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Ralph Wedgwood

University of Southern California
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Cornell University
Sage School of Philosophy
PhD, 1994
APA Western Division
CV
Homepage
Los Angeles, California, United States of America
0000-0003-1391-2407
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Meta-Ethics
Areas of Interest
Normative Ethics
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
  •  162
    The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations, by Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock (review)
    Analysis 72 (1): 187-189. 2012.
    This is a review of "The nature and value of knowlege: Three investigations", by Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011).
    Defining Knowledge, MiscPrimitivism about KnowledgeKnowledge, Misc
  •  177
    Doxastic Correctness
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1): 217-234. 2013.
    If beliefs are subject to a basic norm of correctness—roughly, to the principle that a belief is correct only if the proposition believed is true—how can this norm guide believers in forming their beliefs? Answer: this norm guides believers indirectly: believers are directly guided by requirements of rationality—which are themselves explained by this norm of correctness. The fundamental connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic. Incorrectness comes in degrees; for beliefs, …Read more
    Scoring RulesThe Nature of BeliefEpistemic NormsRationality
  •  317
    The "Good" and the "Right" Revisited
    Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1). 2009.
    Moral philosophy has long been preoccupied by a supposed dichotomy between the "good" and the "right". This dichotomy has been taken to define certain allegedly central issues for ethics. How are the good and the right related to each other? For example, is one of the two "prior" to the other? If so, is the good prior to the right, or is the right prior to the good?
    Values and NormsMoral ConceptsMoral Semantics
  •  196
    The Weight of Moral Reasons
    Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (Ed. Mark Timmons) 3 35-58. 2013.
    This paper starts by giving an interpretation of the notorious question "Why be moral?" Then, to answer that question, it develops an account of why some moral reasons -- specifically, the moral reasons that ground moral requirements -- are sufficiently weighty that they outweigh all countervailing reasons for action.
    Moral Reasons
  •  297
    Sensing values?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1): 215-223. 2001.
    This is a reply to Mark Johnston's paper "The Authority of Affect", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2001).
    Moral Epistemology, MiscPerception