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183Why it Matters that I’m Not Insane: The Role of the Madness Argument in Descartes’s First MeditationInternational Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1): 79-89. 2007.Descartes’s First Meditation employs a series of arguments designed to generate the worry that the senses might not provide sufficient evidence to justify one’staking as certain one’s beliefs about the way the world is. As the meditator considers what principle describes the conditions under which it is possible to attain certain knowledge, one after another doubt-generating device is ushered in, until at last he finds himself like someone caught in a whirlpool, able neither to stand firm nor to…Read more
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33Malebranche and Knowledge of the SoulAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4): 571-581. 1999.
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15Heretics EverywherePhilosophy and Theology 22 (1-2): 49-76. 2010.By carefully considering Galileo’s letters to Castelli and Christina, we argue that his position regarding the relationship between Scripture and science is not only of historical importance, but continues to stand as a perspective worth taking seriously in the context of contemporary philosophical debates. In particular, we contend that there are at least five areas of contemporary concern where Galileo’s arguments are especially relevant: (1) the supposed conflict between science and religion,…Read more
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37James Beattie, Practical Ethics, and the Human Nature QuestionJournal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (1): 1-12. 2012.This article begins by examining James Beattie's conception of speculative ethics, which he regards as the study of the foundation and nature of virtue. This leads to a discussion of the moral sense, or conscience, which Beattie claims is part of the nature of every rational being and which is designed to lead us to a virtuous life. Given this, I ask why Beattie thought himself warranted, or even needed, to dispense practical ethical advice. Answering this involves looking at Beattie's views on …Read more
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187François lamy, occasionalism, and the mind-body problemJournal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4). 2008.There is a long-standing view that Malebranche and his fellow occasionalists accepted occasionalism to solve the problem of interaction between immaterial souls and extended bodies. Recently, however, scholars have shown this story to be a myth. Malebranche, Geulincx, La Forge, and Cordemoy adopted occasionalism for a variety of reasons, but none did so because of a need to provide a solution to a perceived mind-body problem. Yet there is one Cartesian for whom the “traditional” reading is large…Read more
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20Absolute beginners: learning philosophy by learning Descartes and Berkeley: C. G. Prado: Starting with Descartes. London & New York: Continuum, 2009. vi +170 pp, US$ 19.95 PB Nick Jones: Starting with Berkeley. London & New York: Continuum, 2009. viii +191 pp, US$ 19.95 PB (review)Metascience 19 (3): 385-389. 2010.
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43Yolton, John W. Perception and Reality: A History from Descartes to Kant (review)Review of Metaphysics 50 (4): 928-929. 1997.
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41Hutcheson, Perception, and the Sceptic's ChallengeBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2): 269-281. 2012.Francis Hutcheson's theory of perception, as put forth in his Synopsis of Metaphysics, bears a striking similarity to that of John Locke. In particular, Hutcheson and Locke both have at the centre of their theories the notion of ideas as representational entities acting as the direct objects of all of our perceptions. On first consideration, one might find this similarity wholly unremarkable, given the popularity of Locke's Essay. But the Essay was published in 1689 and the Synopsis in 1742, and…Read more