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Susanna Siegel

Harvard University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    107
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    29
  •  News and Updates
    75

 More details
  • Harvard University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Cornell University
Sage School of Philosophy
PhD, 2000
APA Eastern Division
CV
Homepage
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
0000-0001-5554-7677
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
Government and Democracy
Political Ethics
Political Epistemology
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphilosophy
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Cognitive Sciences
Democracy
1 more
PhilPapers Editorships
The Contents of Perception
Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content
Color Experience
Spatial Experience
The Experience of Objects
The Experience of High-Level Properties
The Contents of Perception, Misc
Dogmatism about Perception
Perceptual Justification
4 more
  • All publications (107)
  •  67
    The Visual Experience of Causation
    In Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.
    This chapter argues, using the method of phenomenal contrast, that causation is represented in visual experience. The conclusion is contrasted with the conclusions drawn by Michotte in his book The Perception of Causation.
  •  55
    Kinds
    In Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.
    This chapter argues, using the method of phenomenal contrast, that kind properties are represented in visual experience. The chapter focuses mainly on kind properties that categorize objects. It investigates whether visual experiences represent K-properties by focusing on cases in which subjects gradually develop recognitional capacities, leading to changes in their beliefs about what they see
  •  59
    How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?
    In Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.
    The method of phenomenal contrast is described and defended. The role of introspection in this method is shown to be minimal. It is argued that the contrast method is better than from methods that rely exclusively on introspection, and that there is no direct route from naturalistic theories of intentionality to conclusions about which contents experiences have.
  •  103
    The Content View
    In Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.
    This chapter interprets, develops, and defends the Content View: the thesis that visual perceptual experiences have contents. Several notions of veridicality are distinguished. It is argued the commitments of the Content View are shared across a wide range of philosophical theories of perception. The Content View is distinguished from the Strong Content View, according to which experiences are fundamentally propositional attitudes.
  •  55
    Experiences
    In Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.
    Several concepts of conscious experience are distinguished in this chapter. Phenomenal states are introduced and their relationship to states of seeing is discussed. The kinds of experiences that will be central in the rest of the book are identified.
  •  85
    The Strong Content View Revisited
    In Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.
    The Strong Content View is re-evaluated in this chapter in light of earlier conclusions. It is found that the previous conclusions defended in the book do not warrant endorsing it.
  •  87
    Introduction
    In Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.
  •  558
    Observation and Theory-ladenness
    with Nicholas Silins
    In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Sage Publications. 2013.
    2K word encyclopedia entry
    Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability
  •  881
    Replies to Campbell, Prinz, and Travis
    Philosophical Studies 163 (3): 847-865. 2013.
    Reply to John Campbell's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*
    Aspects of ConsciousnessThe Contents of Perception, MiscAttention and ConsciousnessIntrospection and…Read more
    Aspects of ConsciousnessThe Contents of Perception, MiscAttention and ConsciousnessIntrospection and IntrospectionismThe Experience of High-Level PropertiesPerception-Based Theories of ConceptsThe Experience of ObjectsConceptual and Nonconceptual Content
  •  710
    How can we discover the contents of experience?
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 127-42. 2007.
    In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I
    Introspection and IntrospectionismPhilosophy of Perception, GeneralThe Contents of Perception, Misc
  •  382
    A theory of sentience
    Philosophical Review 111 (1): 135-138. 2002.
    Three central theses of A Theory of Sentience are these
    The Contents of Perception, MiscConceptual and Nonconceptual ContentThe Experience of ObjectsPercept…Read more
    The Contents of Perception, MiscConceptual and Nonconceptual ContentThe Experience of ObjectsPerception and the Mind, MiscPerception and NeuroscienceThe Experience of High-Level Properties
  •  449
    The visual experience of causation
    Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 519-540. 2009.
    In this paper I argue that causal relations between objects are represented in visual experience, and contrast my argument and its conclusion with Michotte's results from the 1960's.
    The Experience of High-Level PropertiesCausation, Misc
  •  1712
    Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics
    with Zoe Jenkin
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 531-545. 2015.
    Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.
    Perceptual JustificationVirtue Ethics, MiscModularity and Cognitive Penetrability
  •  73
    The Contents of Consciousness
    A short overview of the philosophical significance of perceptual contents.
    The Contents of Perception, Misc
  •  289
    Precise of The Contents of Visual Experience
    Philosophical Studies 163 (3): 813-816. 2013.
    The Nature of Perceptual Experience, MiscThe Contents of Perception, Misc
  •  5728
    Do visual experiences have contents?
    In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    This paper defends the Content View: the thesis that all visual experiences have contents.
    The Contents of Perception, MiscThe Experience of ObjectsNaive and Direct RealismBelief Theories of …Read more
    The Contents of Perception, MiscThe Experience of ObjectsNaive and Direct RealismBelief Theories of PerceptionThe Nature of Perceptual Experience, Misc
  •  2205
    Consciousness, Attention, and Justification
    with Nicholas Silins
    In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford University Press. 2013.
    We discuss the rational role of highly inattentive experiences, and argue that they can provide rational support for beliefs.
    Perception and Knowledge, MiscAttention and ConsciousnessChange/Inattentional BlindnessPerceptual Ju…Read more
    Perception and Knowledge, MiscAttention and ConsciousnessChange/Inattentional BlindnessPerceptual JustificationEpistemic Internalism and Externalism
  •  266
    The elements of philosophy: readings from past and present (edited book)
    with Tamar Szabo Gendler and Steven M. Cahn
    Oxford University Press. 2008.
    The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present is a comprehensive collection of historical and contemporary readings across the major fields of philosophy. With depth and quality, this introductory anthology offers a selection of readings that is both extensive and expansive; the readings span twenty-five centuries. They are organized topically into five parts: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life…Read more
    The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present is a comprehensive collection of historical and contemporary readings across the major fields of philosophy. With depth and quality, this introductory anthology offers a selection of readings that is both extensive and expansive; the readings span twenty-five centuries. They are organized topically into five parts: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life and Death. The product of the collaboration of three highly respected scholars in their fields - Tamar Szabó Gendler, Susanna Siegel, and Steven M. Cahn - The Elements of Philosophy also includes introductions from the editors, explanatory footnotes, and a glossary.
    Philosophy, General WorksPhilosophy, Introductions and Anthologies
  •  547
    The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination
    In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 205--224. 2008.
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for p…Read more
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of hallucinations are dim, and that this undermines the case for disjunctivism.
    DiscriminabilityDisjunctivismIllusion and Hallucination
  •  1393
    Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath
    Philosophical Studies 162 (3): 749-757. 2013.
    Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath each contributed to a symposium on "The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience" in Philosophical Studies. These are my replies their contributions.
    Rationality and Cognitive ScienceIrrationalityModularity and Cognitive PenetrabilityPerceptual Justi…Read more
    Rationality and Cognitive ScienceIrrationalityModularity and Cognitive PenetrabilityPerceptual JustificationDogmatism about Perception
  •  371
    How does visual phenomenology constrain object-seeing?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3): 429-441. 2006.
    I argue that there are phenomenological constraints on what it is to see an object, and that these are overlooked by some theories that offer allegedly sufficient causal and counterfactual conditions on object-seeing.
    The Perceptual Relation, MiscThe Objects of PerceptionThe Experience of Objects
  •  5417
    Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification
    Noûs 46 (2): 201-222. 2011.
    In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
    Modularity and Cognitive PenetrabilityPerceptual JustificationDogmatism about Perception
  •  3
    The weak content view
    In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  4208
    Affordances and the Contents of Perception
    In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content?, Oxford University Press. pp. 39-76. 2014.
    Perception and ActionThe Nature of Perceptual Experience, MiscThe Experience of High-Level Propertie…Read more
    Perception and ActionThe Nature of Perceptual Experience, MiscThe Experience of High-Level Properties
  •  56
    The Contents of Experience
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2021.
    The Contents of Perception, Misc
  •  373
    Review of John Campbell's "Reference and Consciousness" (review)
    Philosophical Review 113 (3): 427-431. 2004.
    What is the role of conscious experience in action and cognition? John Campbell’s answer in Reference and Consciousness begins from ideas he thinks are part of common sense: When our actions are directed toward particular things—as when we grab our keys, or lift forks from plates—these actions are guided by visual experience. We see where to reach for keys or fork, and only then are able to do it. Similarly for the case of cognition: in cases where experience is limited, such as blindsight, cogn…Read more
    What is the role of conscious experience in action and cognition? John Campbell’s answer in Reference and Consciousness begins from ideas he thinks are part of common sense: When our actions are directed toward particular things—as when we grab our keys, or lift forks from plates—these actions are guided by visual experience. We see where to reach for keys or fork, and only then are able to do it. Similarly for the case of cognition: in cases where experience is limited, such as blindsight, cognition suffers as well. Consider a blindsighter who can reliably point to the person a normally sighted speaker is talking about whenever she uses the expression ‘that woman’. Even if the blindsighter points correctly all the time, she does not understand the speaker’s use of ‘that woman’. Common sense thus finds a distinctive role for conscious experience in action and cognition, in opposition to the view that everything essential to action and cognition could proceed perfectly well without any conscious experience at all. In this way, common sense opposes epiphenomenalism about experience—the view that experience has no causal role to play with respect to cognition or action.
    Theories of Reference, MiscAttention and ConsciousnessAttention, MiscPhilosophy of Perception, Gener…Read more
    Theories of Reference, MiscAttention and ConsciousnessAttention, MiscPhilosophy of Perception, GeneralNaive and Direct RealismBlindsightAspects of Consciousness
  •  2934
    Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?
    In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 240. 2013.
    I distinguish between two kinds of selection effects on experience: selection of objects or features for experience, and anti-selection of experiences for cognitive uptake. I discuss the idea that both kinds of selection effects can lead to a form of confirmation bias at the level of perception, and argue that when this happens, selection effects can influence the rational role of experience.
    Attention, MiscAttention and ConsciousnessModularity and Cognitive PenetrabilityPerceptual Justifica…Read more
    Attention, MiscAttention and ConsciousnessModularity and Cognitive PenetrabilityPerceptual JustificationFeminist Epistemology
  •  84
    The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present
    with Tamar Szabo Gendler and Steven M. Cahn
    Oxford University Press USA. 2007.
    The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present offers an extensive collection of classic and contemporary readings, organized topically into five main sections: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life and Death. Within these broad areas, readings are arranged in clusters that address both traditional issues--such as the existence of God, justice and the state, knowledge and skepticism, and free will-…Read more
    The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present offers an extensive collection of classic and contemporary readings, organized topically into five main sections: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life and Death. Within these broad areas, readings are arranged in clusters that address both traditional issues--such as the existence of God, justice and the state, knowledge and skepticism, and free will--and contemporary topics--including God and science, just war theory, vegetarianism, and time travel. Carefully chosen selections from a wide range of pre-20th-century philosophers are paired with writings from more than fifty leading contemporary philosophers and thinkers. The traditional philosophers represented range from Plato and Aristotle to Immanuel Kant and A.J. Ayer; the contemporary philosophers include Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, Hilary Putnam, Robert Nozick, Judith Jarvis Thomson, John Rawls, Bernard Williams, and Susan Wolf. Also included are selections from linguist Noam Chomsky, physicist Albert Einstein, and psychologist William James. Edited by a team of scholars who are also highly esteemed instructors, The Elements of Philosophy is uniquely student-friendly. A team of undergraduate philosophy majors played a central role in helping to select topics, choose readings, and identify terms likely to require clarification. In response to their suggestions, the volume includes detailed introductions to each section, explanatory footnotes that define unfamiliar terms and concepts, an extensive glossary, and a guide to further resources. A companion Instructor's Manual, available on CD, offers article summaries, suggested essay questions, reading guides, model handouts, and sample syllabi. One of the most extensive and expansive anthologies available, The Elements of Philosophy is an ideal choice for both general and targeted introductory philosophy courses.
    John Rawls
  •  282
    Presupposition and policing in complex demonstratives
    with Michael Glanzberg
    Noûs 40 (1). 2006.
    In this paper, we offer a theory of the role of the nominal in complex demonstrative expressions, such as 'this dog' or 'that glove with a hole in it'.
    Complex DemonstrativesPresupposition
  •  2872
    The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience
    Philosophical Studies 162 (3): 697-722. 2013.
    In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
    Modularity and Cognitive PenetrabilityPerceptual JustificationDogmatism about PerceptionPerception a…Read more
    Modularity and Cognitive PenetrabilityPerceptual JustificationDogmatism about PerceptionPerception and Knowledge, MiscSeemings
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