•  1404
    Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4): 329-336. 2010.
    Although delusions are typically regarded as beliefs of a certain kind, there have been worries about the doxastic conception of delusions since at least Bleuler’s time. ‘Anti-doxasticists,’ as we might call them, do not merely worry about the claim that delusions are beliefs, they reject it. Reimer’s paper weighs into the debate between ‘doxasticists’ and ‘anti-doxasticists’ by suggesting that one of the main arguments given against the doxastic conception of delusions—what we might call the fu…Read more
  •  1682
    Representationalism and the problem of vagueness
    Philosophical Studies 162 (1): 71-86. 2013.
    This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism
  •  567
    The Presence of Consciousness in Absence Seizures
    Behavioural Neurology 24 (1): 47-53. 2011.
    Although the study of epileptic absence seizures has the potential to contribute a great deal to the scientific understanding of consciousness, this potential has yet to be fully exploited. There have been a number of insightful discussions of consciousness in the context of epileptic seizures, but the basic conceptual issues are still poorly understood and many empirical questions remain unexplored. In this paper I review a number of questions that are of interest to consciousness scientists an…Read more
  •  147
    Replies to Commentators
    Analysis 74 (3): 520-529. 2014.
    This article is a response to commentaries by Chris Hill, Farid Masrour and Robert van Gulick on "The Unity of Consciousness". Topics covered in the discussion include the phenomenal unity relation, the respect in which the unity of consciousness is a necessary feature of consciousness, and challenges to the idea that the self might be a merely virtual entity.
  •  483
    This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent's narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.
  •  401
    Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1): 81-86. 2004.
    Elisabeth Pacherie is a research fellow in philosophy at Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. Her main research and publications are in the areas of philosophy of mind, psychopathology and action theory. Her publications include a book on intentionality (_Naturaliser_ _l'intentionnalité_, Paris, PUF, 1993) and she is currently preparing a book on action and agency.
  •  388
    Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2): 407-420. 2001.
    We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind (TCM). David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PIs are justified. because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phen…Read more
  •  577
    Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence
    with Barry Dainton
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4): 549-571. 2005.
    Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. We begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the …Read more
  •  108
    Thought: A Very Short Introduction
    Oxford University Press. 2013.
    In this lively Very Short Introduction, Tim Bayne looks at the nature of thought. Exploring questions such as 'What are thoughts?' and 'How is thought realized in the brain?', he draws on research in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology to look at what we know - and don't know - about the capacity for thought.
  •  13
    Potential Persons
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.
  •  590
    Libet and the case for free will scepticism
    In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science, Oup/british Academy. 2011.
    Free will sceptics claim that we do not possess free will—or at least, that we do not possess nearly as much free will as we think we do. Some free will sceptics hold that the very notion of free will is incoherent, and that no being could possibly possess free will (Strawson this volume). Others allow that the notion of free will is coherent, but hold that features of our cognitive architecture prevent us from possessing free will. My concern in this chapter is with views of the second kind. Ac…Read more
  •  305
    The papers in this volume are drawn from a workshop on delusion and self-deception, held at Macquarie University in November of 2004. Our aim was to bring together theorists working on delusions and self-deception with an eye towards identifying and fostering connections—at both empirical and conceptual levels—between these domains. As the contributions to this volume testify, there are multiple points of contact between delusion and self-deception. This introduction charts the conceptual space …Read more
  •  1354
    The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3): 459-484. 2010.
    Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call this the standard approach. To date, the results of t…Read more
  •  247
    The sense of agency
    In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press Usa. 2011.
    Where in cognitive architecture do experiences of agency lie? This chapter defends the claim that such states qualify as a species of perception. Reference to ‘the sense of agency’ should not be taken as a mere façon de parler but picks out a genuinely perceptual system. The chapter begins by outlining the perceptual model of agentive experience before turning to its two main rivals: the doxastic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of belief, and the telic model, ac…Read more