normative logic' is the only noncognitivist logic that stands a chance of avoiding Geach's Fregean objection. But what, according to Gibbard, is the point of avoiding inconsistency in one's ethical statements? He must say that it is to e…Read more
  •  389
    The moral evil demons
    In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Moral disagreement has long been thought to create serious problems for certain views in metaethics. More specifically, moral disagreement has been thought to pose problems for any metaethical view that rejects relativism—that is, for any view that implies that whenever two thinkers disagree about a moral question, at least one of those thinkers’ beliefs about the question is not correct. In this essay, I shall outline a solution to one of these problems. As I shall argue, it turns out in the en…Read more
  •  925
    Internalism Explained
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 349-369. 2002.
    According to epistemological internalism, the rationality of a belief supervenes purely on "internal facts" about the thinker's mind. But what are "internal facts"? Why does the rationality of a belief supervene on them? The standard answers are unacceptable. This paper proposes new answers. "Internal facts" are facts about the thinker's nonfactive mental states. The rationality of a belief supervenes on such internal facts because we need rules of belief revision that we can follow directly, no…Read more
  •  26
    Review of "The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics" by Philip Pettit (review)
    European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1): 111-115. 1996.
    This is a review of Philip Pettit's book "The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics"
  •  311
    Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem
    Synthese 190 (14). 2013.
    This article proposes a new theory of rational decision, distinct from both causal decision theory (CDT) and evidential decision theory (EDT). First, some intuitive counterexamples to CDT and EDT are presented. Then the motivation for the new theory is given: the correct theory of rational decision will resemble CDT in that it will not be sensitive to any comparisons of absolute levels of value across different states of nature, but only to comparisons of the differences in value between the ava…Read more
  •  892
    Is Civil Marriage Illiberal?
    In Elizabeth Brake (ed.), After Marriage: Rethinking Marital Relationships, Oxford University Press Usa. 2016.
    This paper defends the institution of civil marriage against the objection that it is inconsistent with political liberalism, and so should be either totally abolished or else transformed virtually beyond recognition.
  •  91
    Railton on normativity (review)
    Philosophical Studies 126 (3): 463-479. 2005.
    This is a critical discussion of Part III of Peter Railton's recent book Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence (Cambridge University Press, 2003).