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Savas L. Tsohatzidis

Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    38
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  • Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
    Professor
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
  • All publications (38)
  •  241
    John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2007.
    This is a volume of original essays on key aspects of John Searle's philosophy of language. It examines Searle's work in relation to current issues of central significance, including internalism versus externalism about mental and linguistic content, truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional conceptions of content, the relative priorities of thought and language in the explanation of intentionality, the status of the distinction between force and sense in the theory of meaning, the issue of…Read more
    This is a volume of original essays on key aspects of John Searle's philosophy of language. It examines Searle's work in relation to current issues of central significance, including internalism versus externalism about mental and linguistic content, truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional conceptions of content, the relative priorities of thought and language in the explanation of intentionality, the status of the distinction between force and sense in the theory of meaning, the issue of meaning scepticism in relation to rule-following, and the proper characterization of ‘what is said’ in relation to the semantics/pragmatics distinction. Written by a distinguished team of contemporary philosophers, and prefaced by an illuminating essay by Searle, the volume aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of Searle's work in philosophy of language, and to suggest innovative approaches to fundamental questions in that area.
    Philosophy of Language, General WorksContent Internalism and Externalism, Misc20th Century Analytic …Read more
    Philosophy of Language, General WorksContent Internalism and Externalism, Misc20th Century Analytic Philosophy, Misc
  •  41
    Existence Assumptions and the Distinction Between Implications and Implicatures
    Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie: International Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 2 (1): 113. 2000.
  •  60
    Ways of doing things with words: an introduction
    In Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, Routledge. 1994.
    SemanticsSpeech ActsPragmatics, Misc
  •  1278
    Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth
    Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (4): 445-452. 2013.
    This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence's meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.
    CompositionalityTruth-Conditional TheoriesPhilosophy of Language, MiscSemantic Theories, MiscLogic a…Read more
    CompositionalityTruth-Conditional TheoriesPhilosophy of Language, MiscSemantic Theories, MiscLogic and Philosophy of Logic
  •  227
    The hybrid theory of mixed quotation
    Mind 107 (427): 661-664. 1998.
    Quotation
  •  327
    How to Forget that 'Know' is Factive
    Acta Analytica 27 (4): 449-459. 2012.
    This paper examines, and rejects, a recent argument to the effect that knowledge is not truth-entailing, i.e. that “know” is not factive.
    Philosophy of Language, MiscDefining Knowledge, MiscImplicature, Misc
  •  182
    A Purported Refutation of Some Theories of Assertion
    Philosophical Forum 45 (2): 169-177. 2014.
    Several influential philosophical accounts of assertion have recently been claimed by Peter Pagin to commit a fundamental mistake. The present paper argues that Pagin's defence of that claim is flawed: The criterion he proposes for evaluating theories of assertion is unreliable; and even if it were supposed to be in itself reliable, it could not be used, in the way he proposes, either against the kinds of theories he intends to undermine or in favour of the kind of theory he intends to support.
    Speech ActsPerformativesAssertion, Misc
  •  1523
    The Distance Between “Here” and “Where I Am”
    Journal of Philosophical Research 40 13-21. 2015.
    This paper argues that Michael Dummett's proposed distinction between a declarative sentence's "assertoric content" and "ingredient sense" is not in fact supported by what Dummett presents as paradigmatic evidence in its support.
    Rigid DesignationIndexicals and DemonstrativesSemantic Theories
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