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352The role of perception in demonstrative referencePhilosophers' Imprint 2 1-21. 2002.Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.
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378The contents of perceptionStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2005.This is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the contents of perception.
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158In discussions of perception and its provision of knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver would normally come to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content
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544Direct realism and perceptual consciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2): 378-410. 2006.In The Problem of Perception, A.D. Smith’s central aim is to defend the view that we can directly perceive ordinary objects, such as cups, keys and the like.1 The book is organized around the two arguments that Smith considers to be serious threats to the possibility of direct perception: the argument from illusion, and the argument from hallucination. The argument from illusion threatens this possibility because it concludes that indirect realism is true. Indirect realism is the view that we pe…Read more
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2874Rich or thin?In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. pp. 59-80. 2018.Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties
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1361XV—Epistemic ChargeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3): 277-306. 2015.Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 277-306, December 2015.
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881Replies to Campbell, Prinz, and TravisPhilosophical Studies 163 (3): 847-865. 2013.Reply to John Campbell's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*
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710How can we discover the contents of experience?Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 127-42. 2007.In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I
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382A theory of sentiencePhilosophical Review 111 (1): 135-138. 2002.Three central theses of A Theory of Sentience are these
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1712Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and EthicsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 531-545. 2015.Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.
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449The visual experience of causationPhilosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 519-540. 2009.In this paper I argue that causal relations between objects are represented in visual experience, and contrast my argument and its conclusion with Michotte's results from the 1960's.
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73A short overview of the philosophical significance of perceptual contents.
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5729Do visual experiences have contents?In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world, Oxford University Press. 2010.This paper defends the Content View: the thesis that all visual experiences have contents.
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266The elements of philosophy: readings from past and present (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2008.The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present is a comprehensive collection of historical and contemporary readings across the major fields of philosophy. With depth and quality, this introductory anthology offers a selection of readings that is both extensive and expansive; the readings span twenty-five centuries. They are organized topically into five parts: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life…Read more
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2206Consciousness, Attention, and JustificationIn Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford University Press. 2013.We discuss the rational role of highly inattentive experiences, and argue that they can provide rational support for beliefs.
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