Katja Crone

Das Buch bietet eine neuartige Erklärung des biographischen Selbstverständnisses, die bei den psychischen Grundlagen ansetzt. Personen schreiben sich u.a. Persönlichkeitsmerkmale zu, indem sie sich ihre Lebensgeschichte vor Augen führen – und diese interpretieren. Individuelle Vorstellungen, soziale Normen und Erwartungen beeinflussen die Konstruktion von Geschichten, über die Personen definieren, wer sie sind oder sein wollen. Was aber genau heißt es, ein biographisches Selbstverständnis zu haben? Um diese Frage zu beantworten, wählt die Autorin einen integrativen Ansatz, der mentale Eigenschaften und Fähigkeiten von Personen in den Blick nimmt und hinsichtlich ihrer Funktion für das biographische Selbstverständnis analysiert. Im Zentrum der Untersuchung steht daher ein multidimensionaler Begriff des Selbstbewusstseins, der verschiedene Formen und Ebenen von Selbstbezugnahmen unterscheidet. In den Fokus genommen werden bestimmte Strukturmerkmale wie etwa Zeitbewusstsein, zeitübergreifende Einheit sowie das Gefühl der Urheberschaft von Handlungen.

The analysis of personal identity over time (personal persistence) in terms of properties of the first-person perspective has been neglected for quite a while. However, there seems to be an interesting relation between experiential features on the one hand and the notion of personal persistence on the other hand. This idea is famously spelled out in an argument introduced by Barry Dainton (2000; 2005; 2008), according to which diachronic personal persistence con- sists in experiential continuity (stream of consciousness). This paper challenges one central claim of the argument, whose main target is to ward off the threat of factual interruptions in the stream of consciousness. It will be objected that this problem cannot be properly solved. However, the relevance of experiential features to personal persistence can be shown if one leaves behind the question of criteria of personal identity over time and instead turns to the question of what it means to have a sense of self-identity over time. It will be argued that not only experiential continuity but also experiential features of episodic memory characterise the sense of self-identity over time.

The article explores the basic conceptual relationship between social cognition, intersubjectivity and self-consciousness. A much-debated recent approach to social cognition, the so-called interaction theory, is the view that the ability to perceive, understand and interpret the behavior of others relies on interaction in the sense of mutual coordination of the embodied agents involved. It will be shown that this notion of reciprocity is too weak in order to fully account for social understanding. It will be argued that the idea of reciprocity should at least in some cases be conceived of as a stance persons adopt towards each other, which in turn presupposes that they acknowledge each other as self-conscious agents. This view is inspired by an argument originally introduced by Johann Gottlieb Fichte.

Ideas about freedom and related concepts like autonomy and self-determination play a prominent role in the moral debate about human enhancement interventions. However, there is not a single understanding of freedom available, and arguments referring to freedom are simultaneously used to argue both for and against enhancement interventions. This gives rise to misunderstandings and polemical arguments. The paper attempts to disentangle the different distinguishable concepts, classifies them and shows how they relate to one another in order to allow for a more structured and clearer debate. It concludes in identifying the individual underpinnings and the social conditions of choice and decision-making as particularly salient dimensions of freedom in the ethical debate about human enhancement.