Graham Harman

The article begins from Stephen Hawking's well-known claim that philosophy is dead, and considers several other quotations in which philosophy is either belittled or subordinated outright to the natural sciences. This subordination requires a downward reductionism that is paralleled by the upward reductionism of the linguistic turn and social constructionist theories. Rather than undermining or overmining mid-sized individual entities, philosophy must deal with objects on their own terms. This suggests a possible tactical alliance between philosophy and the arts

This article claims that the familiar distinction between “first-person” and “third-person” perspectives is not a very strong distinction, given that both are perspectives. Quite apart from any perspective we might take on things there are the things themselves, in what the author calls their “zero-person” reality. Appealing to an unorthodox reading of Brentano, Husserl, and Heidegger, the author makes a lengthy critique of David Chalmers for remaining a reductionist in the physical realm even as he opposes reductionism for minds. In closing, the article defends a “polypsychism” instead of “panpsychism,” since many objects are conscious but by no means all of them.

"Qu'est-ce qu'une chose? " Question déjà ancienne. Elle n'est toujours neuve que parce qu'il faut sans cesse la poser à nouveau ", observait Heidegger. C'est le traitement de cette question fondamentale de la métaphysique qu'entreprend, à nouveaux frais, Graham Harman en proposant une théorie originale de l'objet compris comme une unité autonome et concrète. Un objet, en effet, n'est jamais épuisé par l'usage ou la connaissance que j'en prends. Sa réalité ne se réduit pas non plus aux interactions qu'il peut avoir avec les autres objets qui l'entourent. II outrepasse toute perspective et toute synthèse qui prétendraient le soumettre, possédant un " en soi " qui, enfoui dans les profondeurs mêmes de l'être, en assure l'altérité radicale. La question Qu'est-ce qu'une chose? en cache donc une autre, plus inquiétante : Comment penser ce qui, du réel, ne se montre en aucun cas? Rouvrant un dossier qui semblait clos depuis la mise au ban de la " chose en soi " kantienne, l'auteur trouve dans la phénoménologie les concepts de base de cette remarquable aventure ontologique : dans la pensée husserlienne de l'objet intentionnel et, plus encore, dans l'analyse heideggérienne de l'outil dont Graham Harman suggère la continuité avec le thème mystérieux du " Quadriparti ". C'est alors que l'objet pourra se laisser penser dans toute sa profondeur, réalité multipolaire et conflictuelle, à la fois manifeste et retirée, dont le présent ouvrage dessine la carte inédite". Olivier Dubouclez.

Until quite recently, almost no philosophers trained in the continental tradition saw anything of value in realism. The situation in analytic philosophy was always different, but in continental philosophy realism was usually treated as a pseudo-problem. That is no longer the case. In this provocative new book, two leading philosophers examine the remarkable rise of realism in the continental tradition. While exploring the similarities and differences in their own positions, they also consider the work of others and assess rival trends in contemporary philosophy. They begin by discussing the relation between realism and materialism, which DeLanda links closely but which Harman tries to separate. Part Two covers the many different meanings of realism, with the two authors working together to develop an expanded definition of the term. Part Three features a spirited exchange on the respective virtues and drawbacks of DeLanda's realism of attractors and singularities and Harman's object-oriented theory. Part Four shifts to the question of the knowability of the real, as the authors discuss whether scientific knowledge does full justice to reality. In Part Five, they shift the focus to space, time, and science more generally, and here Harman offers a defence of actor-network theory despite its obvious anti-realist elements. Lively, accessible and engaging, this book is the best attempt so far to clarify the different paths for realism in continental philosophy. It will be of great value to students and scholars of continental philosophy and to anyone interested in the cutting-edge debates in philosophy and critical theory today.