Jason Eberl

One issue in contemporary philosophy that has received significant attention recently concerns the metaphysical nature of human persons. The debate between philosophers who reduce human nature to physical or psychological properties alone, and those who hold that human nature transcends such properties, has engendered a great deal of scholarship and inspired others to formulate accounts that avoid the pitfalls of either extreme. I canvass this debate and focus upon three positions to explicate and evaluate. Richard Swinburne contends that a human person is identical to an immaterial soul. Eric Olson argues for a reduction of human nature to its biological "animality." Lynne Rudder Baker provides an account that preserves the inherently physical nature of human persons, while arguing that being a person includes more than what physical properties alone can explain. ;In addition to these contemporary scholars, I find Thomas Aquinas to provide a good source of interlocution and to add a comparable historical voice to this debate. I thus provide a reconstruction of Aquinas's account for comparison to those discussed previously. I claim that Aquinas offers an account which takes seriously the physical aspect of human nature, though Aquinas does not identify a human person with her physical body. Conversely, Aquinas does not argue that a human person is identical to an immaterial soul, though Aquinas considers an immaterial soul to be an essential part of human nature. ;Conclusions concerning the metaphysical nature of human persons have important practical implications in areas such as bioethics. For example, in the debate over euthanasia, one issue concerns whether a patient in a "persistent vegetative state," i.e., who is permanently unconscious, qualifies as a "person." I show how a metaphysical account of human nature, such as Aquinas', provides an arguable response to this issue among others in bioethics

This paper addresses several questions related to the nature, production, and use of animal-human (a-h) chimeras. At the heart of the issue is whether certain types of a-h chimeras should be brought into existence, and, if they are, how we should treat such creatures. In our current research environment, we recognize a dichotomy between research involving nonhuman animal subjects and research involving human subjects, and the classification of a research protocol into one of these categories will trigger different ethical standards as to the moral permissibility of the research in question. Are a-h chimeras entitled to the more restrictive and protective ethical standards applied to human research subjects? We elucidate an Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical framework in which to argue how such chimeras ought to be defined ontologically. We then examine when the creation of, and experimentation upon, certain types of a-h chimeras may be morally permissible.

Thomas Aquinas argues that matter is informed by a rational soul to compose a human person. But a person may survive her body’s death since a rational soul is able to exist and function without matter. This leads to the typical characterization of Aquinas as a dualist. Thomistic dualism, however, is distinct from both Platonic dualism and various accounts of substance dualism offered by philosophers such as Richard Swinburne. For both Plato and Swinburne, a person is identical to an immaterial soul that is contingently related to a human body. For Aquinas, a human person is composed of her soul and the matter it informs, but is not identical to either metaphysical component. I explicate Thomistic dualism while critically analyzing Swinburne’s account. I conclude that Aquinas’s account has theresources to address a central issue that arises for substance dualism.

Debate concerning human enhancement often revolves around the question of whether there is a common “nature” that all human beings share and which is unwarrantedly violated by enhancing one’s capabilities beyond the “species-typical” norm. I explicate Thomas Aquinas’s influential theory of human nature, noting certain key traits commonly shared among human beings that define each as a “person” who possesses inviolable moral status. Understanding the specific qualities that define the nature of human persons, which includes self-conscious awareness, capacity for intellective thought, and volitional autonomy, informs the ethical assessment of various forms of enhancement. Some forms of cognitive and physical enhancement may be desirable from the perspective of what constitutes the “flourishing” of human persons in our fundamental nature; while other forms of enhancement, such as emotive or so-called “moral” enhancement, run the risk of detracting from human flourishing when evaluated from the virtue-theoretic perspective Aquinas promotes

Those who oppose human embryonic stem cell research argue for a clear position on the metaphysical and moral status of human embryos. This position does not differ whether the embryo is present inside its mother’s reproductive tract or in a cryopreservation tank. It is worth examining, however, whether an embryo in “suspended animation” has the same status as one actively developing in utero. I will explore this question from the perspective of Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical account of human nature. I conclude that a cryopreserved human embryo counts, both metaphysically and morally, as a person; and thus the utilization of such embryos for inherently destructive research purposes is impermissible.

Advocates of active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide argue that a patient’s intractable pain and suffering are a sufficient justification for his life to end if he autonomously so chooses. Others hold that the non-utilization of life-sustaining treatment, the use of pain-relieving medication that may hasten a patient’s death, and palliative sedation may be morally acceptable means of alleviating pain and suffering. How a patient should be cared for when approaching the end of life involves one’s core religious and moral values, particularly concerning whether pain and suffering can have some sort of instrumental value. The author reasons why a patient who is terminally ill can find his suffering valuable for both religious and nonreligious goals. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 12.2 (Summer 2012): 251–261.

This essay focuses on cases in which a physician elects to withhold, either temporarily or permanently, certain information from a patient for arguably beneficent reasons. That is, the physician is not being self-serving, to herself or her institution, by not revealing this information. Rather, the goal is purely to promote what the physician believes to be in the patient’s best interest by withholding information that may be harmful to him. This practice of informational guardianship is known as the “therapeutic privilege.” This discussion is thus also limited to clinical interactions and not explicitly discuss withholding information from research subjects, which raises distinct ethical issues and elicits different reasons used to justify or nullify the moral permissibility of nondisclosure.

Alongside a revival of interest in Thomism in philosophy, scholars have realised its relevance when addressing certain contemporary issues in bioethics. This book offers a rigorous interpretation of Aquinas's metaphysics and ethical thought, and highlights its significance to questions in bioethics. Jason T. Eberl applies Aquinas’s views on the seminal topics of human nature and morality to key questions in bioethics at the margins of human life – questions which are currently contested in the academia, politics and the media such as: When does a human person’s life begin? How should we define and clinically determine a person’s death? Is abortion ever morally permissible? How should we resolve the conflict between the potential benefits of embryonic stem cell research and the lives of human embryos? Does cloning involve a misuse of human ingenuity and technology? What forms of treatment are appropriate for irreversibly comatose patients? How should we care for patients who experience unbearable suffering as they approach the end of life? _Thomistic Principles and Bioethics_ presents a significant philosophical viewpoint which will motivate further dialogue amongst religious and secular arenas of inquiry concerning such complex issues of both individual and public concern.

In addressing bioethical issues at the beginning of human life, such as abortion, in vitro fertilization, and embryonic stem cell research, one primary concern regards establishing when a developing human embryo or fetus can be considered a person. Thomas Aquinas argues that an embryo or fetus is not a human person until its body is informed by a rational soul. Aquinas's explicit account of human embryogenesis has been generally rejected by contemporary scholars due to its dependence upon medieval biological data, which has been far surpassed by current scientific research. A number of scholars, however, have attempted to combine Aquinas's basic metaphysical account of human nature with current embryological data to develop a contemporary Thomistic account of a human person's beginning. In this article, I discuss two recent interpretations in which it is argued that a human person does not begin to exist until a fetus has developed a functioning cerebral cortex

Dignitas personae has garnered significant attention both inside and outside Roman Catholic circles, but it lacks the argumentative force not only to present the Church’s ethical judgment but also to persuade non-sympathetic readers. More direct engagement with contrary views would provide a stronger foundation for constructing arguments in public discourse. This article highlights various assertions found in Dignitas personae which call for greater explicit argumentation. Subjects treated include the ontological and moral status of human embryos, prenatal adoption, potentially abortifacient contraceptives, reproductive cloning, and alternatives to human embryonic stem cell research, such as induced pluripotent stem cells and animal–human chimeras.

Thomas Aquinas presents an account of human immortality and bodily resurrection intended to be both faithful to Christian Scripture and metaphysically sound as following from the Aristotelian view of human nature. One central question is whether a human person persists between death and resurrection by virtue of her soul, given Aquinas’s hylomorphic account of human nature and assertion that a human person is not identical to her soul. Robert Pasnau contends that only a part of a person exists between death and resurrection; whereas Eleonore Stump argues that a person substantially exists, albeit deficiently, during the interim period as composed of, but not identical to her soul. In this essay, I will adjudicate this dispute through textual and metaphysical analysis.

The essays in this volume tackle the philosophical questions from these blockbuster films including: Was Anakin predestined to fall to the Dark Side? Are the Jedi truly role models of moral virtue? Why would the citizens and protectors of a democratic Republic allow it to descend into a tyrannical empire? Is Yoda a peaceful Zen master or a great warrior, or both? Why is there both a light and a dark side of the Force? Star Wars and Philosophy ponders the depths of these subjects and asks what it truly means to be mindful of the "living force."

The Routledge Guidebook to Aquinas‘ Summa Theologiae introduces readers to a work which represents the pinnacle of medieval Western scholarship and which has inspired numerous commentaries, imitators, and opposing views. Outlining the main arguments Aquinas utilizes to support his conclusions on various philosophical questions, this clear and comprehensive guide explores: The historical context in which Aquinas wrote A critical discussion of the topics outlined in the text including theology, metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, ethics, and political theory. The ongoing influence of Summa Theologiae in modern Philosophy and Theology Offering a close reading of the original work, this guidebook highlights the central themes of Aquinas’ masterwork and is an essential read for anyone seeking an understanding of this highly influential work in the history of philosophy

Euthanasia, today, is one of the most debated issues in bioethics. Euthanasia, at the time of Thomas Aquinas, was an unheard-of term. Nevertheless, while there is no direct statement with respect to “euthanasia” per se in the writings of Aquinas, Aquinas’s moral theory and certain theological commitments he held could be applied to the euthanasia question and thus bring Aquinas into contemporary bioethical debate. In this paper, I present the relevant aspects of Aquinas’s account of natural law and his theological views on suffering, examining what conclusions each entails with respect to directly intended euthanasia. I then proceed to discuss cases that involve either the administration of palliative medication that hastens death, terminal sedation, or the non-utilization of life-sustaining treatment. This involves a detailed investigation into Aquinas’s account of human intentional action and the question of whether Aquinas holds some form of the Principle of Double-Effect. I end with a final statement of Aquinas’s position on these various types of cases as a synthesis of the conclusions drawn from the different areas of his thought discussed in this paper. My aim is to provide a set of guidelines, based upon Aquinas’s thought, for those who may be faced with decisions regarding the proper form of palliative treatment to be provided to those suffering from a painful terminal illness. Decision-makers, in such cases, may include a terminally ill patient, a patient’s immediate family, health care providers, and lawmakers concerned with establishing the legality of certain forms of treatment. Establishing a clear set of moral guidelines, specifically addressed to this type of decision, can assist the relevant decision-makers in forming their consciences such that they may take the appropriate course of action in confronting the suffering of a terminally ill patient.

This paper considers the issue of cryopreservation and the definition of death from an Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective. A central conceptual focus throughout this discussion is the purportedly irreversible nature of death and the criteria by which a human body is considered to be informed by a rational soul. It concludes that a cryopreserved corpse fails to have “life potentially in it” sufficient to satisfy Aristotle’s definition of ensoulment. Therefore, if the possibility that such a corpse may be successfully preserved and resuscitated comes to fruition, one would have to conclude that the person’s rational soul, which had separated from its body at death, has literally reanimated its resuscitated body. Obviously, this conclusion has theological implications that go beyond the scope of this discussion if we regard bodily resuscitation in this manner as a form of technologically induced resurrection. Another apparent implication of the paper’s argument is that, in a limited sense, death loses its irreversible nature.