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67The Visual Experience of CausationIn Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.This chapter argues, using the method of phenomenal contrast, that causation is represented in visual experience. The conclusion is contrasted with the conclusions drawn by Michotte in his book The Perception of Causation.
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55KindsIn Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.This chapter argues, using the method of phenomenal contrast, that kind properties are represented in visual experience. The chapter focuses mainly on kind properties that categorize objects. It investigates whether visual experiences represent K-properties by focusing on cases in which subjects gradually develop recognitional capacities, leading to changes in their beliefs about what they see
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59How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?In Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.The method of phenomenal contrast is described and defended. The role of introspection in this method is shown to be minimal. It is argued that the contrast method is better than from methods that rely exclusively on introspection, and that there is no direct route from naturalistic theories of intentionality to conclusions about which contents experiences have.
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103The Content ViewIn Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.This chapter interprets, develops, and defends the Content View: the thesis that visual perceptual experiences have contents. Several notions of veridicality are distinguished. It is argued the commitments of the Content View are shared across a wide range of philosophical theories of perception. The Content View is distinguished from the Strong Content View, according to which experiences are fundamentally propositional attitudes.
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55ExperiencesIn Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.Several concepts of conscious experience are distinguished in this chapter. Phenomenal states are introduced and their relationship to states of seeing is discussed. The kinds of experiences that will be central in the rest of the book are identified.
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85The Strong Content View RevisitedIn Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.The Strong Content View is re-evaluated in this chapter in light of earlier conclusions. It is found that the previous conclusions defended in the book do not warrant endorsing it.
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87IntroductionIn Susannah Siegel (ed.), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press Usa. 2010.
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558Observation and Theory-ladennessIn Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Sage Publications. 2013.2K word encyclopedia entry
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881Replies to Campbell, Prinz, and TravisPhilosophical Studies 163 (3): 847-865. 2013.Reply to John Campbell's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*
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710How can we discover the contents of experience?Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 127-42. 2007.In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I
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382A theory of sentiencePhilosophical Review 111 (1): 135-138. 2002.Three central theses of A Theory of Sentience are these
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449The visual experience of causationPhilosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 519-540. 2009.In this paper I argue that causal relations between objects are represented in visual experience, and contrast my argument and its conclusion with Michotte's results from the 1960's.
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1712Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and EthicsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 531-545. 2015.Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.
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73A short overview of the philosophical significance of perceptual contents.
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5728Do visual experiences have contents?In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world, Oxford University Press. 2010.This paper defends the Content View: the thesis that all visual experiences have contents.
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2205Consciousness, Attention, and JustificationIn Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford University Press. 2013.We discuss the rational role of highly inattentive experiences, and argue that they can provide rational support for beliefs.
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266The elements of philosophy: readings from past and present (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2008.The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present is a comprehensive collection of historical and contemporary readings across the major fields of philosophy. With depth and quality, this introductory anthology offers a selection of readings that is both extensive and expansive; the readings span twenty-five centuries. They are organized topically into five parts: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life…Read more
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547The Epistemic Conception of HallucinationIn Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 205--224. 2008.Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for p…Read more
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1393Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrathPhilosophical Studies 162 (3): 749-757. 2013.Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath each contributed to a symposium on "The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience" in Philosophical Studies. These are my replies their contributions.
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371How does visual phenomenology constrain object-seeing?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3): 429-441. 2006.I argue that there are phenomenological constraints on what it is to see an object, and that these are overlooked by some theories that offer allegedly sufficient causal and counterfactual conditions on object-seeing.
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5417Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual JustificationNoûs 46 (2): 201-222. 2011.In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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4208Affordances and the Contents of PerceptionIn Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content?, Oxford University Press. pp. 39-76. 2014.
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373Review of John Campbell's "Reference and Consciousness" (review)Philosophical Review 113 (3): 427-431. 2004.What is the role of conscious experience in action and cognition? John Campbell’s answer in Reference and Consciousness begins from ideas he thinks are part of common sense: When our actions are directed toward particular things—as when we grab our keys, or lift forks from plates—these actions are guided by visual experience. We see where to reach for keys or fork, and only then are able to do it. Similarly for the case of cognition: in cases where experience is limited, such as blindsight, cogn…Read more
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2934Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 240. 2013.I distinguish between two kinds of selection effects on experience: selection of objects or features for experience, and anti-selection of experiences for cognitive uptake. I discuss the idea that both kinds of selection effects can lead to a form of confirmation bias at the level of perception, and argue that when this happens, selection effects can influence the rational role of experience.
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84The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and PresentOxford University Press USA. 2007.The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present offers an extensive collection of classic and contemporary readings, organized topically into five main sections: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life and Death. Within these broad areas, readings are arranged in clusters that address both traditional issues--such as the existence of God, justice and the state, knowledge and skepticism, and free will-…Read more
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282Presupposition and policing in complex demonstrativesNoûs 40 (1). 2006.In this paper, we offer a theory of the role of the nominal in complex demonstrative expressions, such as 'this dog' or 'that glove with a hole in it'.
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2872The epistemic impact of the etiology of experiencePhilosophical Studies 162 (3): 697-722. 2013.In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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