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124Rawlsian Constructivism In Moral TheoryCanadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1): 71-90. 1987.Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics,’ John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral. A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’. In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equili…Read more
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1191Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queernessAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2). 1984.This Article does not have an abstract
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112Making a Necessity of Virtue (review)Philosophical Review 109 (3): 428-434. 2000.Recent moral philosophy has seen a revival of interest in the concept of virtue, and with it a reassessment of the role of virtue in the work of Aristotle and Kant. This book brings that reassessment to a new level of sophistication. Nancy Sherman argues that Kant preserves a notion of virtue in his moral theory that bears recognizable traces of the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions, and that his complex anthropology of morals brings him into surprising alliance with Aristotle. She develops her …Read more
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722Externalist moral realismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1): 23-41. 1986.SOME THINK THAT MORAL REALISTS CANNOT RECOGNIZE THE PRACTICAL OR ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY AND SO REJECT MORAL REALISM. THIS FORM OF ANTI-REALISM DEPENDS UPON AN INTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY. BUT AN EXTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY IS MORE PLAUSIBLE AND ALLOWS THE REALIST A SENSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY. CONSIDERATION OF THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF MORALITY, THEREFORE, DOES NOT UNDERMINE AND, INDEED, SUPPORTS MORAL REALISM
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Self-realization and the common good : Themes in T.h. GreenIn Maria Dimova-Cookson & W. J. Mander (eds.), T.H. Green: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Political Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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1060Prospects for Temporal NeutralityIn Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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125Legal Positivism and Natural Law ReconsideredThe Monist 68 (3): 364-387. 1985.Legal positivism and natural law theory have traditionally been construed as mutually exclusive theories about the relationship between morality and the law. Although I endorse a good deal of this traditional wisdom, I shall argue that we can and should construe LP and NL as complementary theories. So construed, they not only are compatible but also state important truths.
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280Utilitarian morality and the personal point of viewJournal of Philosophy 83 (8): 417-438. 1986.Consideration of the objection from the personal point of view reveals the resources of utilitarianism. The utilitarian can offer a partial rebuttal by distinguishing between criteria of rightness and decision procedures and claiming that, because his theory is a criterion of rightness and not a decision procedure, he can justify agents' differential concern for their own welfare and the welfare of those close to them. The flexibility in utilitarianism's theory of value allows further rebuttal o…Read more
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15Skorupski, John, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Mill (review)Review of Metaphysics 53 (4): 960-963. 2000.
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748Responsibility, Incompetence, and PsychopathyIn The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas. 2013.This essay articulates a conception of responsibility and excuse in terms of the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing and explores its implications for insanity, incompetence, and psychopathy. The fair opportunity conception factors responsibility into conditions of normative competence and situational control and factors normative competence into cognitive and volitional capacities. This supports a conception of incompetence that recognizes substantial impairment of either cognitive or voliti…Read more
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29Rational egoism and the separateness of personsIn J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, Blackwell. pp. 96--134. 1997.
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101Objectivity and dialectical methods in ethicsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 42 (2). 1999.A cognitivist interpretation of moral inquiry treats it, like other kinds of inquiry, as aiming at true belief. A dialectical conception of moral inquiry represents the justification for a given moral belief as consisting in its intellectual fit with other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral. The essay appeals to semantic considerations to defend cognitivism as a default metaethical view; it defends a dialectical conception of moral inquiry by examining Sidgwick's ambivalence about the probative va…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Philosophy of Law |