•  239
    Reasons and Entailment
    Erkenntnis 66 (3): 353-374. 2007.
    What is the relation between entailment and reasons for belief? In this paper, I discuss several answers to this question, and I argue that these answers all face problems. I then propose the following answer: for all propositions p1,...,pn and q, if the conjunction of p1,..., and pn entails q, then there is a reason against a person's both believing that p1,..., and that pn and believing the negation of q. I argue that this answer avoids the problems that the other answers to this question face…Read more
  •  281
    Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?
    Ratio 26 (4): 450-470. 2013.
    Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world
  •  438
    Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4): 537-561. 2008.
    Frank Jackson has argued that, given plausible claims about supervenience, descriptive predicates and property identity, there are no irreducibly normative properties. Philosophers who think that there are such properties have made several objections to this argument. In this paper, I argue that all of these objections fail. I conclude that Jackson's argument shows that there are no irreducibly normative properties
  •  414
    Reasons and Impossibility
    Philosophical Studies 136 (3): 351-384. 2007.
    Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then give three arguments for the …Read more
  •  318
    Does 'ought' conversationally implicate 'can'?
    European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2). 2003.
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that 'ought' does not entail 'can', but instead conversationally implicates it. I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong is actually committed to a hybrid view about the relation between 'ought' and 'can'. I then give a tensed formulation of the view that 'ought' entails 'can' that deals with Sinnott-Armstrong's argument and that is more unified than Sinnott-Armstrong's view.
  •  295
    Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4): 419-436. 2016.
    Jonas Olson writes that "a plausible moral error theory must be an error theory about all irreducible normativity". I agree. But unlike Olson, I think we cannot believe this error theory. I first argue that Olson should say that reasons for belief are irreducibly normative. I then argue that if reasons for belief are irreducibly normative, we cannot believe an error theory about all irreducible normativity. I then explain why I think Olson's objections to this argument fail. I end by showing tha…Read more
  •  373
    Campbell Brown is right that my argument against semi-global consequentialism relies on the principle of agglomeration. However, semi-global consequentialists cannot rescue their view simply by rejecting this principle.
  •  204
    No, We Cannot
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4): 537-546. 2016.
    Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini argues that we can believe the error theory. In this reply, I explain why I still think we cannot.
  •  378
    Can consequentialism cover everything?
    Utilitas 15 (2): 237-47. 2003.
    Derek Parfit, Philip Pettit and Michael Smith defend a version of consequentialism that covers everything. I argue that this version of consequentialism is false. Consequentialism, I argue, can only cover things that belong to a combination of things that agents can bring about.
  •  140
    Review of David Sobel and Steven Wall, Reasons for Action (review)
    Analysis 71 (1): 200-202. 2011.
  •  310
    Inferential and non-inferential reasoning
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 1-29. 2007.
    It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this answer can help …Read more