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8Chapter Five. Accommodation, Equality, and the LiarIn Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law: On Lying, Morality, and the Law, Princeton University Press. pp. 157-181. 2015.
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631The Incentives Argument for Intellectual Property ProtectionIn A. Gosseries, A. Marciano & A. Strowel (eds.), Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice, Palgrave Mcmillan. 2008.
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11Developments in the Law–DNA Evidence and the Criminal DefenseHarvard Law Review 108 (1): 1557-1582. 1995.
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50Chapter Three. A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of SpeechIn Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law: On Lying, Morality, and the Law, Princeton University Press. pp. 79-115. 2015.
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36Caution about character ideals and capital punishment: A reply to SorellCriminal Justice Ethics 21 (2): 35-39. 2002.
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125Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the LawPrinceton University Press. 2014.To understand one another as individuals and to fulfill the moral duties that require such understanding, we must communicate with each other. We must also maintain protected channels that render reliable communication possible, a demand that, Seana Shiffrin argues, yields a prohibition against lying and requires protection for free speech. This book makes a distinctive philosophical argument for the wrong of the lie and provides an original account of its difference from the wrong of deception.…Read more
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16Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of FogHarvard Law Review 123 (5): 1214-1246. 2010.
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31Chapter Four. Lying and Freedom of SpeechIn Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law: On Lying, Morality, and the Law, Princeton University Press. pp. 116-156. 2015.
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979The Story of West Virginia Board of Education v. BarnetteIn Michael Dorf (ed.), Constitutional Law Stories, 2nd ed., Foundation Press. 2009.
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39Promising, Intimate Relationships, and ConventionalismPhilosophical Review 117 (4): 481-524. 2008.The power to promise is morally fundamental and does not, at its foundation, derive from moral principles that govern our use of conventions. Of course, many features of promising have conventional components—including which words, gestures, or conditions of silence create commitments. What is really at issue between conventionalists and nonconventionalists is whether the basic moral relation of promissory commitment derives from the moral principles that govern our use of social conventions.Oth…Read more
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453Egalitarianism, Choice-Sensitivity, and AccommodationIn Philip Pettit (ed.), Reason and Value: Themes from the Work of Joseph Raz, Oxford Univ. Press. pp. 270--302. 2004.
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9Chapter Two. Duress and Moral ProgressIn Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law: On Lying, Morality, and the Law, Princeton University Press. pp. 47-78. 2015.
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7AcknowledgmentsIn Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law: On Lying, Morality, and the Law, Princeton University Press. 2015.
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476Intellectual PropertyIn Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit & Thomas Pogge (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Blackwell. 2007.Intellectual property theory grapples with intriguing questions about the political and personal significance of our mental labour and creativity, the metaphysics of art and expression, the justifications for private property, and conflicts between property and free expression rights. This chapter begins with an introduction to the nature of intellectual property, comparing intellectual property to physical property. It continues with an overview of some arguments for, and criticisms of, the leg…Read more
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27Compelled Association, Morality, and Market DynamicsLoyola of Los Angeles Law Review 41 (1): 317-328. 2007.
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47Chapter One. Lies and the Murderer Next DoorIn Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law: On Lying, Morality, and the Law, Princeton University Press. pp. 5-46. 2015.
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412What Is Really Wrong With Compelled Association?Northwestern University Law Review 99 (2): 839-888. 2005.
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246Reparations for U.S. Slavery and Justice over TimeIn David Wasserman & Melinda Roberts (eds.), Harming Future Persons, Springer. 2009.
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324Promising, intimate relationships, and conventionalismPhilosophical Review 117 (4): 481-524. 2008.The power to promise is morally fundamental and does not, at its foundation, derive from moral principles that govern our use of conventions. Of course, many features of promising have conventional components—including which words, gestures, or conditions of silence create commitments. What is really at issue between conventionalists and nonconventionalists is whether the basic moral relation of promissory commitment derives from the moral principles that govern our use of social conventions. Ot…Read more
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232Harm and Its Moral SignificanceLegal Theory 18 (3): 357-398. 2012.Standard, familiar models portray harms and benefits as symmetrical. Usually, harm is portrayed as involving a worsening of one's situation, and benefits as involving an improvement. Yet morally, the aversion, prevention, and relief of harms seem, at least presumptively, to matter more than the provision, protection, and maintenance of comparable and often greater benefits. Standard models of harms and benefits have difficulty acknowledging this priority, much less explaining it. They also fail …Read more
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7IntroductionIn Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law: On Lying, Morality, and the Law, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-4. 2015.
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |
Philosophy of Law |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Law |
Social and Political Philosophy |