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81Review of Ingmar Persson, The retreat of reason: A dilemma in the philosophy of life (review)Times Literary Supplement (9 November). 2007.
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295Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4): 537-561. 2008.Frank Jackson has argued that, given plausible claims about supervenience, descriptive predicates and property identity, there are no irreducibly normative properties. Philosophers who think that there are such properties have made several objections to this argument. In this paper, I argue that all of these objections fail. I conclude that Jackson's argument shows that there are no irreducibly normative properties
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248Reasons and ImpossibilityPhilosophical Studies 136 (3): 351-384. 2007.Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then give three arguments for the …Read more
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209Does 'ought' conversationally implicate 'can'?European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2). 2003.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that 'ought' does not entail 'can', but instead conversationally implicates it. I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong is actually committed to a hybrid view about the relation between 'ought' and 'can'. I then give a tensed formulation of the view that 'ought' entails 'can' that deals with Sinnott-Armstrong's argument and that is more unified than Sinnott-Armstrong's view.
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178Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory EitherJournal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4): 419-436. 2016.Jonas Olson writes that "a plausible moral error theory must be an error theory about all irreducible normativity". I agree. But unlike Olson, I think we cannot believe this error theory. I first argue that Olson should say that reasons for belief are irreducibly normative. I then argue that if reasons for belief are irreducibly normative, we cannot believe an error theory about all irreducible normativity. I then explain why I think Olson's objections to this argument fail. I end by showing tha…Read more
Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics |