-
71Conditioned anti-anthropomorphismComparative Cognition and Behavior Reviews 2 147-150. 2007.How should scientists react to anthropomorphism (defined for the purposes of this paper as the attribution of mental states or properties to nonhuman animals)? Many thoughtful scientists have attempted to accommodate some measure of anthropomorphism in their approaches to animal behavior. But Wynne will have none of it. We reject his argument against anthropomorphism and argue that he does not pay sufficient attention to the historical facts or to the details of alternative approaches.
-
122Synthese special issue: representing philosophySynthese 182 (2): 181-183. 2011.This special issue of Synthese discusses conceptual, ontological, technological, ethical, political, and professional dimensions of attempts to represent the entire discipline of philosophy. One of our goals with this issue was to collect in one place several of the leading projects in digital philosophy so that the profession can begin to discern and debate what might be the best practices for the representation of philosophy in the 21st century.
-
201Animal Minds, Cognitive Ethology, and EthicsThe Journal of Ethics 11 (3): 299-317. 2007.Our goal in this paper is to provide enough of an account of the origins of cognitive ethology and the controversy surrounding it to help ethicists to gauge for themselves how to balance skepticism and credulity about animal minds when communicating with scientists. We believe that ethicists’ arguments would benefit from better understanding of the historical roots of ongoing controversies. It is not appropriate to treat some widely reported results in animal cognition as if their interpretation…Read more
-
553Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher-order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so-called “mirror neurons” in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher-order intentionality, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behav…Read more
-
5John Macnamara and Gonzalo E. Reyes, eds., The Logical Foundations of Cognition Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 15 (3): 188-190. 1995.
-
125Consciousness and ethics: Artificially conscious moral agentsInternational Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (01): 177-192. 2011.
-
717Deciphering animal painIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, Bradford Book/mit Press. 2005.In this paper we1 assess the potential for research on nonhuman animals to address questions about the phenomenology of painful experiences. Nociception, the basic capacity for sensing noxious stimuli, is widespread in the animal kingdom. Even rel- atively primitive animals such as leeches and sea slugs possess nociceptors, neurons that are functionally specialized for sensing noxious stimuli (Walters 1996). Vertebrate spinal cords play a sophisticated role in processing and modulating nocicepti…Read more
-
112The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition (edited book)MIT Press. 2002.The fifty-seven original essays in this book provide a comprehensive overview of the interdisciplinary field of animal cognition.
-
176The Geometry of Partial UnderstandingAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3): 249-262. 2013.Wittgenstein famously ended his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein 1922) by writing: "Whereof one cannot speak, one must pass over in silence." (Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.) In that earliest work, Wittgenstein gives no clue about whether this aphorism applied to animal minds, or whether he would have included philosophical discussions about animal minds as among those displaying "the most fundamental confusions (of which the whole of philosophy is full)" …Read more
-
108Answer Set Programming on Expert Feedback to Populate and ExtendIn David Wilson & H. Chad Lane (eds.), Proceedings of the Twenty-First International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference, Aaai Press. pp. 500-505. 2008.dynamic ontologies must be inferred and populated in part from the reference corpora themselves, but ontological rela-.
UCLA
Department Of Philosophy
Alumnus
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Biology |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Computing and Information |
PhilPapers Editorships
Animal Minds |
Animal Communication |
Animal Minds, Misc |