Mario De Caro

The critical concern of the present volume is contemporary naturalism, both in its scientific version and as represented by newly emerging hopes for another, philosophically more liberal, naturalism.1 The papers collected here are state-of-the-art discussions that question the appeal, rational motivations, and presuppositions of scientific naturalism across a broad range of philosophical topics. As an alternative to scientific naturalism, we offer the outlines of a new non- reductive form of naturalism and a more inclusive conception of nature than any provided by the natural sciences. Our authors collectively believe that holding scientific naturalism up for philosophical scrutiny and challenging its misconceptions is of the first importance both for understanding ourselves and our place in the world; and, also, for the future direction of philosophy itself.

What aesthetic interest do we have in watching films? In a much debated paper, Roger Scruton argued that this interest typically comes down to the interest in the dramatic representations recorded by such films. Berys Gaut and Catharine Abell criticized Scruton’s argument by claiming that films can elicit an aesthetic interest also by virtue of their pictorial representation. In this article, we develop a different criticism of Scruton’s argument. In our view, a film can elicit an aesthetic interest that does not come down to an interest in the dramatic representation or in the pictorial representation. We will argue that this is a distinctively cinematic interest. In section I we outline Scruton’s argument. In section II we point out an interest in how the cinematic medium presents the portrayed subject as detached from the spectator’s environment. In section III, by referring to Wittgenstein’s account of the contemplation from outside, we contend that the interest in films introduced in section II can count as an aesthetic interest. In section IV we argue that both documentaries and fiction films can elicit this kind of interest. In section V we compare the three different kinds of aesthetic interest that, in our view, a film can elicit. In section VI we describe the corresponding kinds of cinematic achievements.

Many philosophers have today a skeptic attitude toward the idea of free will, often because of arguments and evidence that come from neuroscience. Other philosophers claim however that no empirical evidence can shake our beliefs that we do enjoy free will and that, because of this, we are responsible for our choices and deeds. This article analyzes Wittgenstein’s view on the issue that went from the view advocated in the Tractatus to his later view that we are involved in two different perspectives on human beings: the scientific perspective, which could in principle prove that we are causally determined and therefore unfree, and the perspective of common sense for which the faith in our freedom is unshakeable. At the end of the article the question of the tension between these two perspectives is raised.

The paper discusses Maurizio Ferraris’ Documentalità by raising two objections. The first objection concerns Ferraris’ view that, in the case of all natural entities, there cannot be differences in the way a normal adult, a little child and an animal perceive them. It is claimed that this is not true for objects such as the sun that we (differently from little children and animals) cannot help perceiving as a gigantic hot celestial body. The second objection concerns the thesis that all social objects presuppose a written act. In this case the claim is that it is unclear which philosophy of mind can support such a view.