•  282
    In this paper, we offer a theory of the role of the nominal in complex demonstrative expressions, such as 'this dog' or 'that glove with a hole in it'.
  •  84
    The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present offers an extensive collection of classic and contemporary readings, organized topically into five main sections: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life and Death. Within these broad areas, readings are arranged in clusters that address both traditional issues--such as the existence of God, justice and the state, knowledge and skepticism, and free will-…Read more
  •  2872
    The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience
    Philosophical Studies 162 (3): 697-722. 2013.
    In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
  •  764
    Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience
    Philosophical Review 115 (3): 355--88. 2006.
    In this paper, I argue that certain perceptual relations are represented in visual experience.
  •  518
    Indiscriminability and the phenomenal
    Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3): 91-112. 2004.
    In this paper, I describe and criticize M.G.F. Martin's version of disjunctivism, and his argument for it from premises about self-knowledge.
  •  1020
    This is a compilations of short talks presented at a workshop held at Harvard in April 14 on the life of analytic philosophy today in Spanish. Authors include Susanna Siegel, Diana Acosta and Patricia Marechal, Diana Perez, Laura Pérez, and Josefa Toribio.
  •  3760
    How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2): 408-435. 2017.
    This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of…Read more
  •  1328
    Which Properties Are Represented in Perception
    In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503. 2006.
    In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content
  •  515
    The Contents of Visual Experience
    Oxford University Press USA. 2010.
    What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then intro…Read more
  •  132
    Erratum to: Precis of The Contents of Visual Experience (review)
    Philosophical Studies 163 (3): 817-817. 2013.
  •  1322
    Are there Edenic Grounds of Perceptual Intentionality?
    Analysis 73 (2): 329-344. 2013.
    This is a critical piece on *The Character of Consciousness* by David Chalmers. It focuses on Chalmers's two-stage view of perceptual content and the epistemology of perceptual belief that flows from this theory, and criticizes his theories of Edenic concepts, perceptual acquaintance, and perceptual belief.
  •  242
    The Phenomenology of Efficacy
    Philosophical Topics 33 (1): 265-84. 2005.
    In this paper I argue that certain type of first-personal causal property, efficacy, is represented in perceptual experience.
  •  352
    The role of perception in demonstrative reference
    Philosophers' Imprint 2 1-21. 2002.
    Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.
  •  378
    The contents of perception
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2005.
    This is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the contents of perception.
  •  158
    In discussions of perception and its provision of knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver would normally come to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content
  •  544
    Direct realism and perceptual consciousness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2): 378-410. 2006.
    In The Problem of Perception, A.D. Smith’s central aim is to defend the view that we can directly perceive ordinary objects, such as cups, keys and the like.1 The book is organized around the two arguments that Smith considers to be serious threats to the possibility of direct perception: the argument from illusion, and the argument from hallucination. The argument from illusion threatens this possibility because it concludes that indirect realism is true. Indirect realism is the view that we pe…Read more