-
2302Consciousness, Big Science and Conceptual ClarityIn Gary Marcus & Jeremy Freeman (eds.), in The Future of the Brain: Essays by the World’s Leading Neuroscientists, Princeton University Press. pp. 161-176. 2014.
-
169Partial awareness and the illusion of phenomenal consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5): 510-510. 2007.The dissociation Block provides between phenomenal and access consciousness (P-consciousness and A-consciousness) captures much of our intuition about conscious experience. However, it raises a major methodological puzzle, and is not uniquely supported by the empirical evidence. We provide an alternative interpretation based on the notion of levels of representation and partial awareness
-
214Functional Role and Truth ConditionsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1): 273-292. 1988.Ned Block, John Campbell; Functional Role and Truth Conditions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 273–292, https:/
-
540Readings in Philosophy of Psychology: 1 (edited book)Harvard University Press. 1980.... PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY is the study of conceptual issues in psychology. For the most part, these issues fall equally well in psychology as in..
-
4611Troubles with functionalismMinnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 261-325. 1978.The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the question "What are mental states?" I shall be concerned with identity thesis formulations of functionalism. They say, for example, that pain is a functional state, just as identity thesis formulations of physicalism say that pain is a physical state.
-
23Consciousness, philosophical issues aboutIn Lynn Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group. 2003.
-
448Biology versus computation in the study of consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1): 159-165. 1997.The distinction between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness arises from the battle between biological and computational approaches to the mind. If P = A, the computationalists are right; but if not, the biological nature of P yields its scientific nature.
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Perception |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
| Philosophy of Neuroscience |
| Philosophy of Mind |