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3624The mind as the software of the brainIn Daniel N. Osherson & Edward E. Smith (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science: Visual cognition. 2, Mit Press. pp. 377-425. 1990.In this section, we will start with an influential attempt to define `intelligence', and then we will move to a consideration of how human intelligence is to be investigated on the machine model. The last part of the section will discuss the relation between the mental and the biological.
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373Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationismIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Mit Press. pp. 137-142. 2005.Representationism 1, as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an experience just is its representational content, where that representational content can itself be understood and characterized without appeal to phenomenal character. Representationists seem to have a harder time handling pain than visual experience. I will argue that Michael Tye's heroic attempt at a representationist theory of pain, although ingenious and enlightening, does not adequately come to terms with the r…Read more
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102Jack and Jill have shifted spectraBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6): 946-947. 1999.There is reason to believe that people of different gender, race or age differ in spectra that are shifted relative to one another. Shifted spectra are not as dramatic as inverted spectra, but they can be used to make some of the same philosophical points.
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278The Anna Karenina Principle and Skepticism about Unconscious PerceptionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2): 452-459. 2015.
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1224Some concepts of consciousnessIn David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 206-219. 2002.Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses". Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state.
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1703Review of Julian Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind from the Boston Globe, March 6, 1977, p. A17.
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Areas of Specialization
| Perception |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
| Philosophy of Neuroscience |
| Philosophy of Mind |