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279The contents of perceptionStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2005.This is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the contents of perception.
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2765How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2): 408-435. 2017.This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of…Read more
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1044Epistemic Evaluability and Perceptual FarceIn A. Raftopoulos & J. Ziembekis (eds.), Cognitive Effects on Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives, . 2015.
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418Indiscriminability and the phenomenalPhilosophical Studies 120 (1-3): 91-112. 2004.In this paper, I describe and criticize M.G.F. Martin's version of disjunctivism, and his argument for it from premises about self-knowledge.
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4516Do visual experiences have contents?In Bence -Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World, Oxford University Press. 2010.This paper defends the Content View: the thesis that all visual experiences have contents.
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1129Which Properties Are Represented in PerceptionIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503. 2006.In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content
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151Presupposition and policing in complex demonstrativesNoûs 40 (1). 2006.In this paper, we offer a theory of the role of the nominal in complex demonstrative expressions, such as 'this dog' or 'that glove with a hole in it'.
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321Reply to PrinzPhilosophical Studies 163 (3): 847-865. 2013.Reply to Jesse Prinz's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*
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1004Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and EthicsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 531-545. 2015.Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.
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154Review of John Campbell's "Reference and Consciousness" (review)Philosophical Review 113 (3): 427-431. 2004.What is the role of conscious experience in action and cognition? John Campbell’s answer in Reference and Consciousness begins from ideas he thinks are part of common sense: When our actions are directed toward particular things—as when we grab our keys, or lift forks from plates—these actions are guided by visual experience. We see where to reach for keys or fork, and only then are able to do it. Similarly for the case of cognition: in cases where experience is limited, such as blindsight, cogn…Read more
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468How can we discover the contents of experience?Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 127-42. 2007.In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I
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178The Phenomenology of EfficacyPhilosophical Topics 33 (1): 265-84. 2005.In this paper I argue that certain type of first-personal causal property, efficacy, is represented in perceptual experience.
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64The Rationality of PerceptionOxford University Press. 2017.There is an important division in the human mind between perception and reasoning. We reason from information that we have already, but perception is a means of taking in new information. Susanna Siegel argues that these two aspects of the mind become deeply intertwined when beliefs, fears, desires, or prejudice influence what we perceive.
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3822Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual JustificationNoûs 46 (2). 2012.In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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73A short overview of the philosophical significance of perceptual contents.
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1737Rich or thin?In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. pp. 59-80. 2016.Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties
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115Reply to CampbellPhilosophical Studies 163 (3): 847-865. 2013.Reply to John Campbell's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*
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158In discussions of perception and its provision of knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver would normally come to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content
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2193Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 240. 2013.I distinguish between two kinds of selection effects on experience: selection of objects or features for experience, and anti-selection of experiences for cognitive uptake. I discuss the idea that both kinds of selection effects can lead to a form of confirmation bias at the level of perception, and argue that when this happens, selection effects can influence the rational role of experience.
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89XV—Epistemic ChargeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3): 277-306. 2015.Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 277-306, December 2015.
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439The Epistemic Conception of HallucinationIn Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 205--224. 2008.Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for p…Read more
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887Are there Edenic Grounds of Perceptual Intentionality?Analysis 73 (2): 329-344. 2013.This is a critical piece on *The Character of Consciousness* by David Chalmers. It focuses on Chalmers's two-stage view of perceptual content and the epistemology of perceptual belief that flows from this theory, and criticizes his theories of Edenic concepts, perceptual acquaintance, and perceptual belief.
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169Reply to TravisPhilosophical Studies 163 (3): 847-865. 2013.Reply to Charles Travis's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*
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2973Affordances and the Contents of PerceptionIn Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content?, Oxford University Press. pp. 39-76. 2014.
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26Reference and Consciousness (review)Philosophical Review 113 (3): 427-431. 2004.What is the role of conscious experience in action and cognition? John Campbell’s answer in Reference and Consciousness begins from ideas he thinks are part of common sense: When our actions are directed toward particular things—as when we grab our keys, or lift forks from plates—these actions are guided by visual experience. We see where to reach for keys or fork, and only then are able to do it. Similarly for the case of cognition: in cases where experience is limited, such as blindsight, cogn…Read more
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91How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 127-142. 2007.How can we discover the contents of experience? I argue that neither introspection alone nor naturalistic theories of experience content are sufficient to discover these contents. I propose another method of discovery: the method of phenomenal contrast. I defend the method against skeptics who doubt that the contents of experience can be discovered, and I explain how the method may be employed even if one denies that experiences have contents.
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351The visual experience of causationPhilosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 519-540. 2009.In this paper I argue that causal relations between objects are represented in visual experience, and contrast my argument and its conclusion with Michotte's results from the 1960's.
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454This is a compilations of short talks presented at a workshop held at Harvard in April 14 on the life of analytic philosophy today in Spanish. Authors include Susanna Siegel, Diana Acosta and Patricia Marechal, Diana Perez, Laura Pérez, and Josefa Toribio.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Democracy |
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Epistemology |
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