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Bradley Monton, seeking God in science: An atheist defends intelligent design (review)Philosophia Reformata 75 (1): 85. 2010.
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9Willem B. Drees, Religion and Science in Context: A Guide to the Debates. London & New York 2010: Routledge. viii + 168 pages. ISBN 9780415556170 (review)Philosophia Reformata 76 (1): 154-157. 2011.
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12Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O’Connor, eds., Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue (review)Journal of Analytic Theology 4 409-415. 2016._ _.
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250Epistemic dependence and collective scientific knowledgeSynthese 191 (1): 1-17. 2014.I argue that scientific knowledge is collective knowledge, in a sense to be specified and defended. I first consider some existing proposals for construing collective knowledge and argue that they are unsatisfactory, at least for scientific knowledge as we encounter it in actual scientific practice. Then I introduce an alternative conception of collective knowledge, on which knowledge is collective if there is a strong form of mutual epistemic dependence among scientists, which makes it so that …Read more
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100Unsafe AssertionsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4): 1-5. 2012.John Turri has recently provided two problem cases for the knowledge account of assertion (KAA) to argue for the express knowledge account of assertion (EKAA). We defend KAA by explaining away the intuitions about the problem cases and by showing that our explanation is theoretically superior to EKAA
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58Design Hypotheses Behave Like Skeptical HypothesesInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2): 69-90. 2017._ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 69 - 90 It is often claimed that, as a result of scientific progress, we now _know_ that the natural world displays no design. Although we have no interest in defending design hypotheses, we will argue that establishing claims to the effect that we know the denials of design hypotheses is more difficult than it seems. We do so by issuing two skeptical challenges to design-deniers. The first challenge draws inspiration from radical skepticism and shows how design …Read more
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27Scientism: The New Orthodoxy (review)International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (1): 93-95. 2016.
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29Bradley Monton, Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design. Peterborough, ON & Buffalo, NY 2009: Broadview Press. 177 pages. ISBN 9781551118635 (review)Philosophia Reformata 75 (1): 85-88. 2010.
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Willem Drees, religion and science in context: A guide to the debates (review)Philosophia Reformata 76 (1): 154. 2011.
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24Marcel Sarot, De goddeloosheid van de wetenschap: Theologie, geloof en het gangbare wetenschapsideaal. Zoetermeer 2006: Meinema. 159 pagina’s. ISBN 9789021141336 (review)Philosophia Reformata 73 (1): 124-127. 2008.
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259Epistemology socialized: Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard : Social epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, xviii+350pp, £45.00 HB (review)Metascience 21 (2): 477-481. 2011.Epistemology socialized Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9579-4 Authors Jeroen de Ridder, Faculty of Philosophy, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796
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21Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God. Malden, MA / Oxford 2008: Blackwell. x + 270 pages. ISBN 9780631193647 (review)Philosophia Reformata 75 (1): 88-90. 2010.
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530The (Alleged) Inherent Normativity of Technological ExplanationsTechné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 10 (1): 79-94. 2006.Technical artifacts have the capacity to fulfill their function in virtue of their physicochemical make-up. An explanation that purports to explicate this relation between artifact function and structure can be called a technological explanation. It might be argued, and Peter Kroes has in fact done so, that there issomething peculiar about technological explanations in that they are intrinsically normative in some sense. Since the notion of artifact function is a normative one (if an artifact ha…Read more
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6Jonathan L. Kvanvig , Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume I. Oxford 2008: Oxford University Press. viii + 272 pages. ISBN 9780199542666 (review)Philosophia Reformata 74 (2): 158-161. 2009.
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18'Barking up the wrong tree': rationaliteit in de religieuze beslisboomAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 104 (2): 112. 2012.
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23Wetenschap en sciëntisme in de populaire wetenschapAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 107 (3): 233-250. 2015.Science and Scientism in Popular Science Writing If one is to believe recent popular scientific accounts of developments in physics, biology, neuroscience, and cognitive science, most of the perennial philosophical questions have been wrested from the hands of philosophers by now, only to be resolved (or sometimes dissolved) by contemporary science. To mention but a few examples of issues that science has now allegedly dealt with: the origin and destiny of the universe, the origin of human life,…Read more
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87Referring To, Believing In, and Worshipping the Same God: A Reformed ViewFaith and Philosophy 31 (1): 46-67. 2014.We present a Reformed view on the relation between Christianity and non-Christian religions. We then explore what this view entails for the question whether Christians and non-Christian religious believers refer to, believe in, and worship the same God. We first analyze the concepts of worship, belief-in, and reference, as well as their interrelations. We then argue that adherents of the Abrahamic religions plausibly refer to the same God, whereas adherents of non-Abrahamic religions do not refe…Read more
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48Is there epistemic justification for secrecy in science?Episteme 10 (2): 101-116. 2013.Empirical evidence shows that secrecy in science has increased over the past decades, partly as a result of the commercialization of science. There is a good prima facie case against secrecy in science. It is part of the traditional ethos of science that it is a collective and open truth-seeking endeavor. In this paper, I will investigate whether secrecy in science can ever be epistemically justified. To answer this question, I first distinguish between different sorts of secrecy. Next, I propos…Read more
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30The (Alleged) Inherent Normativity of Technological ExplanationsTechné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 10 (1): 79-94. 2006.Technical artifacts have the capacity to fulfill their function in virtue of their physicochemical make-up. An explanation that purports to explicate this relation between artifact function and structure can be called a technological explanation. It might be argued, and Peter Kroes has in fact done so, that there issomething peculiar about technological explanations in that they are intrinsically normative in some sense. Since the notion of artifact function is a normative one an explanation of …Read more
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34Kan God een goede verklaring zijn? Over theïstische verklaringen in de wetenschapPhilosophia Reformata 73 (1): 44-60. 2008.Veel wetenschappers, filosofen en theologen zijn van mening dat God nooit opgevoerd mag worden als verklaring voor een verschijnsel. Eén argument dat ze hiervoor aandragen is dat het op de een of andere manier in de aard van wetenschap zit dat God er geen rol in kan spelen. In dit artikel ga ik in op een specifieke versie van dit argument. Ik vraag me af of de aard van wetenschappelijke verklaringen uitsluit dat God als verklaringsgrond wordt genoemd. Om die vraag te beantwoorden ga ik na of de …Read more
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43Design discourse and the cognitive science of designPhilosophia Reformata 79 (1): 37-53. 2014.Much of Alvin Plantinga’s Where the Conflict Really Lies will contain few surprises for those who have been following his work over the past decades. This —I hasten to add — is nothing against the book. The fact alone that his ideas on various topics, which have appeared scattered throughout the literature, are now actualized, applied to the debate about the conflict between science and religion, and organized into an overarching argument with a single focus makes this book worthwhile. Moreover,…Read more
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107Why Only Externalists Can Be SteadfastErkenntnis 79 (S1): 185-199. 2014.What is the rational response to disagreement with an epistemic peer? Some say the steadfast response of holding on to your own belief can be rational; others argue that some degree of conciliation is always rationally required. I argue that only an epistemological externalist about rationality—someone who holds that the rationality of a belief is partly constituted by factors outside a subject’s cognitive perspective—can defend the steadfast view. Or at least that this is so in the kinds of ide…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
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Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |
Epistemology of Religion |
Reformed Epistemology |
Social Epistemology |
Collective Epistemology |
Testimony |
Disagreement |