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620Replies to Brewer, Gupta, and McDowellPhilosophical Issues 29 (1): 403-410. 2019."The Uneasy Heirs of Acquaintance" is my first-round contribution to a 4-way exchange with Bill Brewer, Anil Gupta, and John McDowell. In the first round, each of us writes a commentary on the other three, and in the second round we reply to each other's first-round contributions. This is my second-round contribution.
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1015The uneasy heirs of acquaintancePhilosophical Issues 29 (1): 348-365. 2019.My contribution to the first round of a tetralog with Bill Brewer, Anil Gupta, and John McDowell. Each of us has written a response to the writings of the other three philosophers on the topic "Empirical Reason". My initial contribution focuses on what we know a priori about perception. In the second round, we will each respond to the each writer's first-round contributions.
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1161The Problem of Culturally Normal BeliefIn Robin Celikates, Sally Haslanger & Jason Stanley (eds.), Ideology: New Essays, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.This paper defends an analysis of the epistemic contours of the interface between individuals and their cultural milieu.
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1753Bias and PerceptionIn Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, Routledge. pp. 99-115. 2020.chapter on perception and bias including implicit bias.
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325This handout contains my replies to comments on the Rationality of Perception by Jennifer Nagel, Adam Pautz, and Peter Railton from a symposium at the 2018 Eastern APA in Savannah.
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23Reflections on the use of English and Spanish in analytic philosophyInformes Del Observatorio, Harvard University. 2014.
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1378Perception as Guessing Versus Perception as Knowing: Replies to Clark and PeacockeRes Philosophica 95 (4): 761-784. 2018.A summary of The Rationality of Perception, and my replies to symposium papers on it by Andy Clark and Christopher Peacocke.
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55Replies to Begby, Ghijsen and SamoilovaAnalysis 78 (3): 523-536. 2018.I’m grateful to Endre Begby, Harmen Ghijsen, and Katia Samoilova for engaging with The Rationality of Perception and for writing such interesting and productive commentaries. Taken together, the three commentaries cover a diverse range of topics.
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38SummaryAnalysis 78 (3): 487-489. 2018.The Rationality of PerceptionBy SiegelSusannaOxford University Press, 2017. xxvi + 222 pp.
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142Discussion of Susanna Siegel's “Can perceptual experiences be rational?”Analytic Philosophy 59 (1): 175-190. 2018.
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1824Attention and perceptual adaptationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3): 205-206. 2013.Commentary on Andy Clark's target article on predictive coding.
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Perception and Demonstrative ReferenceDissertation, Cornell University. 2000.Using certain bits of language, we seem to be able to refer to particular middle-sized dry goods. How is this possible? In this essay, I address this question with respect to uses of demonstrative expressions. I argue that perception makes demonstrative reference possible, and I try to explain how it does so. I argue that the reference of uses of demonstrative expressions, such as "these" in utterances of "these are my keys," is fixed by a demonstrative mental state: more exactly, by an intentio…Read more
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696The Rationality of Perception: Reply to Begby, Ghijsen, and SamoilovaAnalysis (Reviews). 2018.Includes a summary of my book *The Rationality of Perception* (Oxford, 2017) and replies to commentaries on it by Endre Begby, Harmen Ghijsen, and Katia Samoilova. These commentaries and my summary and replies will be published soon in Analysis Reviews. Begby focuses on my analysis of the epistemic features of the interface between individual minds and their cultural milieu (discussed in chapter 10 of *The Rationality of Perception*), Ghijsen focuses on the notion of inference and reliabilism (c…Read more
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739The Epistemology of Perception (short version)In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press. 2015.This is a much shorter version of our entry on the Epistemology of Perception, which will be published in the Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Perception in 2013. The longer version has far more references in it, whereas this version is pared down to the essentials.
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1279Inference Without ReckoningIn Brendan Balcerak Jackson & Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking, Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31. 2019.I argue that inference can tolerate forms of self-ignorance and that these cases of inference undermine canonical models of inference on which inferrers have to appreciate (or purport to appreciate) the support provided by the premises for the conclusion. I propose an alternative model of inference that belongs to a family of rational responses in which the subject cannot pinpoint exactly what she is responding to or why, where this kind of self-ignorance does nothing to undermine the intelligen…Read more
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310Replies to Beck, Chirimuuta, Rosenhagen, Smithies, and SpringleAnalytic Philosophy 59 (1): 175-190. 2018.Replies to commentaries on "Can experiences be rational?", forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy.
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57Michael Madary, Visual Phenomenology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2017.Review of Michael Madary's book *Visual Phenomenology* MIT Press, 2016.
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968The Structure of Episodic Memory: Ganeri's ‘Mental Time Travel and Attention’Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (4): 374-394. 2017.We offer a framework for assessing what the structure of episodic memory might be, if one accepts the Buddhist denial of persisting selves. This paper is a response to Jonardon Ganeri's paper "Mental time travel and attention", which explores Buddhaghosa's ideas about memory. (It will eventually be published with a reply by Ganeri).
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Subject and Object in the Contents of ExperienceIn The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.The traditional distinction between visual sensation and visual perception is reconceptualised. It is argued in this chapter using the method of phenomenal contrast that certain perceptual relations between perceivers and the objects they see are represented in experience.
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The Role of Objects in Visual ExperienceIn The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.The distinction between strong and weak veridicality is explained, and by drawing on this distinction, it is argued that experiences have both singular and non-singular contents. The Argument from Appearing from Chapter 2 is adapted to states of seeing, yielding an argument that states of seeing have both singular and non-singular contents. It is also argued that phenomenal states are distinct from states of seeing, and that Naive Realism is probably false.
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The Visual Experience of CausationIn The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.This chapter argues, using the method of phenomenal contrast, that causation is represented in visual experience. The conclusion is contrasted with the conclusions drawn by Michotte in his book The Perception of Causation.
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KindsIn The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.This chapter argues, using the method of phenomenal contrast, that kind properties are represented in visual experience. The chapter focuses mainly on kind properties that categorize objects. It investigates whether visual experiences represent K-properties by focusing on cases in which subjects gradually develop recognitional capacities, leading to changes in their beliefs about what they see
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1How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?In The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.The method of phenomenal contrast is described and defended. The role of introspection in this method is shown to be minimal. It is argued that the contrast method is better than from methods that rely exclusively on introspection, and that there is no direct route from naturalistic theories of intentionality to conclusions about which contents experiences have.
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The Content ViewIn The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.This chapter interprets, develops, and defends the Content View: the thesis that visual perceptual experiences have contents. Several notions of veridicality are distinguished. It is argued the commitments of the Content View are shared across a wide range of philosophical theories of perception. The Content View is distinguished from the Strong Content View, according to which experiences are fundamentally propositional attitudes.
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ExperiencesIn The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.Several concepts of conscious experience are distinguished in this chapter. Phenomenal states are introduced and their relationship to states of seeing is discussed. The kinds of experiences that will be central in the rest of the book are identified.
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The Strong Content View RevisitedIn The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.The Strong Content View is re-evaluated in this chapter in light of earlier conclusions. It is found that the previous conclusions defended in the book do not warrant endorsing it.
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Democracy |
Areas of Interest
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Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Cognitive Sciences |
Democracy |