•  265
    The Essence of Response-Dependence
    European Review of Philosophy 3 31-54. 1997.
    Many philosophers have thought that colours or flavours or values are in some way less objective than shape or mass or motion. This paper explores the approach to capturing this thought that is based on the idea of ‘ response-dependence ’. First, it is argued that the conceptions of response-dependence developed by Mark Johnston, Philip Pettit and Crispin Wright fail to capture this thought adequately. Then, the rest of the paper proposes an alternative conception, based in part on Kit Fine's no…Read more
  •  139
    Moral Disagreement among Philosophers
    In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution, Oxford University Press. pp. 23-39. 2014.
    There is not only moral disagreement among ordinary people: there is also moral disagreement among philosophers. Since philosophers might seem to be in the best possible position to reach the truth about morality, such disagreement may suggest that either there is no single truth about morality, or at least if there is, it is unknowable. The goal of this paper is to rebut this argument: the best explanation of moral disagreement among philosophers is quite compatible with the thesis that many mo…Read more
  •  223
    Primitively rational belief-forming processes
    In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief, Cambridge University Press. pp. 180--200. 2011.
    Intuitively, it seems that some belief-forming practices have the following three properties: 1. They are rational practices, and the beliefs that we form by means of these practices are themselves rational or justified beliefs. 2. Even if in most cases these practices reliably lead to correct beliefs (i.e., beliefs in true propositions), they are not infallible: it is possible for beliefs that are formed by means of these practices to be incorrect (i.e., to be beliefs in false propositions). 3.…Read more
  •  62
    Critical Notice of "The Realm of Reason" by Christopher Peacocke (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3): 776-791. 2007.
    This is a critical notice of Christopher Peacocke's book, "The Realm of Reason" (Oxford University Press, 2004)