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991The uneasy heirs of acquaintancePhilosophical Issues 29 (1): 348-365. 2019.My contribution to the first round of a tetralog with Bill Brewer, Anil Gupta, and John McDowell. Each of us has written a response to the writings of the other three philosophers on the topic "Empirical Reason". My initial contribution focuses on what we know a priori about perception. In the second round, we will each respond to the each writer's first-round contributions.
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1135The Problem of Culturally Normal BeliefIn Robin Celikates, Sally Haslanger & Jason Stanley (eds.), Ideology: New Essays, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.This paper defends an analysis of the epistemic contours of the interface between individuals and their cultural milieu.
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1717Bias and PerceptionIn Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, Routledge. pp. 99-115. 2020.chapter on perception and bias including implicit bias.
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314This handout contains my replies to comments on the Rationality of Perception by Jennifer Nagel, Adam Pautz, and Peter Railton from a symposium at the 2018 Eastern APA in Savannah.
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23Reflections on the use of English and Spanish in analytic philosophyInformes Del Observatorio, Harvard University. 2014.
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1340Perception as Guessing Versus Perception as Knowing: Replies to Clark and PeacockeRes Philosophica 95 (4): 761-784. 2018.A summary of The Rationality of Perception, and my replies to symposium papers on it by Andy Clark and Christopher Peacocke.
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52Replies to Begby, Ghijsen and SamoilovaAnalysis 78 (3): 523-536. 2018.I’m grateful to Endre Begby, Harmen Ghijsen, and Katia Samoilova for engaging with The Rationality of Perception and for writing such interesting and productive commentaries. Taken together, the three commentaries cover a diverse range of topics.
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38SummaryAnalysis 78 (3): 487-489. 2018.The Rationality of PerceptionBy SiegelSusannaOxford University Press, 2017. xxvi + 222 pp.
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136Discussion of Susanna Siegel's “Can perceptual experiences be rational?”Analytic Philosophy 59 (1): 175-190. 2018.
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1803Attention and perceptual adaptationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3): 205-206. 2013.Commentary on Andy Clark's target article on predictive coding.
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Perception and Demonstrative ReferenceDissertation, Cornell University. 2000.Using certain bits of language, we seem to be able to refer to particular middle-sized dry goods. How is this possible? In this essay, I address this question with respect to uses of demonstrative expressions. I argue that perception makes demonstrative reference possible, and I try to explain how it does so. I argue that the reference of uses of demonstrative expressions, such as "these" in utterances of "these are my keys," is fixed by a demonstrative mental state: more exactly, by an intentio…Read more
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674The Rationality of Perception: Reply to Begby, Ghijsen, and SamoilovaAnalysis (Reviews). 2018.Includes a summary of my book *The Rationality of Perception* (Oxford, 2017) and replies to commentaries on it by Endre Begby, Harmen Ghijsen, and Katia Samoilova. These commentaries and my summary and replies will be published soon in Analysis Reviews. Begby focuses on my analysis of the epistemic features of the interface between individual minds and their cultural milieu (discussed in chapter 10 of *The Rationality of Perception*), Ghijsen focuses on the notion of inference and reliabilism (c…Read more
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725The Epistemology of Perception (short version)In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press. 2015.This is a much shorter version of our entry on the Epistemology of Perception, which will be published in the Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Perception in 2013. The longer version has far more references in it, whereas this version is pared down to the essentials.
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1241Inference Without ReckoningIn Brendan Balcerak Jackson & Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking, Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31. 2019.I argue that inference can tolerate forms of self-ignorance and that these cases of inference undermine canonical models of inference on which inferrers have to appreciate (or purport to appreciate) the support provided by the premises for the conclusion. I propose an alternative model of inference that belongs to a family of rational responses in which the subject cannot pinpoint exactly what she is responding to or why, where this kind of self-ignorance does nothing to undermine the intelligen…Read more
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293Replies to Beck, Chirimuuta, Rosenhagen, Smithies, and SpringleAnalytic Philosophy 59 (1): 175-190. 2018.Replies to commentaries on "Can experiences be rational?", forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy.
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57Michael Madary, Visual Phenomenology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2017.Review of Michael Madary's book *Visual Phenomenology* MIT Press, 2016.
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933The Structure of Episodic Memory: Ganeri's ‘Mental Time Travel and Attention’Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (4): 374-394. 2017.We offer a framework for assessing what the structure of episodic memory might be, if one accepts the Buddhist denial of persisting selves. This paper is a response to Jonardon Ganeri's paper "Mental time travel and attention", which explores Buddhaghosa's ideas about memory. (It will eventually be published with a reply by Ganeri).
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47Erratum to: Precis of The Contents of Visual Experience (review)Philosophical Studies 163 (3): 817-817. 2013.
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1371Consciousness, Attention, and JustificationIn Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford University Press. 2014.We discuss the rational role of highly inattentive experiences, and argue that they can provide rational support for beliefs.
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69A theory of sentiencePhilosophical Review 111 (1): 135-138. 2002.Three central theses of A Theory of Sentience are these
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1811The epistemic impact of the etiology of experiencePhilosophical Studies 162 (3): 697-722. 2013.In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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952Epistemic ChargeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3): 277-306. 2015.I give some reasons to think that perceptual experiences redound on the rational standing of the subject, and explore the consequences of this idea for the global structure of justification.
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587Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual ExperiencePhilosophical Review 115 (3): 355--88. 2006.In this paper, I argue that certain perceptual relations are represented in visual experience.
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51Reference and ConsciousnessPhilosophical Review 113 (3): 427-431. 2004.What is the role of conscious experience in action and cognition? John Campbell’s answer in Reference and Consciousness begins from ideas he thinks are part of common sense: When our actions are directed toward particular things—as when we grab our keys, or lift forks from plates—these actions are guided by visual experience. We see where to reach for keys or fork, and only then are able to do it. Similarly for the case of cognition: in cases where experience is limited, such as blindsight, cogn…Read more
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264How does visual phenomenology constrain object-seeing?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3): 429-441. 2006.I argue that there are phenomenological constraints on what it is to see an object, and that these are overlooked by some theories that offer allegedly sufficient causal and counterfactual conditions on object-seeing.
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Democracy |
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Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Mind |
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Cognitive Sciences |
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