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Bart Streumer

University of Groningen
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University of Reading
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2003
Homepage
Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics
  •  74
    Review of David Sobel and Steven Wall, Reasons for Action (review)
    Analysis 71 (1): 200-202. 2011.
    Moral Reasons
  •  156
    Inferential and non-inferential reasoning
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 1-29. 2007.
    It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this answer can help …Read more
    DeliberationPractical and Theoretical ReasoningEpistemological States and PropertiesInference
  •  278
    Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?
    with Daan Evers
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1): 1-9. 2016.
    Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau have recently proposed a new version of moral nonnaturalism, according to which there are nonnatural moral concepts and truths but no nonnatural moral facts. This view entails that moral error theorists are conceptually deficient. We explain why moral error theorists are not conceptually deficient. We then argue that this explanation reveals what is wrong with Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view.
    Moral NonnaturalismMoral SemanticsMoral Error Theories and Fictionalism
  •  213
    Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties
    In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, Oxford University Press. pp. 310-336. 2013.
    Jonathan Dancy thinks that there are irreducibly normative properties. Frank Jackson has given a well-known argument against this view, and I have elsewhere defended this argument against many objections, including one made by Dancy. But Dancy remains unconvinced. In this chapter, I hope to convince him.
    Moral NonnaturalismMoral Supervenience
  •  177
    Practical Reasoning
    In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 244-251. 2010.
    To be able to say what practical reasoning is, we first need to say what reasoning is and what the conclusion of a process of reasoning is. I shall do this in sections 1 and 2. We can then make a distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. There are three main ways to do this, which I shall survey in sections 3 to 5. I shall end by suggesting that there are different kinds of practical reasoning
    Practical and Theoretical Reasoning