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481Internalism defendedIn Hilary Kornblith (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly, Blackwell. 2001.
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41Stich and Nisbett on justifying inference rulesPhilosophy of Science 50 (2): 326-331. 1983.Stich and Nisbett offer an analysis of the concept of a justified inference rule, building upon the efforts of Goodman. They fault Goodman's view on the grounds that it is incompatible with some recent psychological research on reasoning. We criticize their proposal by arguing that it is subject to much the same objections as those they raise against other accounts
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6Rational Disagreement DefendedIn Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, Oxford University Press. 2010.This chapter formulates a rational uniqueness principle holding that those who are epistemic peers on a proposition, in that they know that they share all rational considerations concerning the truth of the proposition, cannot be justified in having different attitudes toward it. It then argues against the principle, primarily on the grounds that such peers may rationally regard themselves as differing in their basis for rational belief, or their evidence, on the topic. The rationality of their …Read more
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108Some Virtues of EvidentialismVeritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4): 95-108. 2005.O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemo…Read more
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Contextualism contested some moreIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 62-66. 2013.
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