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3849Troubles with functionalismMinnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 261-325. 1978.The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the question "What are mental states?" I shall be concerned with identity thesis formulations of functionalism. They say, for example, that pain is a functional state, just as identity thesis formulations of physicalism say that pain is a physical state
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1128What is Functionalism?In Ned Joel Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology: 1, Harvard University Press. 1980.What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain a pain? Cartesian Dualism said the ultim…Read more
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457Concepts of ConsciousnessIn David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 206-218. 2002.
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1Two kinds of lawsIn Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. 1994.
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845The Grain of Vision and the Grain of AttentionThought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3): 170-184. 2012.Often when there is no attention to an object, there is no conscious perception of it either, leading some to conclude that conscious perception is an attentional phenomenon. There is a well-known perceptual phenomenon—visuo-spatial crowding, in which objects are too closely packed for attention to single out one of them. This article argues that there is a variant of crowding—what I call ‘‘identity-crowding’’—in which one can consciously see a thing despite failure of attention to it. This conc…Read more
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788Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and NeuroscienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5): 481--548. 2007.How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have n…Read more
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2288On a confusion about a function of consciousnessBrain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2). 1995.Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consc…Read more
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117Spatial perception via tactile sensationTrends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (7): 285-286. 2003.I’m now looking at a soccer ball and a Nintendo Game Cube, and thus am having a perceptual experience of a sphere and a cube. My friend, blind from birth, (who’s helping me with the cleaning) is touching these items, and is thus having a perceptual experience of the same things. Not only are we perceiving the same items, but in doing so we apply the terms ‘sphere’ and ‘cube’, respectively, to them. Are we, in doing so, applying the same, or different, perceptual concepts?
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10Searle's arguments against cognitive scienceIn John Mark Bishop & John Preston (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford University Press. pp. 70--79. 2002.
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1145Top-down attention and consciousness: comment on Cohen et alTrends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (11): 527. 2012.
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43884What is functionalism?In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), [Book Chapter], Macmillan. 1996.What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain a pain? Cartesian Dualism said the ultim…Read more
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1061Comparing the major theories of consciousnessIn Michael Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences IV, . pp. 1111-1123. 2009.This article compares the three frameworks for theories of consciousness that are taken most seriously by neuroscientists, the view that consciousness is a biological state of the brain, the global workspace perspective and an account in terms of higher order states. The comparison features the “explanatory gap” (Nagel, 1974; Levine, 1983) the fact that we have no idea why the neural basis of an experience is the neural basis of that experience rather than another experience or no experience at …Read more
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396Readings in Philosophy of Psychology: 1 (edited book)Harvard University Press. 1980.... PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY is the study of conceptual issues in psychology. For the most part, these issues fall equally well in psychology as in..
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164The Anna Karenina Principle and Skepticism about Unconscious PerceptionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2): 452-459. 2015.
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325Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationismIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Mit Press. pp. 137-142. 2005.Representationism 1, as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an experience just is its representational content, where that representational content can itself be understood and characterized without appeal to phenomenal character. Representationists seem to have a harder time handling pain than visual experience. I will argue that Michael Tye's heroic attempt at a representationist theory of pain, although ingenious and enlightening, does not adequately come to terms with the r…Read more
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566Max Black's objection to mind-body identityOxford Studies in Metaphysics 2 3-78. 2006.considered an objection that he says he thought was first put to him by Max Black. He says.
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157Semantics, conceptual roleIn [Book Chapter] (Unpublished), . pp. 242--256. 1996.According to Conceptual Role Semantics ("CRS"), the meaning of a representation is the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, e.g. in perception, thought and decision-making. It is an extension of the well known "use" theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a word is its use in communication and more generally, in social interaction. CRS supplements external use by including the role of a symbol inside a computer or a brain. The uses appealed to are not just…Read more
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204Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness”Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1): 89-108. 2012.Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness” Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-20 DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0090-7 Authors J. Kevin O’Regan, Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, CNRS - Université Paris Descartes, Centre Biomédical des Saints Pères, 45 rue des Sts Pères, 75270 Paris cedex 06, France Ned Block, Departments of Philosophy, Psychology and Center for Neural Science, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York,…Read more
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285How not to find the neural correlate of consciousnessIn The Foundations of Cognitive Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 1. 2001.There are two concepts of consciousness that are easy to confuse with one another, access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. However, just as the concepts of water and H2O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searles reasoning about the function of consciousness goes wrong …Read more
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100Ridiculing social constructivism about phenomenal consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 199-201. 1999.Money is a cultural construction, leukemia is not. In which category does phenomenal consciousness fit? The issue is clarified by a distinction between what cultural phenomena causally influence and what culture constitutes. Culture affects phenomenal consciousness but it is ridiculous to suppose that culture constitutes it, even in part.
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Perception |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Neuroscience |
Philosophy of Mind |