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Susanna Siegel

Harvard University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    107
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    29
  •  News and Updates
    75

 More details
  • Harvard University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Cornell University
Sage School of Philosophy
PhD, 2000
APA Eastern Division
CV
Homepage
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
0000-0001-5554-7677
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
Government and Democracy
Political Ethics
Political Epistemology
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphilosophy
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Cognitive Sciences
Democracy
1 more
PhilPapers Editorships
The Contents of Perception
Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content
Color Experience
Spatial Experience
The Experience of Objects
The Experience of High-Level Properties
The Contents of Perception, Misc
Dogmatism about Perception
Perceptual Justification
4 more
  • All publications (107)
  •  2874
    Rich or thin?
    with Alex Byrne
    In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. pp. 59-80. 2018.
    Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties
    Modularity in Cognitive ScienceThe Experience of High-Level PropertiesModularity and Cognitive Penet…Read more
    Modularity in Cognitive ScienceThe Experience of High-Level PropertiesModularity and Cognitive PenetrabilityThe Contents of Perception, Misc
  •  1361
    XV—Epistemic Charge
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3): 277-306. 2015.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 277-306, December 2015.
    Perception and ThoughtPerception and PhenomenologyThe Contents of Perception, MiscPerceptual Justifi…Read more
    Perception and ThoughtPerception and PhenomenologyThe Contents of Perception, MiscPerceptual JustificationBelief Theories of PerceptionJustification, MiscPhilosophy of Perception, GeneralThe Nature of Perceptual Experience, Misc
  •  116
    The dog and the zombie
    DisjunctivismConsciousness and Materialism
  •  881
    Replies to Campbell, Prinz, and Travis
    Philosophical Studies 163 (3): 847-865. 2013.
    Reply to John Campbell's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*
    Aspects of ConsciousnessThe Contents of Perception, MiscAttention and ConsciousnessIntrospection and…Read more
    Aspects of ConsciousnessThe Contents of Perception, MiscAttention and ConsciousnessIntrospection and IntrospectionismThe Experience of High-Level PropertiesPerception-Based Theories of ConceptsThe Experience of ObjectsConceptual and Nonconceptual Content
  •  710
    How can we discover the contents of experience?
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 127-42. 2007.
    In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I
    Introspection and IntrospectionismPhilosophy of Perception, GeneralThe Contents of Perception, Misc
  •  382
    A theory of sentience
    Philosophical Review 111 (1): 135-138. 2002.
    Three central theses of A Theory of Sentience are these
    The Contents of Perception, MiscConceptual and Nonconceptual ContentThe Experience of ObjectsPercept…Read more
    The Contents of Perception, MiscConceptual and Nonconceptual ContentThe Experience of ObjectsPerception and the Mind, MiscPerception and NeuroscienceThe Experience of High-Level Properties
  •  1712
    Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics
    with Zoe Jenkin
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 531-545. 2015.
    Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.
    Perceptual JustificationVirtue Ethics, MiscModularity and Cognitive Penetrability
  •  449
    The visual experience of causation
    Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 519-540. 2009.
    In this paper I argue that causal relations between objects are represented in visual experience, and contrast my argument and its conclusion with Michotte's results from the 1960's.
    The Experience of High-Level PropertiesCausation, Misc
  •  73
    The Contents of Consciousness
    A short overview of the philosophical significance of perceptual contents.
    The Contents of Perception, Misc
  •  289
    Precise of The Contents of Visual Experience
    Philosophical Studies 163 (3): 813-816. 2013.
    The Nature of Perceptual Experience, MiscThe Contents of Perception, Misc
  •  5728
    Do visual experiences have contents?
    In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    This paper defends the Content View: the thesis that all visual experiences have contents.
    The Contents of Perception, MiscThe Experience of ObjectsNaive and Direct RealismBelief Theories of …Read more
    The Contents of Perception, MiscThe Experience of ObjectsNaive and Direct RealismBelief Theories of PerceptionThe Nature of Perceptual Experience, Misc
  •  266
    The elements of philosophy: readings from past and present (edited book)
    with Tamar Szabo Gendler and Steven M. Cahn
    Oxford University Press. 2008.
    The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present is a comprehensive collection of historical and contemporary readings across the major fields of philosophy. With depth and quality, this introductory anthology offers a selection of readings that is both extensive and expansive; the readings span twenty-five centuries. They are organized topically into five parts: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life…Read more
    The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present is a comprehensive collection of historical and contemporary readings across the major fields of philosophy. With depth and quality, this introductory anthology offers a selection of readings that is both extensive and expansive; the readings span twenty-five centuries. They are organized topically into five parts: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life and Death. The product of the collaboration of three highly respected scholars in their fields - Tamar Szabó Gendler, Susanna Siegel, and Steven M. Cahn - The Elements of Philosophy also includes introductions from the editors, explanatory footnotes, and a glossary.
    Philosophy, General WorksPhilosophy, Introductions and Anthologies
  •  2205
    Consciousness, Attention, and Justification
    with Nicholas Silins
    In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford University Press. 2013.
    We discuss the rational role of highly inattentive experiences, and argue that they can provide rational support for beliefs.
    Perception and Knowledge, MiscAttention and ConsciousnessChange/Inattentional BlindnessPerceptual Ju…Read more
    Perception and Knowledge, MiscAttention and ConsciousnessChange/Inattentional BlindnessPerceptual JustificationEpistemic Internalism and Externalism
  •  547
    The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination
    In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 205--224. 2008.
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for p…Read more
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of hallucinations are dim, and that this undermines the case for disjunctivism.
    DiscriminabilityDisjunctivismIllusion and Hallucination
  •  1393
    Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath
    Philosophical Studies 162 (3): 749-757. 2013.
    Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath each contributed to a symposium on "The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience" in Philosophical Studies. These are my replies their contributions.
    Rationality and Cognitive ScienceIrrationalityModularity and Cognitive PenetrabilityPerceptual Justi…Read more
    Rationality and Cognitive ScienceIrrationalityModularity and Cognitive PenetrabilityPerceptual JustificationDogmatism about Perception
  •  371
    How does visual phenomenology constrain object-seeing?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3): 429-441. 2006.
    I argue that there are phenomenological constraints on what it is to see an object, and that these are overlooked by some theories that offer allegedly sufficient causal and counterfactual conditions on object-seeing.
    The Perceptual Relation, MiscThe Objects of PerceptionThe Experience of Objects
  •  5416
    Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification
    Noûs 46 (2): 201-222. 2011.
    In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
    Modularity and Cognitive PenetrabilityPerceptual JustificationDogmatism about Perception
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