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46Erratum to: Precis of The Contents of Visual ExperiencePhilosophical Studies 163 (3): 817-817. 2013.
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253The role of perception in demonstrative referencePhilosophers' Imprint 2 1-21. 2002.Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.
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158A Theory of SentiencePhilosophical Review 111 (1): 135. 2002.Review of Austen Clark's 2000 book *A Theory of Sentience*
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283The contents of perceptionStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2005.This is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the contents of perception.
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2791How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2): 408-435. 2017.This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of…Read more
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1052Epistemic Evaluability and Perceptual FarceIn A. Raftopoulos & J. Ziembekis (eds.), Cognitive Effects on Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives, . 2015.
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418Indiscriminability and the phenomenalPhilosophical Studies 120 (1-3): 91-112. 2004.In this paper, I describe and criticize M.G.F. Martin's version of disjunctivism, and his argument for it from premises about self-knowledge.
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1132Which Properties Are Represented in PerceptionIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503. 2006.In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content
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4534Do visual experiences have contents?In Bence -Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World, Oxford University Press. 2010.This paper defends the Content View: the thesis that all visual experiences have contents.
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152Presupposition and policing in complex demonstrativesNoûs 40 (1). 2006.In this paper, we offer a theory of the role of the nominal in complex demonstrative expressions, such as 'this dog' or 'that glove with a hole in it'.
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1015Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and EthicsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 531-545. 2015.Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.
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322Reply to PrinzPhilosophical Studies 163 (3): 847-865. 2013.Reply to Jesse Prinz's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*
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156Review of John Campbell's "Reference and Consciousness" (review)Philosophical Review 113 (3): 427-431. 2004.What is the role of conscious experience in action and cognition? John Campbell’s answer in Reference and Consciousness begins from ideas he thinks are part of common sense: When our actions are directed toward particular things—as when we grab our keys, or lift forks from plates—these actions are guided by visual experience. We see where to reach for keys or fork, and only then are able to do it. Similarly for the case of cognition: in cases where experience is limited, such as blindsight, cogn…Read more
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178The Phenomenology of EfficacyPhilosophical Topics 33 (1): 265-84. 2005.In this paper I argue that certain type of first-personal causal property, efficacy, is represented in perceptual experience.
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468How can we discover the contents of experience?Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 127-42. 2007.In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I
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66The Rationality of PerceptionOxford University Press. 2017.There is an important division in the human mind between perception and reasoning. We reason from information that we have already, but perception is a means of taking in new information. Susanna Siegel argues that these two aspects of the mind become deeply intertwined when beliefs, fears, desires, or prejudice influence what we perceive.
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3861Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual JustificationNoûs 46 (2). 2012.In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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73A short overview of the philosophical significance of perceptual contents.
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1746Rich or thin?In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. pp. 59-80. 2016.Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties
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115Reply to CampbellPhilosophical Studies 163 (3): 847-865. 2013.Reply to John Campbell's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*
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158In discussions of perception and its provision of knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver would normally come to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content
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