Marcel Sarot

This article situates Auden’s poem Musée des Beaux Arts in the process of his conversion to Christianity. The author argues for the layered intertextuality of the poem, in which allusions to Bruegel’s Landscape with the Fall of Icarus, The Census at Jerusalem, and The Massacre of the Innocents can be recognised. Moreover, Philippe de Champaigne’s Presentation in the Temple and Peter Paul Rubens’s The Martyrdom of St Livinus seem also to have influenced the poem. Finally, there is reason to suppose that John Singer Sargent’s Crashed Aeroplane influenced Auden. In an analysis of the structure of the poem, the author argues that there is a clear structure hidden under the surface of day-to-day language. He connects this hidden structure with Auden’s poem The Hidden Law, and suggests that Auden wished to claim that even though we cannot understand suffering, it has a hidden meaning known only to God. This hidden meaning connects our suffering with the self-emptying of Christ, a connection which the author demonstrates is in fact also made in Musée des Beaux Arts.

In this article, I analyse C.S. Lewis’s attitude towards the theology and the theologians of his time. Lewis often emphasised that he was not a theologian. Sometimes he does so out of modesty, to excuse minor errors that a specialist in the field would not have made. More often than not, however, something else plays a role: Lewis’s dislike of the theology and the theologians of his time. Although he intended not to become a party in theological controversies, Lewis occasionally took sides. He expressed himself in extremely negative terms about the liberal... movement, which in his experience... dominated the theology of his time. By assuming them to be in error, and showing how they had arrived there, he participates in the practice he elsewhere rejected as ‘Bulverism’. Moreover, he employed pejorative, sexually tinged metaphors. Only on one occasion did Lewis provide arguments for his rejection of liberal theology, and on that occasion he limited himself to New Testament exegesis. On another occasion, Lewis states that he allows only marginal, religiously irrelevant revisions of Christian doctrine. Ironically, his own revisions sometimes went beyond this – for example, in the case of the traditional doctrine of hell. In this article I suggested that for Lewis, the practice of faith implicitly is the ultimate criterion.

In Bijdragen 59 Rudi te Velde argued that our appeal to St. Anselm in elucidating the tenets of the ‘Utrecht school’ in philosophical theology is unjustified, because of a presumed anti-realist tendency in our thinking. In our reply we point out that this accusation is the result of a confusion between the disciplines of philosophical theology and religious epistemology. Philosophical theology accepts from an insiders-perspective belief claims which are not directly accessible to reason or observation – such as the claim that God exists. From the fact that the Utrecht philosophical theologians do not attempt to prove these claims, but interpret them as the constitutive presuppositions of the Christian form of life, it does not follow that they doubt their truth. On the contrary, in quite a number of writings representatives of the Utrecht school have insisted on a realist reading of the belief claims of the Christian faith. Our realism goes even further than Te Velde’s. According to Te Velde our religious language is inadequate to such an extent, that it doesn’t enable us to give correct descriptions of reality. We show that this view necessarily leads to agnosticism. Next, as to religious epistemology we point out that since the collapse of foundationalism realists as well as others have reasons to be suspicious of attempts to prove the existence of God. In any case, we don’t needto prove such belief claims in order to be intellectually entitled to accept them – which is not to say that arguments for the existence of God have no value at all. Finally, it is precisely this complementarity of philosophical theology and religious epistemology which we find supremely exemplified in Anselm’s Proslogion. Whether one interprets the ontological argument as functioning sola ratione, i.e. independently of faith in God, or rather as functioning within the framework of the faith seeking understanding programe, the main part of the Proslogion’s ‘single argument’ is devoted to philosophical theology in the sense advocated and illustrated by the Utrecht School, i.e. to the search for insight into the reality and the attributes of God rather than for proof.

Bij alle aandacht die er op dit moment is voor de aard van zingevingsvragen is de analogie tussen de betekenis van taal enerzijds en leven en werkelijkheid anderzijds wel opgemerkt, maar nog nergens uitvoerig doorgelicht. Marcel Sarot voorziet in dit gemis door een zorgvuldige analyse van de structurele overeenkomsten tussen verschillende theorieën over beide vormen van betekenis. Vervolgens past hij de gemaakte onderscheidingen toe in een weerlegging van de argumenten tegen de theïstische vorm van zingeving van Elmar D. Klemke en Jaap van Heerden.

In this chapter I discuss a project on the enduring significance of liberal Protestantism that was initiated and completed by Wim Drees. In this project, Dr3ees rejected the all-or-nothing approaches to Christian theology that are often endorsed by ‘orthodox’ Christians and atheists alike, and argues in favor of a liberal approach that is open to scientific developments and changing moral intuitions. Drees also argues against the prejudice that liberal Christians believe less, and argues that they rather have a different style of believing. Drees himself, however, squarely rejects belief in the Ascension of Christ. In my response, I use speech act theory as a method to analyze doctrine, and argue that the fundamental nature of the act one performs when one confesses a creed is commissive and could best be compared to taking a marriage vow. Speech act theory can not only be used to clarify the general nature of what it is to confess a creed, but also to analyze the complex illocutionary load of individual doctrines. I illustrate this by a brief analysis of the Ascension of Christ and argue that by a speech-act-analysis one can also, in the case of individual doctrines, avoid all-or-nothing approaches and yes-or-no discussions.

In this article, I apply the theory of tradition Karl Popper developed in an article on the rationalist tradition to Christianity. Popper helps us to distinguish between four functions of the Christian tradition. The Christian tradition helps people to order their perceptions by suggesting distinctions between what is important and what is less important. The Christian tradition provides people with guidelines for their behaviour. The Christian tradition provides a framework that helps us to understand the past of our own culture, and can also function as a background against which we may form our own authentic views of life. The Christian tradition is closely connected to the Christian community, which functions as a social group to which people may belong and by reference to which they can define their identity. These four functions shed light on the question why people attach value to participating in the Christian tradition, and why they deplore the decline of the Christian tradition