•  1390
    Insufficient Effort Responding in Experimental Philosophy
    In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 4, Oxford University Press. 2022.
    Providing valid responses to a self-report survey requires cognitive effort. Subjects engaging in insufficient effort responding (IER) are unwilling to take this effort. Compared to psychologists, experimental philosophers so far seem to have paid less attention to IER. This paper is an attempt to begin to alleviate this shortcoming. First, I explain IER’s nature, prevalence and negative effects in self-report surveys in general. Second, I argue that IER might also affect experimental philosophy…Read more
  •  220
    Anti-Realist Pluralism: a New Approach to Folk Metaethics
    with Jennifer Cole Wright
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1): 53-82. 2020.
    Many metaethicists agree that as ordinary people experience morality as a realm of objective truths, we have a prima facie reason to believe that it actually is such a realm. Recently, worries have been raised about the validity of the extant psychological research on this argument’s empirical hypothesis. Our aim is to advance this research, taking these worries into account. First, we propose a new experimental design for measuring folk intuitions about moral objectivity that may serve as an in…Read more
  •  203
    Do liberal states have a moral duty to admit immigrants? According to what has been called the “conventional view”, this question is to be answered in the negative. One of the most prominent critics of the conventional view is Joseph Carens. In the past 30 years Carens’ contributions to the open borders debate have gradually taken on a different complexion. This is explained by the varying “ideality” of his approaches. Sometimes Carens attempts to figure out what states would be obliged to do un…Read more
  •  1565
    Empirical research on folk moral objectivism
    with Jennifer Cole Wright
    Philosophy Compass 14 (5). 2019.
    Lay persons may have intuitions about morality's objectivity. What do these intuitions look like? And what are their causes and consequences? In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have begun to investigate these questions empirically. This article presents and assesses the resulting area of research as well as its potential philosophical implications. First, we introduce the methods of empirical research on folk moral objectivism. Second, we provide an overview of the findings that h…Read more
  •  157
    Camus on the Value of Art
    Philosophia 48 (1): 365-376. 2020.
    Many instances of art are valuable. Where is this value located? And how is it to be justified? In this paper I reconstruct and critically assess Albert Camus’ answers to these questions. Camus’ theory of the value of art is based on his “logic of the absurd”, i.e., the idea that the human condition is absurd and that we therefore ought to adopt an attitude of revolt. This idea entails that art lacks any intrinsic value. Rather, Camus argues, art is valuable only insofar as it promotes creators’…Read more
  •  74
    Finding Meaning in an Imperfect World
    Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275): 435-438. 2019.
    Finding Meaning in an Imperfect World. By Landau Iddo. ).
  •  21
    Compensation for Historical Injustices: The Continuing Injustice Argument
    Archiv Fuer Rechts Und Sozialphilosphie 104 (3): 380-396. 2018.
  •  99
    How to Determine whether Evolution Debunks Moral Realism
    Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft Und Ethik 23 (1): 35-60. 2018.
    Anti-realist evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that if there were objective moral truths, then evolutionary evidence would suggest that our moral judgements are unjustified (which excludes or makes it unlikely that these truths exist). Recent controversies about these arguments can often be traced back to confusion about how its premises are to be supported or undermined. My aim in this paper is accordingly a clarificatory one. I will attempt to identify which kinds of philosophic…Read more
  •  1320
    How to Measure Moral Realism
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3): 647-670. 2018.
    In recent years an increasing number of psychologists have begun to explore the prevalence, causes and effects of ordinary people’s intuitions about moral realism. Many of these studies have lacked in construct validity, i.e., they have failed to measure moral realism. My aim in this paper accordingly is to motivate and guide methodological improvements. In analysis of prominent existing measures, I develop general recommendations for overcoming ten prima facie serious worries about research on …Read more
  •  1641
    Revisiting Folk Moral Realism
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2): 455-476. 2017.
    Moral realists believe that there are objective moral truths. According to one of the most prominent arguments in favour of this view, ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming, and we have therefore prima facie reason to believe that realism is true. Some proponents of this argument have claimed that the hypothesis that ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming is supported by psychological research on folk metaethics. While most recent research has been thought to con…Read more
  •  3115
    Camus’ Feeling of the Absurd
    Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (4): 477-490. 2018.
    Albert Camus is most famous for his engagement with the absurd. Both in his philosophical and literary works his main focus was on the nature and normative consequences of this idea. However, Camus was also concerned with what he referred to as the “feeling of the absurd”. Philosophers have so far paid little attention to Camus’ thoughts about the feeling of the absurd. In this paper I provide a detailed analysis of this feeling. It turns out that the feeling of the absurd is not, strictly speak…Read more
  •  24
    Suppose you are a moral error theorist, i.e., you believe that no moral judgment is true. What, then, ought you to do with regard to our common practice of making such judgments? Determining the usefulness of our ordinary moral practice is exacerbated by the great number and variety of moral judgments. In-depth case studies may thus be more helpful in clarifying error theory’s practical implications than reflections about morality in general. In this chapter I pursue this strategy with regard to…Read more
  •  92
    Introduction to the Special Issue on Legitimate Expectations
    Moral Philosophy and Politics 4 (2): 173-175. 2017.
    In this short introduction, we will briefly sketch some central features of the problem of legitimate expectations and then lead over to the papers of our special issue.
  •  1281
    Ethical but Upsetting Geoscience Research: A Case Study
    with Florian Ortner
    Annals of Geophysics 60 (7): 1-6. 2017.
    Geoscience research may upset people even though it is ethically acceptable. In this paper we attempt to explore three questions about such research. It will turn out that (1) under most circumstances ethical but upsetting geoscience research is morally permissible, (2) revising this research in response to upset-induced external interference is morally impermissible in the absence of strong countervailing pragmatic reasons and attempts to reduce upset, and (3) potentially upsetting geoscience r…Read more
  •  559
    Natural Hazards and the Normative Significance of Expectations in Protecting Alpine Communities
    with Florian Ortner, Oliver Sass, and Lukas Meyer
    Geophysical Research Abstracts: Abstracts of the European Geosciences Union General Assembly. 2017.
  •  46
    Entschädigung für historisches Unrecht: Das Argument des anhaltenden Unrechts
    Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 104 (3): 380-396. 2018.
    Intergenerationelle Gerechtigkeit;Historisches Unrecht;Nicht-Identitäts-Problem;Entschädigung;Argument des anhaltenden Unrechts;intergenerational justice;historical injustice;non-identity problem;compensation;continuing injustice argument.
  •  1211
    An increasing number of moral realists and anti-realists have recently attempted to support their views by appeal to science. Arguments of this kind are typically criticized on the object-level. In addition, however, one occasionally also comes across a more sweeping metatheoretical skepticism. Scientific contributions to the question of the existence of objective moral truths, it is claimed, are impossible in principle; most prominently, because such arguments impermissibly derive normative fro…Read more
  •  1825
    Moral judgments and emotions: A less intimate relationship than recently claimed
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 35 (3): 177-195. 2015.
    It has long been claimed that moral judgements are dominated by reason. In recent years, however, the tide has turned. Many psychologists and philosophers now hold the view that there is a close empirical association between moral judgements and emotions. In particular, they claim that emotions (1) co-occur with moral judgements, (2) causally influence moral judgements, (3) are causally sufficient for moral judgements, and (4) are causally necessary for moral judgements. At first sight these hyp…Read more
  •  1
    Art in the Face of the Absurd
    In Stefan Majetschak & Anja Weiberg (eds.), Contributions of the 39th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 196-198. 2016.
  •  1971
    Climate Change Inaction and Moral Nihilism
    Ethics, Policy and Environment 18 (2): 202-214. 2015.
    The effects of anthropogenic climate change may be devastating. Nevertheless, most people do not seem to be seriously concerned. We consume as much as we always did, drive as much as we always did, eat as much meat as we always did. What can we do to overcome this collective apathy? In order to be able to develop effective measures, we must first get clear about the causes of climate change inaction. In this paper I ask whether moral nihilism is a significant cause of climate change inaction. Th…Read more
  •  1198
    Further problems with projectivism
    South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1): 92-102. 2016.
    From David Hume onwards, many philosophers have argued that moral thinking is characterized by a tendency to “project” our own mental states onto the world. This metaphor of projection may be understood as involving two empirical claims: the claim that humans experience morality as a realm of objective facts (the experiential hypothesis), and the claim that this moral experience is immediately caused by affective attitudes (the causal hypothesis). Elsewhere I argued in detail against one form of…Read more
  •  1
    Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences
    Dissertation, University of Graz. 2015.
    Are there things that are objectively right, wrong, good, bad, etc.: moral properties that are had independently of what we ourselves, our culture, God or any other subjects think about them? Philosophers have traditionally addressed this question from the “armchair.” In recent years, however, more and more participants of the debate have begun to appeal to evidence from science as well. This thesis examines such novel approaches. In particular, it asks what the empirical sciences can contribute…Read more
  •  1200
    Are Moral Judgements Adaptations? Three Reasons Why It Is so Difficult to Tell
    South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (3): 425-439. 2017.
    An increasing number of scholars argue that moral judgements are adaptations, i.e., that they have been shaped by natural selection. Is this hypothesis true? In this paper I shall not attempt to answer this important question. Rather, I pursue the more modest aim of pointing out three difficulties that anybody who sets out to determine the adaptedness of moral judgments should be aware of (though some so far have not been aware of). First, the hypothesis that moral judgements are adaptations has…Read more
  •  1082
    How Does Moral Nihilism Affect our Taking Action against Climate Change?
    Proceedings of the 13. International Conference of ISSEI. 2013.
    The effects of anthropogenic climate change will be devastating. Nevertheless, most people do not seem to be seriously concerned. We consume as much as we always did, drive as much as we always did, eat as much meat as we always did. What can we do to overcome this collective apathy? In order to be able to develop effective measures, we must first get clear about the causes of climate change inaction. In this paper I ask whether moral nihilism (the denial of moral truths) is a significant cause …Read more
  •  873
    Erik Wielenberg’s new book Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism aims at defending a non-theistic of ‘robust normative realism’: the metaethical view that normative properties exist, and have four features: (1) objectivity, (2) non-naturalness, (3) irreducibility, and (4) causal inertness. In my review I criticize that Wielenberg does not address semantic issues which are crucial both to defending robust normative realism, and to assessing the empirical cla…Read more
  •  21
    Camus' Early Logic of the Absurd
    Journal of Camus Studies 2011 98-117. 2011.
    Camus’ early “logic of the absurd” has been interpreted and assessed differently. In this article I do two things: First, I outline what I take to be the most adequate interpretation. Second, I discuss three challenges defenders of the “logic of the absurd” may be said to face (given that my interpretation in the first part is correct). My approach is rather unorthodox. Although Camus explicitly refused to be seen as a philosopher, and although if one sees him as a philosopher, he certainly has …Read more
  •  3
    Moral Disagreement, Anti-Realism, and the Worry about Overgeneralization
    In Christian Kanzian, Josef Mitterer & Katharina Neges (eds.), Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium, . pp. 245-247. 2015.
    According to the classical argument from moral disagreement, the existence of widespread or persistent moral disagreement is best explained by, and thus inductively supports the view that there are no objective moral facts. One of the most common charges against this argument is that it “overgeneralizes”: it implausibly forces its proponents to deny the existence of objective facts about certain matters of physics, history, philosophy, etc. as well (companions in guilt), or even about its own co…Read more