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195PeerageEpisteme 6 (3): 313-323. 2009.Experts take sides in standing scholarly disagreements. They rely on the epistemic reasons favorable to their side to justify their position. It is argued here that no position actually has an overall balance of undefeated reasons in its favor. Candidates for such reasons include the objective strength of the rational support for one side, the special force of details in the case for one side, and a summary impression of truth. All such factors fail to justify any position.
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212The specificity of the generality problemPhilosophical Studies 163 (3): 751-762. 2013.In “Why the generality problem is everybody’s problem,” Michael Bishop argues that every theory of justification needs a solution to the generality problem. He contends that a solution is needed in order for any theory to be used in giving an acceptable account of the justificatory status of beliefs in certain examples. In response, first I will describe the generality problem that is specific to process reliabilism and two other sorts of problems that are essentially the same. Then I will argue…Read more
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88The moral value in promisesPhilosophical Review 109 (3): 411-422. 2000.Holly Smith poses a challenging moral problem. She offers examples that appear to show that the moral significance of promising can be nefariously exploited. Her leading example is this
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129Friendship and consequentialismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2). 2001.This Article does not have an abstract
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75Critical Notices: Epistemology and the psychology of human judgmentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 837-840. 2008.No Abstract
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50Review of Jonathan Sutton, Without Justification (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (12). 2007.
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995Phenomenal knowledgeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2): 136-150. 1994.This Article does not have an abstract
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