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2874Rich or thin?In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. pp. 59-80. 2018.Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties
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1361XV—Epistemic ChargeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3): 277-306. 2015.Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 277-306, December 2015.
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881Replies to Campbell, Prinz, and TravisPhilosophical Studies 163 (3): 847-865. 2013.Reply to John Campbell's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*
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710How can we discover the contents of experience?Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 127-42. 2007.In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I
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382A theory of sentiencePhilosophical Review 111 (1): 135-138. 2002.Three central theses of A Theory of Sentience are these
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1712Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and EthicsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 531-545. 2015.Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.
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449The visual experience of causationPhilosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 519-540. 2009.In this paper I argue that causal relations between objects are represented in visual experience, and contrast my argument and its conclusion with Michotte's results from the 1960's.
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73A short overview of the philosophical significance of perceptual contents.
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5728Do visual experiences have contents?In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world, Oxford University Press. 2010.This paper defends the Content View: the thesis that all visual experiences have contents.
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266The elements of philosophy: readings from past and present (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2008.The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present is a comprehensive collection of historical and contemporary readings across the major fields of philosophy. With depth and quality, this introductory anthology offers a selection of readings that is both extensive and expansive; the readings span twenty-five centuries. They are organized topically into five parts: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life…Read more
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2205Consciousness, Attention, and JustificationIn Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford University Press. 2013.We discuss the rational role of highly inattentive experiences, and argue that they can provide rational support for beliefs.
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547The Epistemic Conception of HallucinationIn Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 205--224. 2008.Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for p…Read more
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1393Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrathPhilosophical Studies 162 (3): 749-757. 2013.Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath each contributed to a symposium on "The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience" in Philosophical Studies. These are my replies their contributions.
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371How does visual phenomenology constrain object-seeing?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3): 429-441. 2006.I argue that there are phenomenological constraints on what it is to see an object, and that these are overlooked by some theories that offer allegedly sufficient causal and counterfactual conditions on object-seeing.
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5416Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual JustificationNoûs 46 (2): 201-222. 2011.In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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Areas of Specialization
| Epistemology |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Government and Democracy |
| Political Ethics |
| Political Epistemology |
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