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Ned Block

New York University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    189
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  •  Events
    26
  •  News and Updates
    134

 More details
  • New York University
    Department of Philosophy
    Psychology
    Center for Neural Science
    Silver Professor
Harvard University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
Homepage
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Perception
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Neuroscience
Philosophy of Mind
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Mind
Cognitive Sciences
Philosophy of Computing and Information
Philosophy of Biology
Philosophy of Action
1 more
  • All publications (189)
  •  1691
    Review of Julian Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind
    Boston Globe. 1977.
    Review of Julian Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind from the Boston Globe, March 6, 1977, p. A17.
    Metaphysics of Mind, Misc
  •  94
    Complexity and adaptation
    with David Pesetsky
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4): 750-752. 1990.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  1348
    Holism, hyper-analyticity and hyper-compositionality
    Mind and Language 8 (1): 1-26. 1993.
    Meaning HolismAnalyticity, MiscCompositionalityInferentialist Accounts of Meaning and ContentThe Nat…Read more
    Meaning HolismAnalyticity, MiscCompositionalityInferentialist Accounts of Meaning and ContentThe Nature of Contents, MiscNarrow ContentThe Basis of Meaning, Misc
  •  221
    Ruritania revisited
    Philosophical Issues 6 171-187. 1995.
    Perhaps you are wondering what I mean by ‘holism’. After all, everyone seems to use the term in a different sense. Even if we restrict ourselves to holism of meaning and content, we have many different holisms. Some take holism about meaning to be the doctrine that if you’ve got one meaning, you’ve got lots of them.2 On other views, to say meaning is holistic is to say that the meaning of each term depends on the meanings of all or most other terms.3 Others take meaning holism to be the doctrine…Read more
    Perhaps you are wondering what I mean by ‘holism’. After all, everyone seems to use the term in a different sense. Even if we restrict ourselves to holism of meaning and content, we have many different holisms. Some take holism about meaning to be the doctrine that if you’ve got one meaning, you’ve got lots of them.2 On other views, to say meaning is holistic is to say that the meaning of each term depends on the meanings of all or most other terms.3 Others take meaning holism to be the doctrine that there is no real distinction between language and theory or between the “dictionary” and the “encyclopedia”
    Narrow ContentMeaning Holism
  •  105
    What intuitions about homunculi don't show
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3): 425-426. 1980.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  1040
    Can the mind change the world?
    In George Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam, Cambridge University Press. pp. 137--170. 1990.
    The Exclusion ProblemExplanatory Role of ContentThe Nature of ContentsRepresentationFunctionalismPsy…Read more
    The Exclusion ProblemExplanatory Role of ContentThe Nature of ContentsRepresentationFunctionalismPsychological Explanation
  • The philosophy of psychology
    with Gabriel Segal
    In Ned Block & Gabriel Segal (eds.), Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject, Oxford University Press. 1998.
    Philosophy of Psychology, Misc
  •  2442
    Consciousness and accessibility
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4): 596-598. 1990.
    This is my first publication of the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, though not using quite those terms. It ends with this: "The upshot is this: If Searle is using the access sense of "consciousness," his argument doesn't get to first base. If, as is more likely, he intends the what-it-is-like sense, his argument depends on assumptions about issues that the cognitivist is bound to regard as deeply unsettled empirical questions." Searle replies: "He refers to…Read more
    This is my first publication of the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, though not using quite those terms. It ends with this: "The upshot is this: If Searle is using the access sense of "consciousness," his argument doesn't get to first base. If, as is more likely, he intends the what-it-is-like sense, his argument depends on assumptions about issues that the cognitivist is bound to regard as deeply unsettled empirical questions." Searle replies: "He refers to what he calls an "access sense of consciousness." On my account there is no such sense."
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Consciousness
  •  79
    Resemblance and imaginal representation
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1): 142-143. 1983.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Consciousness
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