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29Review of Mitchell, Melanie. Artificial Intelligence: A guide for thinking humans. New York: Macmillan, 2019. (review)Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 27 (3): 609-623. 2023.Review of Mitchell, Melanie. Artificial Intelligence: A guide for thinking humans. New York: Macmillan, 2019.
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179Valores na ciência e a perspectiva ecológica do conhecimento científicoIn César Meurer (ed.), Ciência: epistemologia e ensino, Editora Do Ppg Filosofia Da Ufrrj. pp. 250-281. 2024.A ideia de que a ciência — ou ao menos as atividades científicas que são consideradas as mais essenciais para a ciência — deve ser livre de valores é bastante difundida. Neste capítulo, vou discutir essa tese, normalmente entendida como um ideal de ciência. Na primeira seção, introduzo alguns conceitos e distinções que são importantes para entender essa tese, como a diferença entre valores cognitivos e não-cognitivos. Na segunda seção, discuto o papel dos valores na seleção de problemas e na met…Read more
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326Psicologia Ecológica: da percepção à cognição socialIn Marcus José Alves de Souza & Maxwell Morais de Lima Filho (eds.), Escritos de Filosofia V: Linguagem e Cognição, Editora Fi. pp. 368-393. 2022.Neste texto, apresento e examino as principais ideias que animam a abordagem ecológica da percepção. Primeiro, na Seção 2, apresento a visão instantânea da percepção, contra a qual Gibson articula e propõe a abordagem ecológica. Em seguida, na Seção 3, apresento e discuto a noção de informação ecológica. Nas seções 4 e 5 articulo a teoria das affordances e discuto a aprendizagem perceptiva. Por fim, na Seção 6, exponho e discuto a possibilidade de estender a teoria das affordances para explicar …Read more
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45Textos Selecionados de Filosofia da CogniçãoNEPFIL online. 2022.Coletânea de traduções de verbetes da SEP na área de Filosofia da Cognição organizada por Eros Carvalho (UFRGS). A obra contém os seguintes verbetes: "Ciência cognitiva", "A teoria computacional da mente", "Teorias teleológicas do conteúdo mental", "Modularidade da Mente", "Cognição Corporificada", "Emoção", e "Cognição Animal".
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605Affective affordances: Direct perception meets affectivityPerspectiva Filosófica 49 (5): 19-51. 2022.In this paper, I explore and examine different ways in which affectivity is related to perception within ecological psychology. I assess whether some of those ways compromise the realist and direct aspects of traditional ecological perception. I sustain that they don’t. Affectivity, at least in some cases, turns the perception of fine-grained affordances possible. For an engaged perceiver, affectivity is not optional.
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355An ecological approach to hinge propositionsSképsis (25): 1-16. 2022.In this paper, I argue that hinge propositions are ways of acting that constitute abilities or skills. My starting point is Moyal-Sharrock's account of hinge propositions. However, Moyal-Sharrock's account leaves gaps to be filled, as it does not offer a unified explanation of the origin of our ungrounded grounds. Her account also lacks resources to respond to the issue of demarcation, since it does not provide a criterion for distinguishing ways of acting that can legitimately fulfill the role…Read more
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286O disjuntivismo ecológico e o argumento causalTrans/Form/Ação (46): 147-174. 2023.In this paper, I argue that the ecological approach to perception provides resources to overcome the causal argument against disjunctivism. According to the causal argument, since the brain states that proximally cause the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory one can be of the same type, there would be no good reason to reject that the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory experience have fundamentally the same nature. Disjunctivism concerning the nature …Read more
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302Teorias da conspiração: por que algumas não valem um caracolPerspectiva Filosófica 48 (2): 340-357. 2021.Neste artigo, mapeio o terreno da discussão em torno das teorias da conspiração, destacando o problema de como defini-las, os fatores que levam à crença nas teorias da conspiração, os seus potenciais prejuízos e como devemos reagir a elas. Defendo que devemos avaliar as consequências da crença em uma teoria da conspiração para determinar se ela deve ser levada a serio ou não. Em bloco, as teorias da conspiração ameaçam a capacidade coletiva de produção de conhecimento e devemos nos preocupar com…Read more
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443A Abordagem Ecológica das Habilidades e a Epistemologia dos eixosIn Plinio J. Smith & Nara Figueiredo (eds.), A epistemologia dos eixos: uma introdução e debate sobre as certezas de Wittgenstein, Editora Fênix. pp. 101-123. 2022.In this paper, I argue that hinge propositions are ways of acting that constitute abilities or skills. My starting point is Moyal-Sharrock's account of hinge propositions. However, Moyal-Sharrock's account leaves gaps to be filled, as it does not offer a unified explanation of the origin of our ungrounded grounds. Her account also lacks resources to respond to the issue of demarcation, since it does not provide a criterion for distinguishing ways of acting that can legitimately fulfill the role…Read more
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2318Social AffordanceEncyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior. 2020.A short entry on social affordance. Social affordances are possibilities for social interaction or possibilities for action that are shaped by social practices and norms.
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451A tese da mente estendida à luz do externismo ativo: Como tornar Otto responsivo a razões?Trans/Form/Ação 43 (3): 143-166. 2020.The extended mind thesis claims that some mental states and cognitive processes extend onto the environment. Items external to the organism or exploratory actions may constitute in part mental states and cognitive processes. In Clark and Chalmers’ original paper, ‘The Extended Mind’, this thesis receives support from the parity principle and from the active externalism. In their paper, more emphasis is given to the parity principle, which is presented as neutral regarding the nature of cognition…Read more
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435O desafio da integração explanatória para o enativismo: escalonamento ascendente ou descendentePrometheus 33 161-181. 2020.Enactivism is a family of theories that construe action as constitutive of cognition and reject the need to postulate representations in order to explain all cognitive activities. Acknowledging a biologically basic, non-representational mode of cognition, however, raises the question of how to explain higher or more complex cognitive acts, what we call explanatory integration challenge. In this paper, we critically discuss some attempts to meet that challenge through scaling up basic cognition a…Read more
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803Ética da CrençaIn Rogel Esteves de Oliveira, Kátia Martins Etcheverry, Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues & Carlos Augusto Sartori (eds.), Compêndio de Epistemologia, Editora Fi. pp. 467-493. 2022.Há pelo menos três modos pelos quais o debate sobre a conduta doxástica se relaciona com a ética. O primeiro e menos contencioso assinala que o ato de crer, analogamente às ações morais, responde a um tipo de normatividade, não necessariamente moral. Por exemplo, as normas para o ato de crer podem ser puramente epistêmicas. Nesse caso, essas normas diriam respeito a como o agente deve visar ou buscar a verdade. O segundo modo como o debate da ética da crença se relaciona com a ética diz respeito…Read more
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621An Enactive-Ecological Approach to Information and UncertaintyFrontiers in Psychology 11 (Enaction and Ecological Psycholo): 1-11. 2020.Information is a central notion for cognitive sciences and neurosciences, but there is no agreement on what it means for a cognitive system to acquire information about its surroundings. In this paper, we approximate three influential views on information: the one at play in ecological psychology, which is sometimes called information for action; the notion of information as covariance as developed by some enactivists, and the idea of information as minimization of uncertainty as presented by Sh…Read more
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475Neste texto inrodutório, apresento brevemente o que normalmente se entende pelo velho problema da indução e, em seguida, apresento um pouco mais detidamente, acentuando as diferenças e semelhanças, o novo enigma da indução.
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542The Shared Know-how in Linguistic BodiesFilosofia Unisinos 22 (1): 94-101. 2021.The authors of *Linguistic Bodies* appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest. However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that there is no single answer to the first i…Read more
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372Affordances Sociais e a Tese da Mente EstendidaProceedings of the Brazilian Research Group on Epistemology 2018: Social Epistemology. 2018.A tese da mente estendida alega que ao menos alguns processos cognitivos se estendem para além do cérebro do organismo no sentido de que eles são constituídos por ações realizadas por esse organismo no ambiente ao seu redor. Um movimento mais radical seria alegar que ações sociais realizadas pelo organismo poderiam pelo menos constituir alguns dos seus processos cognitivos. Isso pode ser chamando de tese da mente socialmente estendida. Baseando-me na noção de affordance tal como ela foi desenvol…Read more
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289Incorrigibilidade nas circunstâncias adequadas: “qualquer tipo de enunciado pode oferecer evidências para qualquer outro tipo”Analytica (Rio) 18 (2): 41-65. 2014.In this paper, I present the discussion between Ayer and Austin about whether sentences or utterances can be incorrigible and I argue in favor of Austin position. I defend Austin against objections from Ayer presented after the publication of Sense & Sensibilia. Unlike what was sustained by Ayer, experiential sentences and material object sentences are not epistemically asymmetrical. A material object sentence can be incorrigible if uttered in appropriated circumstances, and an experiential s…Read more
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618An ecological approach to disjunctivismSynthese 198 (Radical Views on Cognition). 2021.In this paper I claim that perceptual discriminatory skills rely on a suitable type of environment as an enabling condition for their exercise. This is because of the constitutive connection between environment and perceptual discriminatory skills, inasmuch as such connection is construed from an ecological approach. The exercise of a discriminatory skill yields knowledge of affordances of objects, properties, or events in the surrounding environment. This is practical knowledge in the first-per…Read more
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545Sintonizando com o mundo: uma abordagem ecológica das habilidades sensoriomotorasIn Giovanni Rolla & Gerson Araújo Neto (eds.), Ciência e Conhecimento, . pp. 81-108. 2020.In this chapter, I put forward and sustain an articulation of the notion of bodily skill based on ecological psychology, and I show how it is relevant for the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about skillful coping and also for the debate about whether know-how is reducible or not to propositional knowledge. The right metaphor to understand bodily skills is not the computer metaphor but the radio metaphor. These skills result from a process of organism attunement to its environment.
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608Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de “indução válida”Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (3): 439-460. 2018.In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim, besides suggesting his commitment to the collapse of the distinction between the context of description and the context of justification, seems to open the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects …Read more
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1095Goodman e o equilíbrio reflexivoVeritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 58 (3): 467-481. 2013.Goodman sustentou que o ajuste mútuo entre inferências indutivas particulares e princípios indutivos constitui a única justificação necessária para ambos. Porém, a sua caracterização desse ajuste, posteriormente denominado de “equilíbrio reflexivo”, foi superficial. Isso levantou dúvida sobre a sua adequação. Neste artigo, argumento que o equilíbrio reflexivo, corretamente caracterizado, fornece a única justificação necessária e a melhor que podemos dar para a prática indutiva.
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461On the Nature of Hinge CommitmentsSképsis 10 (19): 55-66. 2019.This is a critical commentary on Pritchard's book Epistemic Angst. In Section 2, I present the closure-based radical skeptical paradox. Then in Section 3, I sketch Pritchard’s undercutting response to this paradox. Finally, in Section 4, I put forward two concerns about Pritchard’s response and I also propose a reading of hinge commitments, the ability reading, that might put some pressure on Pritchard’s own reading of these commitments.
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478Em Defesa da Justificação Perceptiva: Desmistificando o Mito do DadoDissertation, Federal University of Minas Gerais. 2007.Since Wilfrid Sellars' attack on sense-date theories, it became hard to understand the role of perceptual experience in the justification of beliefs about the world. Many philosophers have started to sustain that experience only causes beliefs, never justifies them. In this thesis, I defend that experience justifies empirical beliefs non-inferentially. I work out three senses of 'justification': basement, reason and warrant. The idea is that experience can be a reason to believe. The subject can…Read more
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847Popper e o problema da predição práticaAnalytica (Rio) 15 (2): 123-146. 2011.The problem of rational prediction, launched by Wesley Salmon, is without doubt the Achilles heel of the critical method defended by Popper. In this paper, I assess the response given both by Popper and by the popperian Alan Musgrave to this problem. Both responses are inadequate and thus the conclusion of Salmon is reinforced: without appeal to induction, there is no way to make of the practical prediction a rational action. Furthermore, the critical method needs to be vindicated if one preten…Read more
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422Overcoming Intellectualism about Knowledge and Understanding: A Unified ApproachLogos and Episteme 9 (1): 7-26. 2018.In this paper I defend a unified approach to knowledge and understanding. Both are achievements due to cognitive abilities or skills. The difference between them is a difference of aspects. Knowledge emphasizes the successful aspect of an achievement and the exclusion of epistemic luck, whereas understanding emphasizes the agent's contribution in bringing about an achievement through the exercise of one's cognitive skills. Knowledge and understanding cannot be separated. I argue against the clai…Read more
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564Epistemologia da PercepçãoIn Rogel Esteves de Oliveira, Kátia Martins Etcheverry, Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues & Carlos Augusto Sartori (eds.), Compêndio de Epistemologia, Editora Fi. pp. 268-286. 2022.Tomamos como certo que os nossos sentidos nos colocam em contato com o ambiente ao nosso redor. Enquanto caminhamos em uma rua, vemos obstáculos que temos de contornar ou remover. Mesmo de costas, podemos ouvir a bicicleta que se aproxima e dar passagem. Em suma, por meio de experiências perceptivas (visuais, auditivas, olfativas etc.), ficamos conscientes de objetos ou eventos que estejam ocorrendo ao nosso redor. Além disso, com base no que percebemos, podemos formar e manter crenças acerca do…Read more
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1532A Ética da Crença: uma Defesa Moderada da Posição IndiciáriaSofia 7 (1): 17-40. 2018.In this paper, I articulate and discuss Clifford's two main arguments in favor of the norm that it is illegitimate to believe based on insufficient evidence. The first argument appeals to the instrumental value of belief, and the second one appeals to our intrinsic interest in the truth. Both arguments bring to the fore the relevance of moral and social factors to determine norms for belief. I sustain that the first argument is insufficient to establish Clifford's norm in general. Beliefs that a…Read more
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292Seeing Qualitons as Qualia: A Dialogue with Wittgenstein on Private Experience, Sense Data and the Ontology of MindPapers of the 33rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. 2013.In this paper we put forward the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. Further, we maintain that Wittgenstein hints in this direction. We also find in Wittgenstein elements of an account of language acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition. We conclude by pointing out some difficulties of this view.
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265Alguma Luz para O fundacionismo?Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 13 (1): 35-65. 2008.The foundationalist needs to deal with two fundamental problems: (i) to explain how a justificator grants justification without itself need justification and (ii) to determine the justificator’s epistemic status. Burdzinski (Burdzinski 2007), following Sellars and Bonjour, argues that the perceptive experience could not be a response to the first problem, because if its content was not propositional it would not grant justification and if its content was propositional it would grant justificatio…Read more
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