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Øystein Linnebo

University of OsloUniversità della Svizzera Italiana
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    123
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  •  Recommended
    1
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  •  News and Updates
    114

 More details
  • University of Oslo
    Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas
    Professor
  • Università della Svizzera Italiana
    Institute of Philosophy (ISFI)
    Visiting Professor (Part-time)
Harvard University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2002
Homepage
Oslo, Norway
Areas of Specialization
Science, Logic, and Mathematics
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Mathematics
Metaphysics
Ontology
Metaontology
Modality
Gottlob Frege
3 more
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Mathematics
20th Century Philosophy
Philosophy of Physical Science
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Science, Logic, and Mathematics
Ontology
Metaontology
Modality
Gottlob Frege
10 more
PhilPapers Editorships
Philosophy of Mathematics
  • All publications (123)
  •  17
    Index
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 199-204. 2017.
  •  30
    Introduction
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-3. 2017.
  •  21
    Frontmatter
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. 2017.
  •  30
    Chapter Six. Empiricism about Mathematics
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 88-100. 2017.
  •  33
    Chapter Ten. The Iterative Conception of Sets
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 139-153. 2017.
  •  28
    Chapter Seven. Nominalism
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 101-115. 2017.
  •  27
    Chapter Twelve. The Quest for New Axioms
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 170-182. 2017.
  •  34
    Chapter Three. Formalism and Deductivism
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 38-55. 2017.
  •  26
    Chapter Two. Frege’s Logicism
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 21-37. 2017.
  •  30
    Chapter Eight. Mathematical Intuition
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 116-125. 2017.
  •  24
    Chapter Nine. Abstraction Reconsidered
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 126-138. 2017.
  •  33
    Chapter Four. Hilbert’s Program
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 56-72. 2017.
  •  23
    Concluding Remarks
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 183-188. 2017.
  •  25
    Chapter Eleven. Structuralism
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 154-169. 2017.
  •  23
    Chapter One. Mathematics as a Philosophical Challenge
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 4-20. 2017.
  •  22
    Chapter Five. Intuitionism
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 73-87. 2017.
    Intuitionism and Constructivism
  •  18
    Bibliography
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. pp. 189-198. 2017.
  •  744
    Actual and Potential Infinity
    with Stewart Shapiro
    Noûs 53 (1): 160-191. 2017.
    The notion of potential infinity dominated in mathematical thinking about infinity from Aristotle until Cantor. The coherence and philosophical importance of the notion are defended. Particular attention is paid to the question of whether potential infinity is compatible with classical logic or requires a weaker logic, perhaps intuitionistic.
    Intuitionism and ConstructivismThe Axiom of InfinityHistory: Philosophy of Mathematics
  •  22
    Contents
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. 2017.
  •  15
    Acknowledgments
    In Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press. 2017.
  •  274
    Critical studies/book reviews
    Philosophia Mathematica 11 (1): 92-104. 2003.
    This is a critical notice of Stewart Shapiro's 1997 book, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology.
    Mathematical StructuralismPhilosophy of Mathematics, Misc
  •  145
    The individuation of the natural numbers
    In Ø. Linnebo O. Bueno (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics, Palgrave-macmillan. 2009.
    It is sometimes suggested that criteria of identity should play a central role in an account of our most fundamental ways of referring to objects. The view is nicely illustrated by an example due to (Quine, 1950). Suppose you are standing at the bank of a river, watching the water that floats by. What is required for you to refer to the river, as opposed to a particular segment of it, or the totality of its water, or the current temporal part of this water? According to Quine, you must at least …Read more
    It is sometimes suggested that criteria of identity should play a central role in an account of our most fundamental ways of referring to objects. The view is nicely illustrated by an example due to (Quine, 1950). Suppose you are standing at the bank of a river, watching the water that floats by. What is required for you to refer to the river, as opposed to a particular segment of it, or the totality of its water, or the current temporal part of this water? According to Quine, you must at least implicitly be operating with some criterion of identity that informs you when two sightings of water count as sightings of the same referent. For unless you have at least an implicit grasp of what is required for your intended referent to be identical with another object with which you are presented, you have not succeeded in singling out a unique object for reference.
    Number TheoryNumbersW. V. O. QuineIdentity
  •  286
    Introduction
    Synthese 170 (3): 321-329. 2009.
    Neo-Fregean logicism seeks to base mathematics on abstraction principles. But the acceptable abstraction principles are surrounded by unacceptable ones. This is the "bad company problem." In this introduction I first provide a brief historical overview of the problem. Then I outline the main responses that are currently being debated. In the course of doing so I provide summaries of the contributions to this special issue.
    Mathematical Neo-FregeanismLogicism in Mathematics
  •  173
    Review: Fraser MacBride (ed.): Identity and Modality (review)
    Mind 117 (467): 705-708. 2008.
    Ontology
  •  339
    Plurals and modals
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5): 654-676. 2016.
    Consider one of several things. Is the one thing necessarily one of the several? This key question in the modal logic of plurals is clarified. Some defenses of an affirmative answer are developed and compared. Various remarks are made about the broader philosophical significance of the question.
    Second-Order LogicModal LogicPlural Quantification
  •  259
    Frege's proof of referentiality
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 45 (2): 73-98. 2004.
    I present a novel interpretation of Frege’s attempt at Grundgesetze I §§29-31 to prove that every expression of his language has a unique reference. I argue that Frege’s proof is based on a contextual account of reference, similar to but more sophisticated than that enshrined in his famous Context Principle. Although Frege’s proof is incorrect, I argue that the account of reference on which it is based is of potential philosophical value, and I analyze the class of cases to which it may successf…Read more
    I present a novel interpretation of Frege’s attempt at Grundgesetze I §§29-31 to prove that every expression of his language has a unique reference. I argue that Frege’s proof is based on a contextual account of reference, similar to but more sophisticated than that enshrined in his famous Context Principle. Although Frege’s proof is incorrect, I argue that the account of reference on which it is based is of potential philosophical value, and I analyze the class of cases to which it may successfully be applied.
    Logicism in MathematicsFrege: Context PrincipleFrege: GrundgesetzeFrege: BedeutungFrege: Logic and P…Read more
    Logicism in MathematicsFrege: Context PrincipleFrege: GrundgesetzeFrege: BedeutungFrege: Logic and Philosophy of Logic, MiscFrege: Philosophy of Mathematics
  •  495
    Two types of abstraction for structuralism
    with Richard Pettigrew
    Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255): 267-283. 2014.
    If numbers were identified with any of their standard set-theoretic realizations, then they would have various non-arithmetical properties that mathematicians are reluctant to ascribe to them. Dedekind and later structuralists conclude that we should refrain from ascribing to numbers such ‘foreign’ properties. We first rehearse why it is hard to provide an acceptable formulation of this conclusion. Then we investigate some forms of abstraction meant to purge mathematical objects of all ‘foreign’…Read more
    If numbers were identified with any of their standard set-theoretic realizations, then they would have various non-arithmetical properties that mathematicians are reluctant to ascribe to them. Dedekind and later structuralists conclude that we should refrain from ascribing to numbers such ‘foreign’ properties. We first rehearse why it is hard to provide an acceptable formulation of this conclusion. Then we investigate some forms of abstraction meant to purge mathematical objects of all ‘foreign’ properties. One form is inspired by Frege; the other by Dedekind. We argue that both face problems.
    Mathematical StructuralismNumbers
  •  1
    Against Limitation of Size
    The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1. 2005.
    Set Theory and LogicismRussell's Paradox
  •  513
    Superplurals in English
    with David Nicolas
    Analysis 68 (3). 2008.
    where ‘aa’ is a plural term, and ‘F’ a plural predicate. Following George Boolos (1984) and others, many philosophers and logicians also think that plural expressions should be analysed as not introducing any new ontological commitments to some sort of ‘plural entities’, but rather as involving a new form of reference to objects to which we are already committed (for an overview and further details, see Linnebo 2004). For instance, the plural term ‘aa’ refers to Alice, Bob and Charlie simultaneo…Read more
    where ‘aa’ is a plural term, and ‘F’ a plural predicate. Following George Boolos (1984) and others, many philosophers and logicians also think that plural expressions should be analysed as not introducing any new ontological commitments to some sort of ‘plural entities’, but rather as involving a new form of reference to objects to which we are already committed (for an overview and further details, see Linnebo 2004). For instance, the plural term ‘aa’ refers to Alice, Bob and Charlie simultaneously, and the plural predicate ‘F’ is true of some things just in case these things cooperate. A natural question that arises is whether the step from the singular to the plural can be iterated. Are there terms that stand to ordinary plural terms the way ordinary plural terms stand to singular terms? Let’s call such terms superplural. A superplural term would thus, loosely speaking, refer to several ‘pluralities’ at once, much as an ordinary plural term refers to several objects at once.1 Further, let’s call a predicate superplural if it can be predicated of superplural terms. It is reasonably straightforward to devise a formal logic of superplural terms, superplural predicates, and even superplural quantifiers (see Rayo 2006). But does this formal logic reflect any features of natural languages? In particular, does ordinary English contain superplural terms and predicates? The purpose of this article is to address these questions. We examine some earlier arguments for the existence of superplural expressions in English and find them to be either..
    Reference, MiscPlural QuantificationLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Miscellaneous
  •  4
    Logic and Plurals
    with Salvatore Florio
    In Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, Routledge. pp. 451-463. 2017.
    This chapter provides an overview of the philosophical and linguistic debate about the logic of plurals. We present the most prominent singularizing analyses of plurals as well as the main criticisms that such analyses have received. We then introduce an alternative approach to plurals known as plural logic, focusing on the question whether plural logic can count as pure logic.
    Plural QuantificationCollective Intentionality
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