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John Thrasher

Chapman University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    39
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  •  Events
    6
  •  News and Updates
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 More details
  • Chapman University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
University of Arizona
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2013
CV
Homepage
Orange, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics
Social and Political Philosophy
Causal Decision Theory
Convention and Coordination
Evolutionary Game Theory
Game Theory and Ethics
Game Theory and Political Philosophy
Normative and Descriptive Game Theory
3 more
Areas of Interest
Normative Ethics
Game Theory and Political Philosophy
Game Theory and Ethics
Evolutionary Game Theory
Convention and Coordination
Causal Decision Theory
17th/18th Century Philosophy
General Philosophy of Science
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Social and Political Philosophy
Philosophy of Law
Normative and Descriptive Game Theory
7 more
PhilPapers Editorships
Social Contract
Contractarianism about Political Authority
Contractualism about Political Authority
Social Contract, Misc
  • All publications (39)
  •  13
    Review of Bounds of Reason (review)
    Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1). 2011.
    Value TheoryValue Theory, Miscellaneous
  •  11
    Ordering Anarchy
    Rationality, Markets and Morals 5 (1): 30-46. 2014.
    Ordered social life requires rules of conduct that help generate and preserve peaceful and cooperative interactions among individuals. The problem is that these social rules impose costs. They prohibit us from doing some things we might see as important and they require us to do other things that we might otherwise not do. The question for the contractarian is whether the costs of these social rules can be rationally justified. I argue that traditional contract theories have tended to underestim…Read more
    Ordered social life requires rules of conduct that help generate and preserve peaceful and cooperative interactions among individuals. The problem is that these social rules impose costs. They prohibit us from doing some things we might see as important and they require us to do other things that we might otherwise not do. The question for the contractarian is whether the costs of these social rules can be rationally justified. I argue that traditional contract theories have tended to underestimate the importance of evaluating the cost of enforcement and compliance in the contract procedure. In addition, the social contract has been understood narrowly as a method of justifying specifically moral or political rules. I defend a broader version of contractarianism as a justificatory model that can be used to evaluate any set of social rules or institutions that impose costson agents. In so doing, I argue that contractarianism is a general method of evaluating and justifying the rules that order the structure of social life
    Political TheoryAnarchismPolitical ConstructivismMoral ContractarianismContractarianism about Politi…Read more
    Political TheoryAnarchismPolitical ConstructivismMoral ContractarianismContractarianism about Political Authority
  •  242
    Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract
    with Fred D'Agostino and Gerald Gaus
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2011.
    Moral ContractarianismMoral ContractualismContractualism about Political AuthorityContractarianism a…Read more
    Moral ContractarianismMoral ContractualismContractualism about Political AuthorityContractarianism about Political AuthorityEvolutionary Game TheoryVarieties of Justice
  •  168
    Uniqueness and symmetry in bargaining theories of justice
    Philosophical Studies 167 (3): 683-699. 2014.
    For contractarians, justice is the result of a rational bargain. The goal is to show that the rules of justice are consistent with rationality. The two most important bargaining theories of justice are David Gauthier’s and those that use the Nash’s bargaining solution. I argue that both of these approaches are fatally undermined by their reliance on a symmetry condition. Symmetry is a substantive constraint, not an implication of rationality. I argue that using symmetry to generate uniqueness un…Read more
    For contractarians, justice is the result of a rational bargain. The goal is to show that the rules of justice are consistent with rationality. The two most important bargaining theories of justice are David Gauthier’s and those that use the Nash’s bargaining solution. I argue that both of these approaches are fatally undermined by their reliance on a symmetry condition. Symmetry is a substantive constraint, not an implication of rationality. I argue that using symmetry to generate uniqueness undermines the goal of bargaining theories of justice
    Game Theory and EthicsGame Theory and Political PhilosophyMoral Contractarianism
  • Bounds of Reason (review)
    Journal of Value Inquiry. 2011.
    Value TheoryAutonomyValue Theory, Miscellaneous
  •  64
    The Virtues of Justice1
    with David Schmidtz
    In Timpe Kevin & Boyd Craig (eds.), Virtues and Their Vices, Oxford University Press. pp. 59. 2013.
  •  149
    When Justice Demands Inequality
    with Keith Hankins
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4): 172-194. 2013.
    In Rescuing Justice and Equality G.A. Cohen argues that justice requires an uncompromising commitment to equality. Cohen also argues, however, that justice must be sensitive to other values, including a robust commitment to individual freedom and to the welfare of the community. We ask whether a commitment to these other values means that, despite Cohen’s commitment to equality, his view requires that we make room for inequality in the name of justice? We argue that even on Cohen’s version of eg…Read more
    In Rescuing Justice and Equality G.A. Cohen argues that justice requires an uncompromising commitment to equality. Cohen also argues, however, that justice must be sensitive to other values, including a robust commitment to individual freedom and to the welfare of the community. We ask whether a commitment to these other values means that, despite Cohen’s commitment to equality, his view requires that we make room for inequality in the name of justice? We argue that even on Cohen’s version of egalitarianism equality, freedom, and welfare are not always compatible. Justice will require trade-offs between these values. Sometimes, equality will need to be sacrificed. This is a surprising result and to show it, we use two informal impossibility proofs drawn from examples in Rescuing Justice and Equality
    Political TheoryRights and EqualityConflicts Among RightsThe Scope of Equality
  •  25
    Free Market Fairness (review)
    Public Choice. 2012.
    Political Theory
  •  102
    Credit and Blame
    with David Schmidtz
    The European Legacy 18 (7): 967-967. 2013.
    Ethics
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