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116Functional role and truth conditionsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1): 157-181. 1988.Ned Block, John Campbell; Functional Role and Truth Conditions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 273–292, https:/
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108Partial awareness and the illusion of phenomenal consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5): 510-510. 2007.The dissociation Block provides between phenomenal and access consciousness (P-consciousness and A-consciousness) captures much of our intuition about conscious experience. However, it raises a major methodological puzzle, and is not uniquely supported by the empirical evidence. We provide an alternative interpretation based on the notion of levels of representation and partial awareness
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100The Puzzle of Perceptual PrecisionOpen Mind. 2015.Argues for a failure of correspondence between perceptual representation and what it is like to perceive. If what it is like to perceive is grounded in perceptual representation, then, using considerations of veridical representation, we can show that inattentive peripheral perception is less representationally precise than attentive foveal perception. However, there is empirical evidence to the contrary. The conclusion is that perceptual representation cannot ground what it is like to perceive
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99Ridiculing social constructivism about phenomenal consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 199-201. 1999.Money is a cultural construction, leukemia is not. In which category does phenomenal consciousness fit? The issue is clarified by a distinction between what cultural phenomena causally influence and what culture constitutes. Culture affects phenomenal consciousness but it is ridiculous to suppose that culture constitutes it, even in part.
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96Begging the question against phenomenal consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2): 205-206. 1992.
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91Biology versus computation in the study of consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1): 159-165. 1997.The distinction between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness arises from the battle between biological and computational approaches to the mind. If P = A, the computationalists are right; but if not, the biological nature of P yields its scientific nature.
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87Author's responseBehavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1). 1997.The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness arises from the battle between biological and computational approaches to the mind. If P = A, the computationalists are right; but if not, the biological nature of P yields its scientific nature.
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86Response to Kouider et al. : which view is better supported by the evidence?Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (3): 141-142. 2012.
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81Imagery (edited book)MIT Press. 1981.The "great debate" in cognitive science today is about the nature of mental images. One side says images are basically pictures in the head. The other side says they are like the symbol structures in computers. If the picture-in-the-head theorists are right, then computers will never be able to think like people.This book contains the most intelligible and incisive articles in the debate, articles by cognitive psychologists, computer scientists and philosophers. The most exciting imagery phenome…Read more
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75Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology, V (edited book)Harvard University Press. 1981.Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and ... V. Influence of imaged pictures and sounds on detection of visual and auditory signals. ...
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53Perception is iconic, perceptual working memory is discursiveBehavioral and Brain Sciences 46. 2023.The evidence that the target article cites for language-of-thought (LoT) structure in perceptual object representations concerns perceptual working memory, not perception. Perception is iconic, not structured like an LoT. Perceptual working memory representations contain the remnants of iconic perceptual representations, often recoded, in a discursive envelope.
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51Is Experiencing Just Representing?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 663-670. 1998.
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38Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2. Ned BlockPhilosophy of Science 50 (1): 175-176. 1983.
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30Functional Role and Truth ConditionsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61 (1): 157-184. 1987.
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29Responses to my criticsAnalysis 83 (3): 575-588. 2023.Ian Phillips and Chaz Firestone have written a wonderful article on the rationale for adaptation as an indicator of perception, and more generally, on the purpo.
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28Jack and Jill have shifted spectraBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6): 946-947. 1999.There is reason to believe that people of different gender, race or age differ in spectra that are shifted relative to one another. Shifted spectra are not as dramatic as inverted spectra, but they can be used to make some of the same philosophical points.
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26Functional Role and Truth ConditionsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1): 273-292. 1988.Ned Block, John Campbell; Functional Role and Truth Conditions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 273–292, https:/
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Areas of Specialization
Perception |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Neuroscience |
Philosophy of Mind |