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69A theory of sentiencePhilosophical Review 111 (1): 135-138. 2002.Three central theses of A Theory of Sentience are these
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1829The epistemic impact of the etiology of experiencePhilosophical Studies 162 (3): 697-722. 2013.In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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959Epistemic ChargeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3): 277-306. 2015.I give some reasons to think that perceptual experiences redound on the rational standing of the subject, and explore the consequences of this idea for the global structure of justification.
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588Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual ExperiencePhilosophical Review 115 (3): 355--88. 2006.In this paper, I argue that certain perceptual relations are represented in visual experience.
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51Reference and ConsciousnessPhilosophical Review 113 (3): 427-431. 2004.What is the role of conscious experience in action and cognition? John Campbell’s answer in Reference and Consciousness begins from ideas he thinks are part of common sense: When our actions are directed toward particular things—as when we grab our keys, or lift forks from plates—these actions are guided by visual experience. We see where to reach for keys or fork, and only then are able to do it. Similarly for the case of cognition: in cases where experience is limited, such as blindsight, cogn…Read more
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264How does visual phenomenology constrain object-seeing?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3): 429-441. 2006.I argue that there are phenomenological constraints on what it is to see an object, and that these are overlooked by some theories that offer allegedly sufficient causal and counterfactual conditions on object-seeing.
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452Direct realism and perceptual consciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2): 378-410. 2006.In The Problem of Perception, A.D. Smith’s central aim is to defend the view that we can directly perceive ordinary objects, such as cups, keys and the like.1 The book is organized around the two arguments that Smith considers to be serious threats to the possibility of direct perception: the argument from illusion, and the argument from hallucination. The argument from illusion threatens this possibility because it concludes that indirect realism is true. Indirect realism is the view that we pe…Read more
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177The elements of philosophy: readings from past and present (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2008.The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present is a comprehensive collection of historical and contemporary readings across the major fields of philosophy. With depth and quality, this introductory anthology offers a selection of readings that is both extensive and expansive; the readings span twenty-five centuries. They are organized topically into five parts: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life…Read more
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327The Contents of Visual ExperienceOxford University Press USA. 2010.What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then intro…Read more
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737Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrathPhilosophical Studies 162 (3): 749-757. 2013.Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath each contributed to a symposium on "The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience" in Philosophical Studies. These are my replies their contributions.
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46Erratum to: Precis of The Contents of Visual ExperiencePhilosophical Studies 163 (3): 817-817. 2013.
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40The Elements of Philosophy: Readings From Past and Present (edited book)Oxford University Press USA. 2007.The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present offers an extensive collection of classic and contemporary readings, organized topically into five main sections: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life and Death. Within these broad areas, readings are arranged in clusters that address both traditional issues--such as the existence of God, justice and the state, knowledge and skepticism, and free will-…Read more
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156A Theory of SentiencePhilosophical Review 111 (1): 135. 2002.Review of Austen Clark's 2000 book *A Theory of Sentience*
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249The role of perception in demonstrative referencePhilosophers' Imprint 2 1-21. 2002.Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.
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2763How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2): 408-435. 2017.This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of…Read more
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279The contents of perceptionStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2005.This is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the contents of perception.
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1039Epistemic Evaluability and Perceptual FarceIn A. Raftopoulos & J. Ziembekis (eds.), Cognitive Effects on Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives, . 2015.
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418Indiscriminability and the phenomenalPhilosophical Studies 120 (1-3): 91-112. 2004.In this paper, I describe and criticize M.G.F. Martin's version of disjunctivism, and his argument for it from premises about self-knowledge.
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4511Do visual experiences have contents?In Bence -Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World, Oxford University Press. 2010.This paper defends the Content View: the thesis that all visual experiences have contents.
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1129Which Properties Are Represented in PerceptionIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503. 2006.In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content
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