•  266
    Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4): 329-336. 2010.
    Although delusions are typically regarded as beliefs of a certain kind, there have been worries about the doxastic conception of delusions since at least Bleuler’s time. ‘Anti-doxasticists,’ as we might call them, do not merely worry about the claim that delusions are beliefs, they reject it. Reimer’s paper weighs into the debate between ‘doxasticists’ and ‘anti-doxasticists’ by suggesting that one of the main arguments given against the doxastic conception of delusions—what we might call the fu…Read more
  •  89
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print
  •  260
    One of the central problems in the study of consciousness concerns the ascription of consciousness. We want to know whether certain kinds of creatures—such as non-human animals, artificially created organisms, and even members of our own species who have suffered severe brain-damage—are conscious, and we want to know what kinds of conscious states these creatures might be in if indeed they are conscious. The identification of accurate markers of consciousness is essential if the science of consc…Read more
  •  251
    The grounds of worship
    Religious Studies 42 (3): 299-313. 2006.
    Although worship has a pivotal place in religious thought and practice, philosophers of religion have had remarkably little to say about it. In this paper we examine some of the many questions surrounding the notion of worship, focusing on the claim that human beings have obligations to worship God. We explore a number of attempts to ground our supposed duty to worship God, and argue that each is problematic. We conclude by examining the implications of this result, and suggest that it might be …Read more
  •  31
    Response to Commentators (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1): 223-229. 2013.
  •  1
    Monothematic delusions, empiricism, and framework beliefs
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1): 1. 2004.
  •  211
    Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1): 81-86. 2004.
    Elisabeth Pacherie is a research fellow in philosophy at Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. Her main research and publications are in the areas of philosophy of mind, psychopathology and action theory. Her publications include a book on intentionality (_Naturaliser_ _l'intentionnalité_, Paris, PUF, 1993) and she is currently preparing a book on action and agency
  •  317
    The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3): 459. 2010.
    Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call this the standard approach. To date, the results of t…Read more
  •  203
    Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2): 407-419. 2001.
    We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal…Read more
  •  1290
    The unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome
    Journal of Philosophy 105 (6): 277-300. 2008.
    According to conventional wisdom, the split-brain syndrome puts paid to the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. The aim of this paper is to challenge that view. I argue both that disunity models of the split-brain are highly problematic, and that there is much to recommend a model of the split-brain—the switch model—according to which split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all times. Although the task of examining the unity of consciousness through the lens of…Read more
  •  55
    Summary
    Analysis 74 (3): 488-490. 2014.
  •  69
    Précis of The Unity of Consciousness (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1): 200-208. 2013.
  •  130
    In defence of genethical parity
    In David Archard & David Benatar (eds.), Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Can a person be harmed or wronged by being brought into existence? Can a person be benefited by being brought into existence? Following David Heyd, I refer to these questions as “genethical questions”. This chapter examines three broad approaches to genethics: the no-faults model, the dual-benchmark model, and the parity model. The no-faults model holds that coming into existence is not properly subject to moral evaluation, at least so far as the interests of the person that is to be brought int…Read more