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Ned Block

New York University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    189
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    26
  •  News and Updates
    134

 More details
  • New York University
    Department of Philosophy
    Psychology
    Center for Neural Science
    Silver Professor
Harvard University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
Homepage
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Perception
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Neuroscience
Philosophy of Mind
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Mind
Cognitive Sciences
Philosophy of Computing and Information
Philosophy of Biology
Philosophy of Action
1 more
  • All publications (189)
  •  2302
    Consciousness, Big Science and Conceptual Clarity
    In Gary Marcus & Jeremy Freeman (eds.), in The Future of the Brain: Essays by the World’s Leading Neuroscientists, Princeton University Press. pp. 161-176. 2014.
    Cognitive Models of ConsciousnessBiological Theories of Consciousness, MiscMind-Body Problem, Genera…Read more
    Cognitive Models of ConsciousnessBiological Theories of Consciousness, MiscMind-Body Problem, GeneralMind-Brain Identity TheoryNeurobiological Theories and Models of Consciousness
  •  169
    Partial awareness and the illusion of phenomenal consciousness
    with Sid Kouider, Vincent de Gardelle, and Emmanuel Dupoux
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5): 510-510. 2007.
    The dissociation Block provides between phenomenal and access consciousness (P-consciousness and A-consciousness) captures much of our intuition about conscious experience. However, it raises a major methodological puzzle, and is not uniquely supported by the empirical evidence. We provide an alternative interpretation based on the notion of levels of representation and partial awareness
    Illusionism about Consciousness
  •  214
    Functional Role and Truth Conditions
    with John Campbell
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1): 273-292. 1988.
    Ned Block, John Campbell; Functional Role and Truth Conditions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 273–292, https:/
    Semantic TheoriesInferentialist Accounts of Meaning and ContentFunctional Realization
  •  540
    Readings in Philosophy of Psychology: 1 (edited book)
    Harvard University Press. 1980.
    ... PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY is the study of conceptual issues in psychology. For the most part, these issues fall equally well in psychology as in..
    Philosophy of Psychology, Misc
  •  4611
    Troubles with functionalism
    Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 261-325. 1978.
    The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the question "What are mental states?" I shall be concerned with identity thesis formulations of functionalism. They say, for example, that pain is a functional state, just as identity thesis formulations of physicalism say that pain is a physical state.
    Absent QualiaFunctionalism, MiscFunctionalism and QualiaFunctional Realization
  •  23
    Consciousness, philosophical issues about
    In Lynn Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group. 2003.
    Philosophy of Consciousness
  •  1
    Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject
    with Gabriel Segal
    Oxford University Press. 1998.
    Philosophy of Psychology, Misc
  •  99
    The merely verbal problem of consciousness
    Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6): 270. 2005.
    Consciousness and Neuroscience, Foundational IssuesScience of Visual Consciousness
  •  448
    Biology versus computation in the study of consciousness
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1): 159-165. 1997.
    The distinction between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness arises from the battle between biological and computational approaches to the mind. If P = A, the computationalists are right; but if not, the biological nature of P yields its scientific nature.
    Computationalism in Cognitive ScienceFunctionalism and Qualia
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