•  113
    Non-cognitivism, truth and logic
    Philosophical Studies 86 (1): 73-91. 1997.
    This paper provides a new argument for a position of Crispin Wright's: given that ethical statements can be embedded within all sorts of sentential operators and are subject to definite standards of warrantedness, they must have truth conditions. Allan Gibbard's normative logic' is the only noncognitivist logic that stands a chance of avoiding Geach's Fregean objection. But what, according to Gibbard, is the point of avoiding inconsistency in one's ethical statements? He must say that it is to e…Read more
  •  670
    The Nature of Normativity
    Oxford University Press. 2007.
    This is a book about normativity -- where the central normative terms are words like 'ought' and 'should' and their equivalents in other languages. It has three parts: The first part is about the semantics of normative discourse: what it means to talk about what ought to be the case. The second part is about the metaphysics of normative properties and relations: what is the nature of those properties and relations whose pattern of instantiation makes propositions about what ought to be the case …Read more
  •  929
    Internalism Explained
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 349-369. 2002.
    According to epistemological internalism, the rationality of a belief supervenes purely on "internal facts" about the thinker's mind. But what are "internal facts"? Why does the rationality of a belief supervene on them? The standard answers are unacceptable. This paper proposes new answers. "Internal facts" are facts about the thinker's nonfactive mental states. The rationality of a belief supervenes on such internal facts because we need rules of belief revision that we can follow directly, no…Read more
  •  389
    The moral evil demons
    In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Moral disagreement has long been thought to create serious problems for certain views in metaethics. More specifically, moral disagreement has been thought to pose problems for any metaethical view that rejects relativism—that is, for any view that implies that whenever two thinkers disagree about a moral question, at least one of those thinkers’ beliefs about the question is not correct. In this essay, I shall outline a solution to one of these problems. As I shall argue, it turns out in the en…Read more
  •  311
    Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem
    Synthese 190 (14). 2013.
    This article proposes a new theory of rational decision, distinct from both causal decision theory (CDT) and evidential decision theory (EDT). First, some intuitive counterexamples to CDT and EDT are presented. Then the motivation for the new theory is given: the correct theory of rational decision will resemble CDT in that it will not be sensitive to any comparisons of absolute levels of value across different states of nature, but only to comparisons of the differences in value between the ava…Read more
  •  26
    Review of "The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics" by Philip Pettit (review)
    European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1): 111-115. 1996.
    This is a review of Philip Pettit's book "The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics"
  •  91
    Railton on normativity (review)
    Philosophical Studies 126 (3): 463-479. 2005.
    This is a critical discussion of Part III of Peter Railton's recent book Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
  •  896
    Is Civil Marriage Illiberal?
    In Elizabeth Brake (ed.), After Marriage: Rethinking Marital Relationships, Oxford University Press Usa. 2016.
    This paper defends the institution of civil marriage against the objection that it is inconsistent with political liberalism, and so should be either totally abolished or else transformed virtually beyond recognition.
  •  157
    The price of non-reductive moral realism
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3): 199-215. 1999.
    Non-reductive moral realism is the view that there are moral properties which cannot be reduced to natural properties. If moral properties exist, it is plausible that they strongly supervene on non-moral properties- more specifically, on mental, social, and biological properties. There may also be good reasons for thinking that moral properties are irreducible. However, strong supervenience and irreducibility seem incompatible. Strong supervenience entails that there is an enormous number of mod…Read more
  •  269
    Instrumental rationality
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6 280-309. 2011.
    Is there any distinctive aspect of rationality that deserves the label of “instrumental rationality”? Recently, Joseph Raz (2005) has argued that instrumental rationality is a “myth”. In this essay, I shall give some qualified support to Raz’s position: as I shall argue, many philosophers have indeed been seduced by certain myths about instrumental rationality. Nonetheless, Raz’s conclusion is too strong. Instrumental rationality is not itself a myth: there really is a distinctive aspect of rati…Read more
  •  163
    This is a review of "The nature and value of knowlege: Three investigations", by Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011).
  •  177
    Doxastic Correctness
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1): 217-234. 2013.
    If beliefs are subject to a basic norm of correctness—roughly, to the principle that a belief is correct only if the proposition believed is true—how can this norm guide believers in forming their beliefs? Answer: this norm guides believers indirectly: believers are directly guided by requirements of rationality—which are themselves explained by this norm of correctness. The fundamental connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic. Incorrectness comes in degrees; for beliefs, …Read more
  •  234
    The "Good" and the "Right" Revisited
    Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1). 2009.
    Moral philosophy has long been preoccupied by a supposed dichotomy between the "good" and the "right". This dichotomy has been taken to define certain allegedly central issues for ethics. How are the good and the right related to each other? For example, is one of the two "prior" to the other? If so, is the good prior to the right, or is the right prior to the good?
  •  198
    The Weight of Moral Reasons
    Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (Ed. Mark Timmons) 3 35-58. 2013.
    This paper starts by giving an interpretation of the notorious question "Why be moral?" Then, to answer that question, it develops an account of why some moral reasons -- specifically, the moral reasons that ground moral requirements -- are sufficiently weighty that they outweigh all countervailing reasons for action.
  •  296
    Sensing values?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1): 215-223. 2001.
    This is a reply to Mark Johnston's paper "The Authority of Affect", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2001).
  •  193
    Review: Kieran Setiya: Reasons without Rationalism (review)
    Mind 117 (468): 1130-1135. 2008.
    This is a review of Kieran Setiya's book, "Reasons without Rationalism" (Princeton University Press, 2007).
  •  37
    Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs (review)
    Philosophical Review 107 (3): 447. 1998.
    This is a review of James Griffin's book "Value-Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs".
  •  159
    An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5. 2015.
    This paper offers an account of the a priori. According to this account, the fundamental notion is not that of a priori knowledge, or even of a priori justified belief, but a notion of an a priori justified inferential disposition. The rationality or justification of such a priori justified inferential dispositions is explained purely by some of the basic cognitive capacities that the thinker possesses, independently of any further experiences or other conscious mental states that the thinker ha…Read more
  •  352
    Objective and Subjective 'Ought'
    In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality, Oxford University Press. pp. 143-168. 2016.
    This essay offers an account of the truth conditions of sentences involving deontic modals like ‘ought’, designed to capture the difference between objective and subjective kinds of ‘ought’ This account resembles the classical semantics for deontic logic: according to this account, these truths conditions involve a function from the world of evaluation to a domain of worlds (equivalent to a so-called “modal base”), and an ordering of the worlds in such domains; this ordering of the worlds itself…Read more
  •  6
    Critical Notice of Jean Hampton, "The Authority of Reason" (review)
    Philosophical Books 40 (4): 218-226. 1999.
    This is a review of Jean Hampton's posthumously published book "The Authority of Reason" (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
  •  155
    The metaethicists' mistake
    Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1). 2004.
    According to normative judgment internalism (NJI), normative judgments -- that is, judgments of the form 'I ought to F' and the like -- are "essentially practical", in the sense that they are in some way essentially connected to practical reasoning, or to motivation for action. Many metaethicists believe that if NJI is true, then it would cast grave doubts on any robustly realist (RR) conception of normative judgments. These metaethicists are mistaken. This mistake about the relations between NJ…Read more
  •  170
    Butler on Virtue, Self Interest, and Human Nature
    In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    This essay gives a new interpretation of some of the central ethical doctrines of Bishop Butler's Sermons -- in particular, of his claim that a review of the empirical facts of human nature shows that we have "an obligation to the practice of virtue", and of the precise claims that he makes about the relations between morality and self-interest.
  •  265
    The Essence of Response-Dependence
    European Review of Philosophy 3 31-54. 1997.
    Many philosophers have thought that colours or flavours or values are in some way less objective than shape or mass or motion. This paper explores the approach to capturing this thought that is based on the idea of ‘ response-dependence ’. First, it is argued that the conceptions of response-dependence developed by Mark Johnston, Philip Pettit and Crispin Wright fail to capture this thought adequately. Then, the rest of the paper proposes an alternative conception, based in part on Kit Fine's no…Read more
  •  141
    Moral Disagreement among Philosophers
    In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution, Oxford University Press. pp. 23-39. 2014.
    There is not only moral disagreement among ordinary people: there is also moral disagreement among philosophers. Since philosophers might seem to be in the best possible position to reach the truth about morality, such disagreement may suggest that either there is no single truth about morality, or at least if there is, it is unknowable. The goal of this paper is to rebut this argument: the best explanation of moral disagreement among philosophers is quite compatible with the thesis that many mo…Read more
  •  226
    Primitively rational belief-forming processes
    In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief, Cambridge University Press. pp. 180--200. 2011.
    Intuitively, it seems that some belief-forming practices have the following three properties: 1. They are rational practices, and the beliefs that we form by means of these practices are themselves rational or justified beliefs. 2. Even if in most cases these practices reliably lead to correct beliefs (i.e., beliefs in true propositions), they are not infallible: it is possible for beliefs that are formed by means of these practices to be incorrect (i.e., to be beliefs in false propositions). 3.…Read more
  •  62
    Critical Notice of "The Realm of Reason" by Christopher Peacocke (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3): 776-791. 2007.
    This is a critical notice of Christopher Peacocke's book, "The Realm of Reason" (Oxford University Press, 2004)
  •  718
    Justified Inference
    Synthese 189 (2): 273-295. 2012.
    What is the connection between justification and the kind of consequence relations that are studied by logic? In this essay, I shall try to provide an answer, by proposing a general conception of the kind of inference that counts as justified or rational.