•  112
    Partial awareness and the illusion of phenomenal consciousness
    with Sid Kouider, Vincent de Gardelle, and Emmanuel Dupoux
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5): 510-510. 2007.
    The dissociation Block provides between phenomenal and access consciousness (P-consciousness and A-consciousness) captures much of our intuition about conscious experience. However, it raises a major methodological puzzle, and is not uniquely supported by the empirical evidence. We provide an alternative interpretation based on the notion of levels of representation and partial awareness
  •  122
    How many concepts of consciousness?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 272-287. 1995.
    With some help from the commentators, a few adjustments to the characterizations of A-consciousness and P-consciousness can avoid some trivial cases of one without the other. But it still seems that the case for the existence of P without A is stronger than that for A without P. If indeed there can be P without A, but not A without P, this would be a remarkable result that would need explanation.
  •  1093
    Some concepts of consciousness
    In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 206-219. 2002.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses". Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state
  •  555
    Are absent qualia impossible?
    Philosophical Review 89 (2): 257-74. 1980.
  •  3849
    Troubles with functionalism
    Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 261-325. 1978.
    The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the question "What are mental states?" I shall be concerned with identity thesis formulations of functionalism. They say, for example, that pain is a functional state, just as identity thesis formulations of physicalism say that pain is a physical state
  •  1128
    What is Functionalism?
    In Ned Joel Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology: 1, Harvard University Press. 1980.
    What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain a pain? Cartesian Dualism said the ultim…Read more
  •  141
    Ruritania revisited
    Philosophical Issues 6 171-187. 1995.
    Perhaps you are wondering what I mean by ‘holism’. After all, everyone seems to use the term in a different sense. Even if we restrict ourselves to holism of meaning and content, we have many different holisms. Some take holism about meaning to be the doctrine that if you’ve got one meaning, you’ve got lots of them.2 On other views, to say meaning is holistic is to say that the meaning of each term depends on the meanings of all or most other terms.3 Others take meaning holism to be the doctrine…Read more
  •  1132
    Review of Julian Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind from the Boston Globe, March 6, 1977, p. A17