Richard King

Two treatises on memory which have come down to us from antiquity are Aristotle’s “On memory and recollection” and Plotinus’ “On perception and memory” ; the latter also wrote at length about memory in his “Problems connected with the soul”. In both authors memory is treated as a ‘modest’ faculty: both authors assume the existence of a persistent subject to whom memory belongs; and basic cognitive capacities are assumed on which memory depends. In particular, both theories use phantasia to explain memory. Aristotle takes representations to be changes in concrete living things which arise from actual perception. To be connected to the original perception the representation has to be taken as a copy of the original experience ‑ this is the way Aristotle defines memory at the end of his investigation. Plotinus does not define memory: he is concerned with the question of what remembers. This is of course the soul, which goes through different stages of incarnation and disincarnation. Since the disembodied soul can remember, so he does not have Aristotle’s resources for explaining the continued presence of representations as changes in the concrete thing. Instead, he thinks that when acquiring a memory we acquire a capacity in respect of the object of the memory, namely to make it present at a later time.

Nutrition provides Aristotle a way of distinguishing form and matter in living things. It also provides the way of binding form and matter. On the one hand, living activity takes part in continuously different matter, in any individual. On the other, nutrition, specified by any one indivisible kind of living thing, must take part in matter of the requisite kind. Between them these two facts explain the sense in which living is in a subject without being an attribute. For the soul is the cause of the living thing: it brings it about that there is a living body. Nutrition is the way that the soul achieves this. This explains how soul can then serve as the substance of living things in the Metaphysics.

In Menciusiia6 all humans are said to have ‘a heart that does not bear the suffering of others’. I argue that this statement is illustrated, rather than proven, by the example of our reaction to a child about to fall into a well. This illustration can be located at the most basic level of ethical universals (it is a universal example): basic ethical training; further steps in a ladder of reflection are universal reflection on ethical norms themselves, which may finally be related universally to non-ethical concerns.

Ren in the Lunyu is often taken to be virtue; if virtue is taken to be excellence as performing a function, as Plato understands it, this is not persuasive. Nor is it easy to show how ren encompasses or implies all other virtues. Ren is furthermore ambiguous—it is used both in a wide sense and specifically as benevolence; in fact there are at least six accounts of what ren is in the Lunyu. This ambiguity cannot be made harmless by use of speech act theory, since commands, for example, require satisfaction conditions for them to be comprehensible. I conclude on a skeptical note: how ren is to be understood as virtue, if at all, remains unclear

Recent controversies in Japanese Buddhist scholarship have focused upon the Mah y na notion of a “Buddha nature” within all sentient beings and whether or not the concept is compatible with traditional Buddhist teachings such as an tman. This controversy is not only relevant to Far Eastern Buddhism, for which the notion of a Buddha-nature is a central doctrinal theme, but also for the roots of this tradition in those Indian Mah y na s tras which utilised the notion of tath gatagarbha. One of the earliest Buddhist texts to discuss this notion is the Queen r m l S tra, which appears to display a transitional and revisionist attitude towards traditional Mah y na doctrines such as emptiness and no-abiding-self. These and related issues are examined as they occur in the r m l S tra and as they might relate to the issue of the place of Buddha-nature thought within the Buddhist tradition. Finally some concluding remarks are made about the quest for “true” Buddhism.

The Tao and the Logos: Literary Hermeneutics, East and West. Zhang Longxi, 1992 Duke University Press xviii + 239 pp., ISBN 0 8223 1218 2, pb $14.50 Ibn Sinā and Mysticism: Remarks and Admonitions. Shams C. Inati, 1996, London, Kegan Paul International, 114 pp., ISBN 0 7103 0482 X, hb £30.00 Ethics in Early Buddhism. David J. Kalupahana, 1995, Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, ix+ 171 pp., ISBN 0 8248 1702 8, hb $27.00 On Understanding Buddhists. Essays on Theravāda Tradition in Sri Lanka. John Ross Carter, 1993, Albany, State University of New York Press, xiv+215 pp, hb $16.95 To See the Buddha. A Philosopher's Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness. Malcolm David Eckel, 1994, Princeton, Princeton University Press, x + 262 pp., ISBN 0 691 03773 6, pb US$ 16.95