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183Causation and preemptionIn Peter Clark & Katherine Hawley (eds.), Philosophy of science today, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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52Review of Wesley C. salmon, Phil Dowe (ed.), Merrilee H. salmon (ed.), Reality and Rationality (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (1). 2007.
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203How to set a surprise examMind 108 (432): 647-703. 1999.The professor announces a surprise exam for the upcoming week; her clever student purports to demonstrate by reductio that she cannot possibly give such an exam. Diagnosing his puzzling argument reveals a deeper puzzle: Is the student justified in believing the announcement? It would seem so, particularly if the upcoming 'week' is long enough. On the other hand, a plausible principle states that if, at the outset, the student is justified in believing some proposition, then he is also justified …Read more
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237Philosophy of causation: Blind alleys exposed; promising directions highlightedPhilosophy Compass 1 (1). 2006.Contemporary philosophical work on causation is a tangled mess of disparate aims, approaches, and accounts. Best to cut through it by means of ruthless but, hopefully, sensible judgments. The ones that follow are designed to sketch the most fruitful avenues for future work.
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2CausationIn Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press Uk. 2005.
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158Review. The quantum challenge. G Greenstein, AG ZajoncBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (2): 313-315. 1999.
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158Induction and ProbabilityIn Peter K. Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of science, Blackwell. pp. 149-172. 2002.Arguably, Hume's greatest single contribution to contemporary philosophy of science has been the problem of induction (1739). Before attempting its statement, we need to spend a few words identifying the subject matter of this corner of epistemology. At a first pass, induction concerns ampliative inferences drawn on the basis of evidence (presumably, evidence acquired more or less directly from experience)—that is, inferences whose conclusions are not (validly) entailed by the premises. Philosop…Read more
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136Comments on Michael Strevens’s Depth (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2): 474-482. 2012.
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140The hypothesis of the conditional construal of conditional probabilityIn Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms (eds.), Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision, Cambridge University Press. pp. 75. 1994.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Physical Science |
Philosophy of Probability |
General Philosophy of Science |