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36Précis of Unbelievable ErrorsInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (4): 257-269. 2018.In Unbelievable Errors, I defend an error theory about all normative judgements, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that our inability to believe this theory makes the theory more likely to be true. This précis gives a brief overview of my arguments for the error theory and of my explanation of our inability to believe the theory.
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34Review of Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005. 2005.
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32Précis of Unbelievable ErrorsJournal of Moral Philosophy 16 (6): 687-696. 2019.In Unbelievable Errors, I defend an error theory about all normative judgments, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that our inability to believe this theory makes the theory more likely to be true. This précis gives a brief overview of my arguments for the error theory.
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7Irrealism in Ethics (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2014.Irrealism in Ethics is a collection of six original essays by prominent moral philosophers. The essays discuss various forms of ethical irrealism and present arguments for and against the two major versions of ethical irrealism: expressivism and the error theory.
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4Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?In Irrealism in Ethics, Wiley. 2014.Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world.
Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics |